2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*5 Respondent's determination sustained.
P agreed to sell a portion of its business (clinical
business) to N, a third party, pursuant to a prearranged sale
that was structured as a spinoff. P's basis in the clinical
business's assets was $ 105,015. On Oct. 29, 1993, P transferred
the clinical business to a newly incorporated entity, S, in
exchange for all of S's stock, pursuant to
I.R.C., and, on Oct. 30, 1993, P distributed the stock to P's
shareholders in a transaction it claimed satisfied the
requirements of
distribution of S's stock to P's shareholders, S's shareholders
sold all of S's stock to N for $ 5,530,000. P had accumulated E &
P as of the beginning of its taxable year and failed to prove
that P and S did not have current E & P as of Oct. 30, 1993.
Although P conceded that the spinoff followed immediately by the
prearranged stock sale constituted evidence that the transaction
was a device to distribute E & P within the meaning of sec.
claimed it had valid corporate business purposes for structuring
the transaction as it did which overcame the evidence of device.
Alternatively, P argued that, even if the spinoff did not meet
the requirements of
stock for purposes of calculating the gain P must recognize
under
value of the assets transferred to S and not on the price paid
for S's stock by N.
1. Held: There is substantial evidence that the
spinoff was a device to distribute E&P, which is not overcome by
substantial evidence of nondevice or by evidence that P and S
lacked current and accumulated E&P. Consequently, the spinoff
does not qualify for tax deferral under
I.R.C., and P's gain must be determined in accordance with sec.
2. Held, further,
2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*7 requires P to recognize gain on the distribution of S's stock as
though the stock were sold to P's shareholders at its fair
market value. In this case, the best evidence of the fair market
value of S's stock on the distribution date is the price paid
for the stock by N on that same date.
118 T.C. 84">*85 MARVEL, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax of $ 1,926,232 for taxable year ended June 30, 1994.
The issues for decision are: (1) Whether, pursuant to a plan of reorganization under
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. We incorporate the stipulation of facts herein by this reference.
South Tulsa Pathology Laboratory, Inc. (petitioner), is, and was for all relevant periods, an Oklahoma professional corporation, which had its principal place of business in Tulsa, Oklahoma, when it filed its petition in this case. Petitioner was incorporated as an Oklahoma professional corporation in July 1968. Petitioner was owned by seven physicians (shareholders). For all relevant periods, petitioner was classified as a "C" corporation for Federal corporate income tax purposes and had a fiscal year ended June 30 for tax and financial reporting2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*9 purposes.
Since its incorporation, petitioner has provided pathology-related medical services to hospitals and medical professionals in northeastern Oklahoma. Until 1993, petitioner offered both anatomic pathology and clinical pathology medical services to its customers (anatomic business and clinical business, respectively). Petitioner's anatomic business included examination and diagnosis of pathology of human tissue and provision of consulting diagnostic assistance to physicians in northeastern Oklahoma. Petitioner's anatomic business services were performed by its physician shareholders and/ or other licensed physicians. Petitioner's clinical business included performance of laboratory tests on body fluids and tissue samples obtained from hospitals and medical professionals throughout northeastern Oklahoma. Petitioner's clinical business services were performed by nonphysician employees of petitioner at a laboratory and three "draw" facilities in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Beginning in 1970, and continuing through 1992, petitioner received several offers from competing clinical pathology laboratories to purchase its clinical business. 2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*10 These offers were always rejected by petitioner's shareholders and management. In 1993, however, petitioner's shareholders decided to sell the clinical business to a large national clinical laboratory because they believed the growth of large national clinical laboratories and the implementation of managed health care during the early 1990s would force petitioner out of the clinical business over the next few years. Petitioner's shareholders, however, decided they wanted to 118 T.C. 84">*87 continue to own and operate the anatomic business using the corporate name, "South Tulsa Pathology Laboratory, Inc.", under which they had practiced for 25 years.
In August 1993, petitioner was approached by representatives of two national laboratory chains, Smith Kline Laboratories (Smith Kline) and National Health Laboratories, Inc. (NHL), each of which expressed an interest in purchasing petitioner's clinical business. Both Smith Kline and NHL were large, publicly traded corporations that provided clinical laboratory services to hospitals, physicians, and clinics throughout the United States.
Sometime in the fall of 1993, petitioner decided to pursue a sale of its clinical2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*11 business to NHL. On September 20, 1993, petitioner and NHL entered into a confidentiality agreement to provide for the disclosure by petitioner to NHL of certain confidential information. Under the confidentiality agreement, petitioner agreed to disclose certain financial and business information necessary and appropriate in any negotiations conducted by the parties.
After petitioner made the disclosures pursuant to the confidentiality agreement, petitioner agreed to sell its clinical business to NHL. Before October 5, 1993, petitioner and NHL negotiated the sale of the clinical business and agreed to structure it as a sale of the stock of a yet-to-be-incorporated clinical laboratory company that would be capitalized with the clinical business and spun off 2 from petitioner. Thereafter, NHL delivered to petitioner a letter of intent, dated September 30, 1993, concerning the purchase by NHL of all outstanding stock of that newly incorporated clinical laboratory company. After both parties signed the letter of intent, petitioner's shareholders believed there was a commitment by NHL to buy and a commitment by petitioner to sell petitioner's clinical business. 3 As of October 5, 1993, petitioner2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*12 118 T.C. 84">*88 and NHL had negotiated and agreed to the essential terms of the sale. 4
On October 5, 1993, petitioner formed Clinpath, Inc. (Clinpath), an Oklahoma general business corporation. Pursuant to a subscription agreement between petitioner and2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*13 Clinpath, dated October 6, 1993, petitioner agreed to purchase 14,399 shares of the common stock of Clinpath, representing 100 percent of the issued shares of Clinpath.
On October 29, 1993, petitioner and its shareholders entered into a reorganization agreement in which they agreed, among other things, that: (1) Petitioner shall contribute all of its clinical laboratory assets to Clinpath in exchange for 14,399 shares of Clinpath stock issued to petitioner; and (2) after the exchange of petitioner's clinical laboratory assets for Clinpath stock, petitioner promptly shall distribute all of the Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders in proportion to their ownership of stock in petitioner. Also, on October 29, petitioner transferred the clinical laboratory assets, including goodwill, to Clinpath, and Clinpath transferred 14,399 shares of its common stock to petitioner. Petitioner's adjusted basis in the Clinpath stock it received equaled $ 105,015, its adjusted basis in the clinical laboratory assets it transferred to Clinpath in exchange for the stock.
On October 30, 1993, petitioner distributed 100 percent of the Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders in proportion to their2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*14 stock ownership. Clinpath conducted no business during the period from October 5, 1993, the date of Clinpath's incorporation, through October 30, 1993.
Pursuant to an acquisition agreement dated October 30, 1993, on October 30, 1993, immediately following the distribution of Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders, Clinpath shareholders 5 transferred all of the issued and 118 T.C. 84">*89 outstanding Clinpath stock to NHL in exchange for $ 5,530,000. The purchase price paid by NHL for the Clinpath stock was negotiated and agreed upon by unrelated parties at arm's length.
As a condition precedent to the sale, NHL demanded that each of Clinpath's physician-shareholders execute covenants2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*15 not to compete, dated October 30, 1993. The covenants not to compete provided that each of the physician-shareholders agreed not to compete with NHL in the clinical laboratory business anywhere within the 918 area code of the State of Oklahoma for 5 years, except as provided in the contract. NHL paid each of the physician-shareholders $ 10,000, or a total of $ 70,000, in exchange for the covenants not to compete. The total consideration, consisting of covenant payments and the purchase price of the Clinpath stock, was $ 5,600,000. The consideration allocated to the covenants not to compete was negotiated and agreed upon by unrelated parties at arm's length. 6
2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*16 Neither petitioner nor its shareholders retained any ownership interest in Clinpath after October 30, 1993.
Petitioner had accumulated earnings and profits of at least $ 236,347 as of its taxable year beginning July 1, 1993. Petitioner did not prove whether petitioner and Clinpath had current earnings and profits as of October 30, 1993.
OPINION
118 T.C. 84">*90 (D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its
assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer
the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders (including
persons who were shareholders immediately before the transfer),
or any combination thereof, is in control2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*17 of the corporation to
which the assets are transferred; but only if, in pursuance of
the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which
qualifies under section 354, 355, or 356; * * *
The above-described transaction, commonly referred to as a "D" reorganization, is sometimes used to divide an existing corporation on a tax-deferred basis into more than one corporation for corporate business purposes. In order for a divisive D reorganization to qualify for tax-deferred treatment at the corporate level under
In this case, petitioner divided its existing business into two parts by way of a spinoff. It transferred its clinical business to a newly formed subsidiary, Clinpath, in exchange for 100 percent of Clinpath's stock. Petitioner then immediately distributed the Clinpath stock to its shareholders in a transaction petitioner claims met the requirements of
If a spinoff does not qualify under
The primary issue in this case is whether petitioner's spinoff of Clinpath qualified as a valid reorganization under
Respondent also argues that, in calculating the gain to petitioner under
In order to resolve these disputes, we must first decide whether the distribution of Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders met the
Respondent argues that the distribution of Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders failed to satisfy the requirements of
A transaction2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*22 fails to qualify under
Petitioner essentially concedes that there is evidence of device as described in
1. Device Factors
A distribution that is pro rata or substantially pro rata among shareholders of the distributing corporation is more likely to be used principally as a device and is evidence of device.
A sale or exchange of the distributing or controlled corporation's stock after a distribution is also evidence of device.
In addition, a sale or exchange negotiated or agreed upon before the distribution is substantial evidence of device.
We conclude, based on a review of the applicable factors, that the facts and circumstances of this case present substantial evidence of device within the meaning of
2. Nondevice2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*25 Factors and Absence of Earnings and
Profits
In order to overcome the substantial evidence of device, petitioner argues that: (1) Although both petitioner and Clinpath had some accumulated earnings and profits during the periods in question, these amounts were not significant enough to warrant the conclusion that the spinoff of Clinpath was a device in contravention of
a. Earnings and Profits
A distribution ordinarily is considered not to have been used principally as a device if: (1) The distributing and controlled corporations have no accumulated earnings and profits at the beginning of their respective taxable years; (2) the distributing and controlled corporations have no current earnings and profits as of the date of the distribution; and (3) no distribution of property by the distributing corporation immediately before the separation would require recognition of gain resulting in current earnings and profits for the taxable year of the distribution.
118 T.C. 84">*95 In its opening brief, petitioner concedes, "that the balance sheet for * * * [petitioner] as of June 30, 1993, reflected current and accumulated earnings and profits of $ 252,928.64, for both the anatomic and clinical pathology portions of * * * [petitioner's] business." 7 Petitioner argues, however, that:
2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*27 While petitioner concedes that it and Clinpath had some
earnings and profits during the periods in question, these
amounts were not meaningful and certainly do not provide a basis
for a "bailout" of these earnings and profits amounts in
order to avoid dividend treatment to Petitioner's shareholders.
Respondent disagrees, contending that the presence of any earnings and profits precludes petitioner from utilizing
We agree with respondent for several reasons. First, petitioner reported it had over $ 230,000 of accumulated earnings and profits as of July 1, 1993, and petitioner did not introduce any evidence to prove that it had no current earnings and profits as of October 30, 1993.
Second, petitioner ignores the fact that the spinoff enabled it to claim that the substantial gain on the distribution of Clinpath stock to its shareholders, which ordinarily would have increased its current and accumulated earnings and profits, need not be recognized for corporate income tax purposes or reflected in the calculation of its earnings and profits as of October 30, 1993 and at yearend. Respondent argues that, if the spinoff of Clinpath did not qualify for tax-free treatment under
Neither party disputes that, if the spinoff of Clinpath does not qualify as a tax-free transaction2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*29 under
For the reasons set forth above, petitioner has failed to prove that it did not have accumulated or current earnings and profits as of the date of the distribution within the meaning of
b. Corporate Business Purpose
The presence of a valid corporate business purpose may trump a conclusion that the transaction was2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*31 used principally 118 T.C. 84">*97 as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits.
The stronger the evidence of device, such as the presence of the device factors specified in
Petitioner identifies three purported corporate business purposes for the disputed distribution: (1) Increased competition caused by a changing economic environment that favored the larger, national laboratories; (2) Oklahoma State law restricting the ownership of petitioner to licensed physicians or physician-owned entities licensed to practice medicine within Oklahoma; and (3) NHL's requirement that each of petitioner's physician-shareholders sign binding and enforceable covenants not to compete in the clinical laboratory business. Respondent contends there was no valid corporate business purpose for the distribution. We consider each of the purported corporate business purposes below.
i. Increased Competition
The first purported corporate business purpose asserted by petitioner is that the changing economic environment in the clinical laboratory market in 1993 favored the large, national laboratories over the smaller clinical laboratories, such as petitioner's. This environment, petitioner contends, was caused by increasing2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*33 competition from national clinical laboratories, 118 T.C. 84">*98 delivery of service issues, and development of alliances between large health insurance companies and national clinical laboratories. Petitioner argues that, based upon these economic factors, its shareholders and employees became convinced that petitioner's clinical laboratory would be forced out of business within a few years. This belief led the shareholders to sell the clinical business to NHL and "partner" with NHL to enhance the competitive position of their remaining anatomic business.
We do not question, and respondent does not dispute, that the economic factors cited by petitioner may have forced it out of the clinical business within a few years. Although these factors may have been the impetus behind the decision to sell the clinical business in the first instance, such factors do not demonstrate a corporate business purpose for petitioner's decision to distribute the Clinpath stock to its shareholders before selling the stock to NHL. A transfer of the clinical laboratory assets directly to Clinpath would have sufficed to achieve petitioner's desired result; i.e., to create a new company containing solely the assets of the2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*34 clinical business in order to sell the clinical business with minimum liability to the buyer. Minimizing the effect of the economic factors cited by petitioner, however, did not require the nearly simultaneous distribution of Clinpath stock to its shareholders. The purpose of separating the clinical laboratory assets in preparation for the sale to NHL and shielding NHL from liability was achieved as soon as the clinical business was contributed to Clinpath by petitioner in exchange for Clinpath stock. See generally
The changing economic environment, therefore, does not by itself constitute a valid corporate business purpose for the distribution of Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders or constitute evidence of nondevice.
ii. Petitioner's Status as a Professional
Corporation
The second purported corporate business purpose arises from petitioner's claim that Oklahoma State law mandated the final structure of the spinoff transaction. Petitioner essentially argues that it was constrained from selling, and NHL was prevented from purchasing, petitioner's stock2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*35 118 T.C. 84">*99 because petitioner's status as a professional corporation prevented NHL from owning any interest in it.
Petitioner's argument concerning its status as a professional corporation is without merit. Even if petitioner were precluded from selling its stock to nonphysicians as petitioner contends, such a bar would justify only petitioner's decision to transfer its clinical business to a separate general business corporation, i.e., Clinpath; it would not lend support to petitioner's decision to distribute Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders. Indeed, petitioner could have sold the Clinpath stock directly to NHL without first transferring the Clinpath stock to its shareholders. 9
2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*36 We conclude, therefore, that petitioner's status as a professional corporation does not provide a valid corporate business purpose for the distribution of Clinpath's stock to petitioner's shareholders and is not evidence of nondevice.
iii. Covenants Not To Compete
The third purported corporate business purpose cited by petitioner is NHL's requirement that each of Clinpath's physician- shareholders sign a binding and enforceable covenant not to compete. Relying upon
2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*37 We do not agree. Even if we were to conclude that NHL's desire to obtain enforceable covenants not to compete qualified as a corporate business purpose of either petitioner or 118 T.C. 84">*100 Clinpath, as
2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*39 We conclude, therefore, that NHL's demand for binding and enforceable covenants not to compete does not constitute a corporate business purpose within the meaning of
118 T.C. 84">*101 3. Conclusion
There is substantial evidence of device in this case, which is not overcome by substantial evidence of nondevice or by proof that petitioner and Clinpath lacked current or accumulated earnings and profits. We hold, therefore, that the distribution of Clinpath stock failed to satisfy the requirements2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*40 of
It is well settled that fair market value is the price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*41 under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.
The parties agree that if we hold the distribution of Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders did not qualify as a
118 T.C. 84">*102 Respondent contends that the fair market value of the Clinpath stock petitioner received and distributed to its shareholders2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*42 on October 30, 1993, should be measured by the price paid by NHL for the Clinpath stock. NHL purchased the Clinpath stock for $ 5,530,000 on the same day the stock was distributed to petitioner's shareholders. Petitioner argues in effect that the purchase price paid by NHL for the Clinpath stock was excessive and urges us to conclude instead that the fair market value of the Clinpath stock should be measured by the fair market value of the clinical laboratory assets contributed by petitioner to Clinpath. At trial, Harry Joe Wells, Jr., an expert witness called by petitioner, testified that the fair market value of the clinical laboratory assets, including going-concern value, was $ 1,040,000. Petitioner contends that the Clinpath stock could not possess a value in excess of the fair market value of its underlying clinical laboratory assets, given Clinpath's status as a new corporation with no operating history; therefore, the focus of
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. I, the taxpayer corporation, pursuant to a plan of distribution, transferred its timber and land development properties and related assets located in the State of Washington (collectively referred to as the Washington properties) to a newly formed Delaware limited partnership (partnership). The partnership's initial partners were two newly formed corporate general partners, which initially were owned equally by two of the taxpayer's principal shareholders. Upon transfer of the Washington properties to the partnership, the managing general partner made a pro rata distribution of the interests in the partnership (partnership units) 2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*44 to the taxpayer's shareholders on the basis of one partnership unit for each 5 shares of common stock. The taxpayer 118 T.C. 84">*103 was not a partner in the partnership and received no partnership units.
The issue decided in Pope & Talbot, Inc. I was whether gain from the distribution of appreciated property under former
2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*45 We reached our conclusion by examining the language and purpose of former
We face a different dispute from that decided by this Court in Pope & Talbot, Inc. I. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. I, we only decided what property interest had to be valued for purposes of
In order to calculate the gain that petitioner must recognize under
In this case, there was an actual third-party sale of the Clinpath stock to NHL on the same day as the distribution of the Clinpath stock to petitioner's shareholders. Petitioner contends, however, that the fair market value of the Clinpath stock as of October 30, 1993, cannot exceed the fair market value of the clinical business's assets contributed to Clinpath by petitioner. Petitioner introduced into evidence a report by Harry Joe Wells, Jr., which it claims valued "selected" assets as of October 30, 1993, but which, in reality, purported to value the clinical business as a "going business" as of October 29, 1993. The Wells report, using an indirect method of valuation, concluded that the value of the clinical business was only $ 1,040,000, including the alleged value of corporate goodwill. Citing our decisions in
118 T.C. 84">*105 We reject the Wells report because it did not value the property distributed to petitioner's shareholders as of the date of distribution as required by
We also reject the Wells report and petitioner's argument because they are simply not credible. Neither the Wells report nor petitioner's argument reconciles the conclusions reached regarding the value of the assets contributed to Clinpath ($ 1,040,000) and the amount of professional goodwill attributable to the physician- shareholders ($ 498,000) with what actually transpired in this case. In an arm's-length sale negotiated prior to October 29, 1993, between NHL and the physician-shareholders who had adverse interests, NHL paid $ 5,530,000 for the Clinpath stock and $ 70,000 for the covenants not to compete with the seven physician-shareholders. Neither petitioner nor its expert witness credibly explained how their positions on valuation reconcile with these facts. The physician- shareholder who testified at trial did not admit that the covenants not to compete had been undervalued in the negotiations or agree that Clinpath's physician-shareholders had collectively mischaracterized over $ 4,000,000 of the amount they received from NHL as proceeds from the sale of capital assets rather than as ordinary income attributable to the covenants.
There2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*50 is a compelling reason why we ordinarily view an actual and contemporaneous sale between unrelated parties having adverse interests as the best evidence of the fair market value of property -- ordinarily, it is credible evidence. See
118 T.C. 84">*106 We hold, therefore, that the fair market value of the Clinpath stock on the date it was distributed to petitioner's shareholders equaled $ 5,530,000, the price negotiated and agreed upon as the stock's sale price to NHL. 16 We also hold that petitioner realized and must recognize gain of $ 5,424,985, calculated by subtracting petitioner's adjusted basis in the stock, $ 105,015, from the fair market value of the Clinpath stock, $ 5,530,000.
2002 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*51 We have considered the remaining arguments of both parties for results contrary to those expressed herein and, to the extent not discussed above, find those arguments to be irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
1. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Monetary amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.↩
2. A spinoff is described as a "pro rata distribution by one corporation of the stock of a subsidiary". Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, par. 11.01[1][e], p. 11-6 (7th ed.).↩
3. Ordinarily, NHL purchased clinical laboratory businesses through an asset sale. In this case, NHL agreed to structure its purchase of the clinical business as a stock sale only if it could acquire a "clean" corporation. A "clean corporation" was defined by the parties as one in which no clinical laboratory tests had been performed that could subject the purchaser (NHL) to any potential liability.↩
4. Petitioner conceded in its brief that "the sale of the Clinpath stock to NHL was prearranged prior to the spin-off transaction".↩
5. Before completing the sale to NHL, petitioner's shareholders transferred 244 shares of the Clinpath stock they received from petitioner to the profit-sharing plan of petitioner's business manager. Consequently, the Clinpath shareholders consisted of petitioner's shareholders and the profit-sharing plan.↩
6. In connection with the sale of Clinpath stock, petitioner and NHL executed a consulting agreement, dated Oct. 30, 1993, providing for a continuing business relationship between petitioner and NHL for 5 years. The consulting agreement reflected the desire of both petitioner and NHL to partner with each other to increase the competitive position of both entities in northeastern Oklahoma with respect to both clinical and anatomic pathology services.↩
7. Petitioner also reported on its Federal income tax return for the taxable year beginning July 1, 1993, that it had accumulated earnings and profits of $ 236,347 as of July 1, 1993.↩
8. Petitioner acknowledges that dividends paid to its shareholders result "in a fairly significant double income tax liability, and is the primary reason that * * * [petitioner] distributes most or all of its income to its employee shareholders and other employees prior to year end", presumably as deductible compensation. Petitioner claims, however, that its practice of distributing income "virtually assures that there would be little or no corporate income tax liability * * * irrespective of the ultimate outcome of the spin-off transaction."↩
9.
10. Petitioner in its posttrial briefs appears to concede that the sale of Clinpath involved the sale of both "practice goodwill" inherent in the going concern value of the clinical business and "professional goodwill" possessed by petitioner's physician-shareholders.↩
11. Even if we were to conclude that any of the alleged corporate business purposes satisfied the requirements of
12. Because we hold that the
13. See also
14.
15. Petitioner's expert witness, on the other hand, testified that the difference between the purchase price paid by NHL and the value reconstructed in his report was paid for NHL's own "synergy". Petitioner's expert could not and did not explain why NHL would pay over $ 4 million for a synergy NHL allegedly created.↩
16. In his notice of deficiency, the Commissioner determined petitioner's gain to be $ 5,494,985. This amount was calculated by subtracting petitioner's basis in the Clinpath stock, $ 105,015, from the total consideration of $ 5,600,000 paid by NHL. The portion of the sale price allocated to the covenants not to compete, $ 70,000, was not subtracted from petitioner's gain as determined in the notice of deficiency. On brief, respondent conceded that the $ 70,000 represented the fair market value of the covenants not to compete and was not part of the value of the 14,399 shares of Clinpath stock.↩