In connection with the foregoing, section 6331(d)(1) and (2) sets forth the general rule that the Secretary must provide a taxpayer with 30 days' advance notice before proceeding with collection by levy. Nevertheless, section 6331(d)(3) provides that paragraph (1) shall not apply to a levy if the Secretary determines that collection of the tax is in jeopardy 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*34 under the final sentence of section 6331(a).

Section 6330(a) provides the general rule that no levy may be made on any property or right to property of any taxpayer unless the Secretary has provided 30 days' advance notice to the taxpayer of the right to an administrative hearing before the levy is carried out. Section 6330(f) provides, however, that if the Secretary finds that the collection of the tax is in jeopardy, the taxpayer shall be given the opportunity for a section 6330 hearing within a reasonable time after the levy.

If the taxpayer makes a timely request for an administrative hearing, the hearing shall be conducted by the IRS Office of Appeals (Appeals Office) before an impartial officer. Sec. 6330(b)(1), (3). The parameters for the hearing are set forth in section 6330(c). First, the Appeals officer must obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. Sec. 6330(c)(1). Second, the taxpayer may raise at the hearing any issue relevant to the collection action, including spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the collection 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*35 action, and offers of collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). Additionally, the taxpayer may contest the existence and amount of the underlying tax liability, but only if he or she did not receive a notice of deficiency or otherwise 130 T.C. 222">*234 have an opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). The Appeals officer must make a determination after reviewing the matters prescribed in section 6330(c)(1) and (2) and considering whether the proposed collection action balances the need for efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that the collection should be no more intrusive than necessary. Sec. 6330(c)(3).

After the Appeals Office makes a determination under section 6330(c), the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court for judicial review. Sec. 6330(d). If the taxpayer's underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the Court reviews any determination regarding the underlying tax liability de novo. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604">114 T.C. 604, 114 T.C. 604">610 (2000). The Court reviews any other administrative determinations regarding the proposed collection action for abuse of discretion. Id.

A debtor who files 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*36 a bankruptcy petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code shall be granted a discharge unless one of the grounds for denial of discharge enumerated in that chapter exists. 11 U.S.C. sec. 727(a). Title 11 U.S.C. section 727(b) provides in relevant part that, except as provided in 11 U.S.C. section 523, a discharge under subsection (a) of 11 U.S.C. section 727 discharges a debtor from personal liability for all debts incurred before the bankruptcy petition was filed. See United States v. Hatton, 220 F.3d 1057">220 F.3d 1057, 220 F.3d 1057">1059-1060 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 11 U.S.C. section 523(a) sets forth several exceptions to discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 727 and provides in pertinent part:

section 523. Exceptions to discharge

(a) A discharge under section 727 * * * of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt --

(1) for a tax or a customs duty --

(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed;

(B) with respect to which a return, if required --

(i) was not filed; or

(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was last due, under applicable law or under any extension, and after two 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*37 years before the date of the filing of the petition; or

130 T.C. 222">*235 (C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax * * *

Title 11 U.S.C. section 507(a)(8) refers to certain income taxes due for specified periods before the bankruptcy petition was filed. See Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 114">120 T.C. 114, 120 T.C. 114">121-122 (2003). Thus, 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) provides that a discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 727 does not discharge an individual debtor with regard to certain Federal income taxes if the debtor willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such taxes.

A discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 727 relieves the debtor of personal (or in personam) liability. See, e.g., Schott v. WyHy Fed. Credit Union, 282 Bankr. 1, 5 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002). Such a discharge, however, does not protect the debtor's assets if those assets were subject to a Federal tax lien that was properly filed pursuant to section 6323 before the bankruptcy petition was filed. See 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B). As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78">501 U.S. 78, 501 U.S. 78">84, 111 S. Ct. 2150">111 S. Ct. 2150, 115 L. Ed. 2d 66">115 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1991), a discharge of personal liability in bankruptcy "extinguishes 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*38 only one mode of enforcing a claim -- namely, an action against the debtor in personam -- while leaving intact another -- namely, an action against the debtor in rem." See Connor v. United States, 27 F.3d 365">27 F.3d 365, 27 F.3d 365">366 (9th Cir. 1994); Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287">122 T.C. 287, 122 T.C. 287">292-293 (2004); Woods v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2006-38.

In the light of the relatively novel set of circumstances that preceded the filing of the petition, we feel compelled to briefly outline the scope of the Court's jurisdiction in this case. We first note that this case comes before the Court after respondent collected substantial amounts from petitioners for the years 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1987 by issuing jeopardy levies. ^{92008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*39} There is no dispute that the Court's jurisdiction 130 T.C. 222">*236 to review collection actions under section 6330(d) vests the Court with authority to review the Commissioner's determination to issue a jeopardy levy. See Dorn v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 356">119 T.C. 356, 119 T.C. 356">359 (2002); see also sec. 301.6330-1(a)(2)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.

We also observe that although petitioners do not dispute the specific amounts of their underlying tax liabilities for any of the years in issue, ¹⁰ they do assert that some or all of their tax liabilities for the years in issue were discharged in bankruptcy. The Court's jurisdiction to review a collection action under section 6320 and/or 6330 includes the authority to determine whether a taxpayer's unpaid tax liabilities were discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. See Swanson v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 111">121 T.C. 111, 121 T.C. 111">118-119 (2003); 120 T.C. 114">Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 120-121. A taxpayer's assertion that his or her tax liabilities were discharged in bankruptcy amounts to a challenge to the appropriateness of the collection action under section 6330(c)(2)(A). 121 T.C. 111">Swanson v. Commissioner, supra at 119. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review respondent's 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*40 determination that petitioners' tax liabilities were excepted from discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding. See Kendricks v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 69">124 T.C. 69, 124 T.C. 69">75 (2005); 121 T.C. 111">Swanson v. Commissioner, supra at 119.

Finally, the notice of determination includes a statement that any question regarding the appropriateness of the disputed jeopardy levies is moot inasmuch as petitioners' tax liabilities for the years in issue were fully paid by application of the amounts collected through the jeopardy levies and petitioner's payment in May 2003. ¹¹ We conclude that this matter is not moot.

When the Commissioner determines that collection of tax is in jeopardy, the taxpayer is not afforded 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*41 a prior opportunity for a hearing under section 6330 to challenge the appropriateness of the levy before it is issued. See sec. 6330(f)(1). In recognition of this reality, section 6330(f) provides that the taxpayer against whom a jeopardy levy is 130 T.C. 222">*237 issued "shall be given the opportunity for the hearing described in [section 6330] within a reasonable time after the levy." The right to a hearing conferred by section 6330(f) is not limited to situations where some portion of the taxpayer's tax liability remains unpaid. In sum, subsections (d) and (f) of section 6330 confer upon a taxpayer against whom a jeopardy levy has been issued an unqualified right to a postlevy hearing (if timely requested) and judicial review by this Court, regardless of whether the jeopardy levy resulted in the seizure of assets sufficient to fully pay the disputed tax liabilities. See 119 T.C. 356">Dorn v. Commissioner, supra.

Consistent with the foregoing, the issues we are called upon to decide are (1) whether the requirements of all applicable laws and administrative procedures were met in respect of the disputed jeopardy levies, and (2) the related questions whether petitioners' tax liabilities were discharged in bankruptcy 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*42 and whether respondent improperly levied on certain of petitioners' assets. ¹²

The notice of determination states the Appeals officer concluded petitioners' tax liabilities for the years in issue were excepted from discharge in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) and therefore respondent was free to proceed with collection. Petitioners contend that the Appeals officer erred 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*43 in this determination.

Title 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) excepts from discharge a debtor's liability for taxes if the debtor "willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax". Although bankruptcy courts normally make determinations regarding the dischargeability of specific debts, nonbankruptcy courts may exercise jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the exceptions to discharge enumerated in 11 U.S.C. section 523(a) (other than the exceptions contained in 130 T.C. 222">*238 subsection (a)(2), (4), and (6)). See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, par. 523.03, at 523-19 to 523-21 (March 2006). As we explained in 121 T.C. 111">Swanson v. Commissioner, supra, the question whether a taxpayer's debts are excepted from discharge may have a direct bearing on whether the Commissioner's determination in a collection action should be sustained.

Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure impose a time limit or deadline in respect of a determination of the applicability of an exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C). See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(b) (a complaint that a debt is excepted from discharge may be filed anytime during a bankruptcy case, and if the case is 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*44 closed, the case may be reopened for the purpose of filing such a complaint); see also 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, par. 523.04, at 523-23 (September 2005) ("If the dischargeability issue is not raised during the bankruptcy case, it may be determined potentially in the state court or other nonbankruptcy court in an action initiated by the debtor or as an affirmative defense in an action initiated by the creditor."). ^{132008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*45}

The exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) is applicable if the following elements are present: (1) The debtor engaged in an affirmative act or omission to evade or defeat the payment or collection of tax, and (2) the debtor acted willfully. See United States v. Jacobs, 490 F.3d 913">490 F.3d 913, 490 F.3d 913">921 (11th Cir. 2007) (and cases cited therein); United States v. Fegeley, 118 F.3d 979">118 F.3d 979, 118 F.3d 979">983-984 (3d Cir. 1997). A debtor acts willfully under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) by voluntarily and intentionally violating a known legal duty. Griffith v. United States, 206 F.3d 1389">206 F.3d 1389, 206 F.3d 1389">1396 (11th Cir. 2000).

Respondent avers that petitioner is collaterally estopped from denying that her tax liabilities for the years in issue were excepted from discharge under 130 T.C. 222">*239 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) because petitioner was convicted of willfully attempting to evade the payment of her tax liabilities for 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1987 under section 7201. ^{142008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*46}

As explained by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147">440 U.S. 147, 440 U.S. 147">153, 99 S. Ct. 970">99 S. Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210">59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979), the doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, provides that, once an issue of fact or law is "actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation." See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322">439 U.S. 322, 439 U.S. 322">329, 99 S. Ct. 645">99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552">58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979). Collateral estoppel is a judicially created equitable principle the purposes of which are to protect parties from unnecessary and redundant litigation, to conserve judicial resources, and to foster certainty in and reliance on judicial action. 440 U.S. 147">Montana v. United States, supra at 153-154; 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*47 United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996">627 F.2d 996, 627 F.2d 996">1000 (9th Cir. 1980).

It is well settled that bankruptcy courts may apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel in making dischargeability determinations. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279">498 U.S. 279, 498 U.S. 279">285 n.11, 111 S. Ct. 654">111 S. Ct. 654, 112 L. Ed. 2d 755">112 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1991); Simone v. United States, 252 Bankr. 302, 306-307 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000). Inasmuch as this Court has undertaken to determine in the disposition of this collection review proceeding whether petitioners' tax liabilities were excepted from discharge, and with a view to furthering the policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we conclude that the doctrine may be asserted and considered by the Court in this collection review proceeding under section 6330.

In Peck v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162">90 T.C. 162, 90 T.C. 162">166-167 (1988), affd. 904 F.2d 525">904 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1990), the Court identified the following five conditions that must be satisfied before collateral estoppel may be applied in the context of a factual dispute: (1) The issue in the second suit must be identical in all respects with the issue decided in the first suit, (2) the issue in the first suit must have been the subject of a final judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*48 (3) the130 T.C. 222">*240 person against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party in the first suit, (4) the parties must actually have litigated the issue in the first suit and resolution of the issue must have been essential to the prior decision, and (5) the controlling facts and applicable legal principles must remain unchanged from those in the first suit. See United States IRS v. Palmer, 207 F.3d 566">207 F.3d 566, 207 F.3d 566">568 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469">976 F.2d 469, 976 F.2d 469">472 (9th Cir. 1992)). We shall examine each of these conditions in turn.

Section 7201 provides in pertinent part that "Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall * * * be guilty of a felony". We note that section 7201 encompasses two closely related but distinct crimes: (1) An attempt to evade or defeat any tax (evasion of assessment), ¹⁵ and (2) an attempt to evade or defeat the payment of any tax (evasion of payment). See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343">380 U.S. 343, 380 U.S. 343">354, 85 S. Ct. 1004">85 S. Ct. 1004, 13 L. Ed. 2d 882">13 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1965) (citing Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339">355 U.S. 339, 78 S. Ct. 311">78 S. Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321">2 L. Ed. 2d 321, 1958-1 C.B. 540 (1958)). Petitioner was convicted of attempting to evade the payment of her taxes for the years in 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*49 issue.

To prove that a taxpayer attempted to evade payment of tax, the Government must establish that the taxpayer failed to pay a tax imposed under the Internal Revenue Code, ¹⁶ the taxpayer engaged in an affirmative act to evade payment, and the taxpayer acted willfully. See United States v. Schoppert, 362 F.3d 451">362 F.3d 451, 362 F.3d 451">454-456 (8th Cir. 2004). Like the willfulness element under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C), willfulness for purposes of section 7201 requires proof that the taxpayer voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192">498 U.S. 192, 498 U.S. 192">201, 111 S. Ct. 604">111 S. Ct. 604, 112 L. Ed. 2d 617">112 L. Ed. 2d 617 (1991); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10">429 U.S. 10, 429 U.S. 10">12, 97 S. Ct. 22">97 S. Ct. 22, 50 L. Ed. 2d 12">50 L. Ed. 2d 12 (1976). Because the elements necessary for a conviction under section 7201 overlap with the elements necessary to establish the applicability of the exception to discharge under 130 T.C. 222">*241 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C), 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*50 we conclude the first condition for collateral estoppel is present.

Petitioner was charged in a single count of the superseding indictment with violating section 7201 by willfully attempting to evade and defeat the payment of income taxes she owed for 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1987. The superseding indictment alleged that petitioner fraudulently caused the bankruptcy court to discharge her tax debts for the years in issue. When an act of evasion of payment of taxes involves transfers of funds or concealing assets that cannot logically be assigned to a particular taxable year, section 7201 permits a unit of prosecution charging an evasion of payment of taxes owed for a group of tax years. See United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78">978 F.2d 78, 978 F.2d 78">85-87 (3d Cir. 1992). In United States v. Shorter, 257 U.S. App. D.C. 358">257 U.S. App. D.C. 358, 809 F.2d 54">809 F.2d 54, 809 F.2d 54">56-58 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*51 the court explained that tax evasion covering several taxable years may be charged in a single count where the defendant has allegedly engaged in a course of conduct directed at evading payment of those taxes.

After a hard-fought and lengthy trial, petitioner was convicted of several crimes, including a violation of section 7201, as outlined above, and each such conviction was upheld on appeal. See United States v. Bussell, 414 F.3d 1048">414 F.3d at 1052. Consequently, we conclude that the second, third, and fourth conditions for the application of collateral estoppel are present. Specifically, petitioner was the defendant in the earlier criminal proceeding, the parties litigated the charge that petitioner violated section 7201, and petitioner's conviction under section 7201 was affirmed by a final judgment entered by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Finally, there is no dispute that the controlling facts and legal principles remain unchanged from the time of the criminal proceeding to the present. Consistent with the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is collaterally estopped from contesting respondent's determination that her tax liabilities for the years in issue were excepted from discharge 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*52 under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C). ^{172008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*53} See Grothues v. IRS, 226 F.3d 334">226 F.3d 334, 226 F.3d 334">339 (5th Cir. 2000)130 T.C. 222">*242 (taxpayer estopped from challenging 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) discharge exception because taxpayer pleaded guilty to evading the payment of excise taxes under section 7201); Simone v. United States, 252 Bankr. 302 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000).

Petitioner seeks to avoid the application of collateral estoppel by arguing that it is possible the jury decided that she was guilty of violating section 7201 because she attempted to evade the payment of tax for one or more (but not all) of the years in issue. To the contrary, the Government charged petitioner with a single count of violating section 7201 by engaging in a course of conduct intended to evade the payment of taxes for each of the years in issue. As previously mentioned, section 7201 permits a unit of prosecution (a single count) charging evasion of payment of taxes owed for a group of tax years in a case (such as the present case) where it is not practicable to assign to a particular taxable year the value of assets a taxpayer attempted to hide from the Commissioner. See 978 F.2d 78">United States v. Pollen, supra at 85-87. 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*54 Moreover, the record clearly shows that, before filing for bankruptcy, petitioners failed to pay substantial amounts of their tax liabilities for each of the years in issue. There is no indication that petitioners attempted to contest that fact in the criminal case, and it is evident that any attempt to do so would have been futile. Finally, what the Government alleged and proved to the satisfaction of the jury in petitioner's criminal case was that petitioners failed to disclose all of their assets in the bankruptcy proceeding in a willful attempt to use the bankruptcy proceeding as a means to evade the payment of their tax liabilities for the years in issue. Petitioner simply cannot relitigate these facts.

Petitioner also asserts that the exception to discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C), which uses the past tense in referring to a debtor who "willfully attempted" to evade or defeat a tax, is applicable only if the debtor 130 T.C. 222">*243 attempted to defeat or evade taxes before filing for bankruptcy; i.e., prepetition. Petitioner reasons that, because the superseding indictment stated that petitioner violated section 7201 by acts committed both prepetition and postpetition, ¹⁸ the possibility 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*55 exists that the jury based its guilty verdict solely on petitioner's postpetition activities.

Petitioner does not cite any case in which 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) has been interpreted in this fashion, and we are not aware of such a case. In any event, petitioner's argument is strained and unconvincing -- we see no justification for limiting the scope of the exception to discharge set forth in 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) to a taxpayer's prepetition activities when opportunities to deceive the Commissioner and the bankruptcy court are available throughout a bankruptcy proceeding. In sum, we reject petitioner's argument and conclude that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C) is properly read as excepting from discharge any tax that petitioner attempted to defeat or evade either before or during the bankruptcy proceeding.

Petitioners contend that the bankruptcy court's discharge order relieved them of liability for interest accrued on their 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*56 unpaid tax liabilities. However, interest accrued on a tax liability excepted from discharge is also nondischargeable. See Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358">376 U.S. 358, 376 U.S. 358">360, 84 S. Ct. 906">84 S. Ct. 906, 11 L. Ed. 2d 772">11 L. Ed. 2d 772, 1964-2 C.B. 500 (1964); Ward v. Board of Equalization (In re Artisan Woodworkers), 204 F.3d 888">204 F.3d 888, 204 F.3d 888">891 (9th Cir. 2000). Because petitioners' 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1987 tax liabilities are excepted from discharge, they remain liable for the interest that accrued on those liabilities.

The parties agree that the penalties respondent assessed against petitioners for the years in issue were discharged under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(7)(B), which provides for the discharge of any tax penalty "imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred before three years before 130 T.C. 222">*244 the date of the filing of the petition". ¹⁹ Respondent apparently does not dispute that there is no exception to discharge for these penalties because 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(A), which refers to 11 U.S.C. section 507(a), excepts from discharge only priority tax penalties, a term defined in 11 U.S.C. section 507(a)(8)(G) as penalties "in compensation for actual pecuniary loss." Respondent acknowledges that the penalties assessed against 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*57 petitioners were not "pecuniary loss" penalties. Respondent argues, however, that he was free to collect the penalties in question because the notice of Federal tax lien filed with the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office in March 1994 attached to certain of the Bussells' assets before they filed their bankruptcy petition.

A Federal tax lien that is properly filed before a debtor files for bankruptcy attaches to the debtor's property and is not extinguished by a subsequent bankruptcy discharge. See 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78">501 U.S. at 84; Connor v. United States, 27 F.3d 365">27 F.3d at 366; Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287">122 T.C. 292-293. On the other hand, a prepetition lien does not attach to property acquired by the debtor after a bankruptcy petition is filed. See, e.g., United States v. McGugin (In re Braund), 423 F.2d 718">423 F.2d 718, 423 F.2d 718">718-719 (9th Cir. 1970).

Respondent contends that the notice of Federal tax lien filed with the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office attached to the pension plan account 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*58 that petitioners maintained at Washington Mutual Bank and to the Connecticut Mutual and John Hancock term life insurance policies and therefore respondent was justified in levying upon and applying the proceeds from those assets to satisfy the penalties in question. ²⁰

Petitioners do not challenge the validity of respondent's lien, nor do they dispute that the Bussells owned the pension plan account and the life insurance policies when they filed their bankruptcy petition. Petitioners argue instead that respondent failed to prove that those assets had sufficient 130 T.C. 222">*245 value as of the date of the bankruptcy filing to offset all of the penalties in question. As petitioners see it, respondent must have improperly collected petitioners' postpetition 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*59 assets and applied the proceeds against petitioners' penalties. Petitioners contend that they are entitled to a refund of any amounts that respondent collected in violation of the bankruptcy discharge as it pertains to tax penalties.

This is not a case in which the levies in question were preceded by an invalid assessment, see Chocallo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-152, nor (as discussed below) did respondent fail to adhere to any of the statutory provisions governing jeopardy levies, see Zapara v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 223">124 T.C. 223 (2005), as supplemented 126 T.C. 215">126 T.C. 215 (2006). Respondent was entitled, pursuant to the notice of Federal tax lien filed in March 1994, to levy upon prepetition assets to satisfy petitioners' tax liabilities, including the discharged penalties. Because respondent had the right to proceed in rem against petitioners' prepetition assets, respondent's decision to pursue a jeopardy levy was appropriate and was not an abuse of discretion.

Because respondent had the right to proceed in rem against prepetition assets to satisfy the discharged penalties, petitioners' contention that they are entitled to a refund to the extent respondent may have improperly applied proceeds 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*60 of postpetition assets in partial satisfaction of the discharged penalties is not relevant to the issue before us -- whether respondent's use of a jeopardy levy was appropriate. Petitioners' contention may be relevant in an action seeking refund of an overpayment. See sec. 6342(b). However, any ruling by this Court on that subject would amount to an advisory opinion. See, e.g., Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 1">126 T.C. 1, 126 T.C. 1">13 (2006).

For the reasons already described, we do not have to decide the value of the pension plan account ^{212008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*61} or the value of the life insurance policies ²² on the date the Bussells filed 130 T.C. 222">*246 their bankruptcy petition in order to decide whether the jeopardy levy was appropriate. We conclude only that respondent was entitled to levy on all of these assets and apply the proceeds against petitioners' unpaid tax liabilities, interest thereon, and the penalties in question.

Petitioners contend that the Appeals officer erroneously concluded that petitioners received proper notice before the jeopardy levies were served on Washington Mutual Bank. Specifically, petitioners contend that respondent failed to provide them with notice and demand for immediate payment and, as a result, they were denied the opportunity to fail or refuse to pay their tax liabilities before respondent served the jeopardy levies. As explained below, petitioners simply misconstrue the applicable statutory provisions.

The 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*62 first sentence of section 6331(a) provides that, if any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the tax within 10 days after notice and demand, the Secretary is authorized to collect such tax by levy upon all property and rights to property belonging to such person or on which there is a lien for the payment of such tax. The final sentence of section 6331(a) provides that if the collection of tax is in jeopardy and the Commissioner finds it necessary to expedite collection, the normal 10 days' advance notice requirement may be set aside and the Commissioner may instead serve the taxpayer with a notice and demand for immediate payment. Petitioners assert that respondent was obliged under the last sentence of section 6331(a) to provide them with notice and demand for immediate payment before proceeding with the jeopardy levies in dispute. We disagree.

The record shows that respondent complied with the first sentence of section 6331(a) by sending the Bussells multiple notices of balance due with regard to their unpaid taxes for the years in issue during 1992 and 1993. In addition, respondent sent them notices of intent to levy for each of the years in issue during 1993, 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*63 and respondent filed Federal tax liens for the years in issue during 1994. All of these collection notices were issued well in advance of the jeopardy levies 130 T.C. 222">*247 which were served in 2002. It is well settled that a notice of balance due constitutes a notice and demand for payment within the meaning of section 6303(a). See Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531">953 F.2d 531, 953 F.2d 531">536 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137">7 F.3d 137, 7 F.3d 137">138 (9th Cir. 1993); Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252">119 T.C. 252, 119 T.C. 252">262-263 (2002).

Considering that respondent fully complied with the first sentence of section 6331(a) and petitioners repeatedly failed to pay their taxes for the years in issue, respondent was under no obligation to provide petitioners with any additional notice and demand for payment before serving the jeopardy levies in question. Requiring a notice and demand for immediate payment in all jeopardy situations, as petitioners suggest, is inconsistent with both section 6331(d)(3), which provides that the Commissioner is not required to give a taxpayer any notice of his intent to levy if collection is in jeopardy, and section 7429(a)(1)(B), which provides that the Commissioner has 5 days from the date of a jeopardy 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*64 levy to give the taxpayer written notice of the information upon which he relied in determining that collection was in jeopardy. Simply put, by the time respondent determined that collection of petitioners' tax liabilities was in jeopardy, he had already complied with the 30 days' advance notice requirement, and therefore he was free to serve the jeopardy levies in dispute. ²³

Petitioners received each collection notice that they were entitled to under the law. In addition to providing petitioners with notice and demand for payment, respondent complied with sections 6330(f) and 7429(a)(1)(B) by providing petitioners with notice of the jeopardy levies and of their rights to administrative and judicial review of the levies 3 days after the levies were served. Petitioners took full advantage of both avenues of review.

We conclude that respondent did not 2008 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13">*65 abuse his discretion in determining that it was appropriate to proceed with collection by jeopardy levy. The Appeals officer determined that all 130 T.C. 222">*248 procedural requirements were met, addressed petitioners' arguments raised at the Appeals Office hearing, and balanced the need for efficient collection of taxes against petitioners' concern that the collection method was overly intrusive. Petitioners' unpaid tax liabilities and the interest accrued thereon were not discharged in bankruptcy, and respondent held a lien on petitioners' property that survived bankruptcy and provided an avenue for respondent to collect some, if not all, of the penalties petitioners owed.

We have considered the remaining arguments of both parties for results contrary to those discussed herein, and to the extent not discussed above, conclude those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent.