Filed: Jul. 17, 2020
Latest Update: Jul. 17, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 17, 2020 _ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 20-3079 (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-20088-JWL-JPO-1) JAMES HOLLY, (D. Kan.) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _ James Holly appeals pro se from a district court order denying his motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404 of t
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 17, 2020 _ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 20-3079 (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-20088-JWL-JPO-1) JAMES HOLLY, (D. Kan.) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _ James Holly appeals pro se from a district court order denying his motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404 of th..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 17, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 20-3079
(D.C. No. 2:04-CR-20088-JWL-JPO-1)
JAMES HOLLY, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
James Holly appeals pro se from a district court order denying his motion for a
reduced sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-
391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. Construing his pleading liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon,
935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), we decipher his argument as proceeding in two
steps. First, he argues that he is eligible for a reduced sentence under the First Step
Act.1 Second, he maintains that this eligibility entitles him to a sentence reduction,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
In fact, the district court’s order concluded that Holly was “eligible to seek a
reduction under the First Step Act.” R. vol. 1 at 105. We agree with the reasons
provided by the district court in reaching this conclusion.
meaning the district court erred when it ordered otherwise. See Opening Br. 2
(arguing that he “is eligible for the first step because he has the covered offense and
the court still denied relief”). But Holly misunderstands the workings of the First
Step Act. Under Section 404(c) of the Act, the district court has discretion whether to
reduce a movant’s sentence. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222, § 404(c)
(“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence
pursuant to this section.”). And here, the district court exercised this discretion when
it declined to reduce Holly’s sentence.2 Holly offers nothing to support a ruling that
the district court abused its discretion.3 In fact, he has not acknowledged that the
district court even possessed that discretion.
2
It did so for three reasons. First, Holly “admitted to conduct involving 288
grams of cocaine base, an amount in excess of even the increased threshold for a 10-
year mandatory minimum sentence.” R. vol. 1 at 107–08. Second, Holly had
continued to use drugs after being released from prison, leading to his supervised
release being revoked twice. Thus, “[i]n light of those continued violations, a
reduction would not result in a sufficient sentence for defendant’s original offense.”
Id. at 108 (citing United States v. Woods,
949 F.3d 934, 938 (6th Cir. 2020)). And
third, the court concluded that Holly had failed to “offer[] any reason why the Court
should exercise its discretion to effect his present release from prison, despite the
Court’s revocation mere months ago.”
Id.
3
We review a district court’s exercise of its discretion under Section 404(c) to
deny a movant a reduced sentence for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Woods, 949
F.3d at 937–38 (reviewing a district court’s decision not to reduce a defendant’s
sentence, despite the defendant’s eligibility under the First Step Act, “for abuse of
discretion” (citations omitted)); United States v. McDonald,
944 F.3d 769, 771 (8th
Cir. 2019) (“We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to
grant or deny an authorized sentence reduction.” (citing First Step Act § 404(c))); cf.
United States v. Saldana, 807 F. App’x 816, 818 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished)
(“We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to deny an
authorized sentence reduction.” (citation omitted)).
2
Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
3