Filed: Nov. 27, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT NOVEMBER 27, 2007 No. 07-12125 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 04-00490-CR-T-17-TBM UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ELIAS LOU ABUSAID, JR., a.k.a. Lou, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (November 27, 2007) Before BARKETT, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT NOVEMBER 27, 2007 No. 07-12125 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 04-00490-CR-T-17-TBM UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ELIAS LOU ABUSAID, JR., a.k.a. Lou, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (November 27, 2007) Before BARKETT, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges...
More
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 27, 2007
No. 07-12125 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00490-CR-T-17-TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ELIAS LOU ABUSAID, JR.,
a.k.a. Lou,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 27, 2007)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Elias L. Abusaid, Jr., appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se motion
for disclosure of grand jury material under Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e), filed after we
affirmed his conviction and sentence on one count of maintaining an establishment
for the purpose of unlawfully distributing or using a controlled substance, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) and (b), and one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
In his Rule 6(e) motion, Abusaid requested (1) all exculpatory material
presented to the grand jury, (2) the government’s closing argument, (3) any
explanation of the law presented to the grand jury, (4) all items related to the length
of the term of the grand jury, (5) affidavits from the court reporters involved,
(6) grand jury attendance records, and (7) the “entire transcript” of the grand jury
session, except for the transcripts of testimony given by “facts witnesses.”
Abusaid indicated that he intended to pursue post-trial relief and that he needed the
material to establish in those proceedings that a key government witness testified
incompletely and inconsistently at trial. Abusaid acknowledged that he already
had partial transcripts of the grand jury testimony given by the witness in question.
The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the government had furnished
the relevant transcripts before trial, pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
2
We note that, since appealing the district court’s denial of his Rule 6(e) motion,
Abusaid has filed in the district court a motion to vacate, set aside or correct
sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
We review a district court’s order granting disclosure of grand jury
transcripts for an abuse of discretion, keeping in mind that “the district court has
substantial discretion in determining whether grand jury materials should be
released.” United States v. Aisenberg,
358 F.3d 1327, 1338, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation omitted). “It has long been a policy of the law that grand jury
proceedings be kept secret.”
Id. at 1346. Rule 6(e)(2) codifies this secrecy
principle and prohibits the disclosure of grand jury material except in the limited
circumstances described in Rule 6(e)(3).
Id. at 1347. The portion of that provision
at issue is:
(E) The court may authorize disclosure--at a time, in a manner, and
subject to any other conditions that it directs--of a grand-jury matter:
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may
exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred
before the grand jury.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i) and (ii).1
1
In his Rule 6(e) motion, Abusaid cited Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(ii). On appeal, however,
Abusaid cites Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i). While the government has argued that we should, therefore,
review the district court’s denial of disclosure under the latter provision for plain error only, we
3
The Supreme Court has held that the Rule 6(e) exceptions apply only when a
party seeking disclosure of grand jury material shows a “particularized need” for
that material. See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw.,
441 U.S. 211, 222,
99 S. Ct. 1667, 1674,
60 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1979). The Supreme Court explained that a
party meets this standard when he shows “that the material [he] seek[s] is needed
to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for
disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that [his] request is
structured to cover only material so needed.”
Id. The Supreme Court stated that
“such a showing must be made even when the grand jury whose transcripts are
sought has concluded its operations.”
Id. We have explained that a party meets
the particularized need standard when he shows that “circumstances had created
certain difficulties peculiar to this case, which could be alleviated by access to
specific grand jury material, without doing disproportionate harm to the salutary
purpose of secrecy embodied in the grand jury process.”
Aisenberg, 358 F.3d at
1348-49. We specifically cautioned, though, that a “blanket request for
all . . . grand jury materials . . . cannot be described as the kind of particularized
request required for the production of otherwise secret information.”
Id. at 1349.
Abusaid did not establish the requisite particularized need to merit
find it unnecessary to make this distinction because the record demonstrates that the district
court did not abuse its discretion, such that it also did not commit plain error.
4
disclosure under Rule 6(e). See Douglas Oil Co. of
Cal., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct.
at 1674. Specifically, Abusaid failed to establish that the material requested was
needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding. See
id. To this
end, Abusaid was not involved in any other judicial proceeding before the district
court when he submitted his motion and failed to specify how the material sought
would help him obtain relief even in some future action. Also, Abusaid
acknowledged that he already had at least partial transcripts of the testimony given
by the witness, and did not specify how any remaining portions of this testimony
would help him. Furthermore, Abusaid failed to describe any “difficulties peculiar
to [his] case” that merited disclosure. See
Aisenberg, 358 F.3d at 1348-49.
Finally, while Abusaid’s request was not a “blanket request for all . . . grand jury
materials,” it encompassed a wide array of material without any indication of how
each part of the request alleviated his needs. See
id.
Accordingly, because Abusaid did not show that he had a particularized
need for the material sought, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying his motion. See
Aisenberg, 358 F.3d at 1338, 1349. Therefore, we affirm
the district court’s denial of Abusaid’s Rule 6(e) motion.
AFFIRMED.
5