HILLMAN, District Judge.
Wakeelah A. Cocroft ("Cocroft" or "Plaintiff") filed a federal civil rights claims against Worcester Policer Officer Jeremy Smith ("Smith" or "Defendant") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her First and Fourth Amendment rights. Cocroft also filed Massachusetts state law claims against Smith for violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA"), Mass.Gen.L. ch. 12, §§ 11-H-I and tort law claims for assault and battery and false arrest. After trial, the jury found that Officer Smith unlawfully seized Cocroft, but that he did not use excessive force against her or violate her First Amendment rights. Jury Verdict Form (Docket No. 112). As to her Massachusetts state law claims, the jury found that Officer Smith violated Cocroft's rights under the MCRA, but did not commit an assault and battery on her.
This Memorandum of Decision and Order addresses Plaintiff's Supplemental And Amended Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Docket No. 151)("Amended Motion")
Having prevailed on her Section 1983 false arrest claim, Cocroft is presumptively entitled to recover her reasonable attorneys' fees, "unless special circumstances
Id. (internal citations and citations to quoted case omitted). After passing on the reasonability of the time expended by the attorneys, the Court must determine the appropriateness of the rates charged. Id.
In determining an objectively reasonable award based on the work of Cocroft's attorneys, the Court has reviewed the pretrial, trial and post-trial record of this case, including the affidavits and billing records submitted by Cocroft in support of her application for fees and costs. Considering these materials and the arguments of the parties, the Court will apply the lodestar method, making appropriate adjustments in light of the factors outlined by the First Circuit.
Cocroft's attorneys provided able representation prior to, during, and through trial. Moreover, there is no question that, having received a favorable, albeit minimal, jury verdict on the false arrest claim, Cocroft's counsel obtained at least a partial victory for their client. Therefore, she is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. Cocroft's legal team consisted of senior level attorneys, three of whom billed at the hourly rate of $350.00 and one of whom was billed at the hourly rate of 300.00, a junior level attorney billed at the rate of $175.00 per hour, and a legal intern billed at the rate of $100.00 per hour. The Court finds that, with one exception, the rates charged by Cocroft's attorneys were reasonable considering the usual price charged for similar services in the area.
While the rates charged by the practicing attorneys are reasonable, the Court is troubled by other aspects of the fee application. More specifically, this was not a complex litigation. On the contrary, it was a straightforward and simplistic civil rights action. The case involved a single plaintiff
Plaintiff's suggests that "[w]ork was distributed liberally to law student interns and less experienced attorneys as appropriate. The more experienced attorneys did not duplicate efforts or overstaff the case." However, the records submitted by the Plaintiff in support of her fee application belie this assertion. Indeed, the records reflect that of the 811.8 attorney hours billed relative to pretrial and trial matters, 703.6 hours, or 86.7%, was incurred by the four senior level attorneys. Additionally, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the time sheets reflect a duplication of effort from each of these attorney, particularly in regards to the summary judgment motion and preparation for, and review of, deposition and other evidentiary matters. It would be difficult to justify this level of staffing for complex litigation; it is impossible to justify it for this litigation and Plaintiff's attempts to do so are unavailing. Accordingly, I am reducing the attorneys' fees charged by the four senior attorneys in Plaintiff's original fee request by forty percent (40%), from $235,770 to $141,462, which reduces the total attorney fee award to $154,657, i.e., $141,462.00 for the four senior attorneys plus $13,195.00 for the junior attorney.
Despite the fact that the jury found for Smith on Cocroft's excessive force, First Amendment and assault and battery claims, Cocroft takes the position that she is entitled to recover attorneys' fees with respect to legal work related to all of her claims because they all "`arose out of a short, visibly linked series of events.'" Pl's Mot. For Award Of Attorneys' Fees And Costs (Docket No. 137)(citation to quoted case omitted). While the incident which led to Cocroft's suit took place over a period of minutes, to suggest that for purposes of attorneys' fees and costs that her claims were indistinct flies in the face of how Plaintiff postured her case throughout pretrial proceedings and, in particular, during the trial. Moreover, Plaintiff taking the position that this claim was the primary focus of her case after having prevailed on her false arrest claim is disingenuous. On the contrary, it was clear during the trial that Plaintiff's focal point was her excessive force claim/assault and battery claim, with a secondary emphasis on the claim that Smith arrested her without probable cause and/or in violation of her First Amendment rights.
Another factor in determining the amount of fees is the extent of the plaintiff's success — contrary to Cocroft's contention at the fee hearing, the prevailing party's success remains a critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award. Cent. Pension Fund of the Int'l Union of Operating Engineers & Participating Employers v. Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 745 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2014). While the jury awarded more than nominal damages in this case, Cocroft's recovery of $15,000 was modest when considered in context. Based on the Cocroft's limited success "in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole," I am reducing the total amount attorneys' fees to which I find her entitled by twenty percent (20%). See Id. Accordingly, in connection with her original fee petition, she shall recover attorneys' fees in the amount of $123,725.60.
Plaintiff has filed a supplemental and amended motion for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to which she seeks additional attorneys' fees of $2,520 incurred in connection with prosecuting her original fee petition and an additional $971.20 in costs inadvertently omitted from the original petition. Inexplicably, all the time for preparing and arguing this motion was incurred by attorney Segal at the rate of 350.00 per hour. While the time speng in connection with the preparation of and hearing on the original fee petition is reimbursable, given the ministerial nature of such a motion, I am reducing the rate which attorney Segal charged for preparing and arguing the motion to $100.00 per hour, or $720.00 See Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 638-39, 2015 WL 7280627 at *8 (1st Cir.2015)(certain amounts of fee awards such as work performed in preparing and litigating fee petitions may be calculated at discounted rates due to the comparative simplicity of task). I find all of Cocroft's cost to be reasonable and reimbursable and therefore, award her the entire amount requested ($2,288.40).
This case was important to Wakeelah Cocroft and, as are all civil rights matters, raised important public concerns. However, as civil rights cases go, it was evident from that start that this case involved few, if any, novel issues, and would require limited discovery and little legal wrangling. Plaintiff's attorneys are experienced civil rights and trial lawyers and were aware from that this was a straightforward case that would come down to a determination as to which parties' version
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that an award of $124,445.60 in fees and $2,288.40 in costs is reasonable. Thus, the Court awards a total sum of $126,734.00. This award strikes the appropriate balance between vindicating the rights of plaintiffs like Cocroft and the public and ensuring that the fee-shift provision is not used as a license for exorbitant billing practices on claims that do not involve complex facts and legal analysis.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Supplemental and Amended Motion For Award Of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Docket No. 151) is