STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
SIDARA CHAU,
Petitioner,
vs.
MTHREE CORPORATE CONSULTING, LTD.,
Respondent.
/
Case No. 20-2270
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On October 7, 2020, pursuant to notice, Administrative Law Judge Yolonda Y. Green of the Division of Administrative Hearings (“Division”), conducted a hearing, pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2020), by Zoom conference.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Sidara Chau, pro se
705 Pennsylvania Avenue
Winchester, Virginia 22601
For Respondent: Ian M. Jones, Esquire
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP 50 North Laura Street, Suite 2600
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether Respondent, MThree Corporate Consulting, LTD (“MThree”), subjected Petitioner, Sidara Chau, to unlawful employment practices on the basis of her race or her sex in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On December 10, 2018, Petitioner, Sidara Chau (“Ms. Chau” or “Petitioner”), filed a complaint of discrimination (“Complaint”) with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) alleging that Deutsche Bank unlawfully terminated her employment by discriminating against her on the basis of her race and sex. On April 23, 2020, FCHR issued a Notice of Determination to Ms. Chau notifying her that FCHR found “no reasonable cause” to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination occurred. Dissatisfied with FCHR’s finding, Ms. Chau filed a Petition for Relief seeking an administrative hearing. FCHR referred the Petition to the Division on
May 13, 2020, and the undersigned was assigned to conduct the hearing in this case.
On August 5, 2020, Deutche Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the basis that Deutche Bank was not Petitioner’s employer, but instead, Petitioner was employed by MThree. Deutsche Bank and MThree stipulated to substitution of MThree as the Respondent in this matter.
This matter was initially scheduled for a final hearing on July 14, 2020.
It was subsequently continued two times and ultimately scheduled for October 7, 2020. The final hearing proceeded as scheduled. Petitioner testified on her own behalf. Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 through 5 were admitted into evidence over objection. Petitioner’s Exhibit 6 was not admitted into evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Emily Keefe, Associate Director, Head Engagement of North America for MThree. Respondent’s Exhibits 1 through 10 were admitted into evidence.
The parties did not order a transcript for the hearing. Thus, the timeline for filing Proposed Recommended Orders was October 19, 2020. Both parties
filed post hearing submittals, which have been considered in preparation of this Recommended Order.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Florida Statutes will be to the 2017 codification, which was the statute in effect at the time of the alleged violations.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits admitted into evidence and the testimony presented at the final hearing:
Ms. Chau, an Asian (Cambodian) woman, was at all times material to this matter employed by MThree. Petitioner alleges that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of her race and sex. FCHR determined there was no reasonable cause to find Respondent discriminated against Petitioner. Dissatisfied with FCHR’s findings, Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practices and Request for Administrative Hearing requesting this hearing.
MThree is an international corporation that provides consulting services to assist clients with technology projects. An arm of MThree’s business includes the Alumni Associate program, which hires recent college graduates, provides training, and places the program associates with clients with the goal of the client hiring MThree’s program associates as permanent employees of the client.
Given that MThree is an international corporation, and given the number of known employees, MThree is an employer. See § 760.02(7), Fla. Stat.
By letter dated August 31, 2017, MThree hired Ms. Chau as an Alumni Associate for production support with the expectation that she would be assigned to work onsite with one of MThree’s clients. Ms. Chau’s job responsibilities included assisting customers with instruments and client
data quality checks. Based on the offer letter, Ms. Chau would be paid an annual salary with periodic increases subject to successful performance reviews after every six month of being onsite, through the end of the agreement. After training, Ms. Chau earned $42,000 per year. She anticipated receiving an increase to $45,000 after her six month review.
Throughout her employment with MThree, Ms. Chau’s supervisor was Emily Keefe.
As an Alumni Associate, Ms. Chau was required to complete training for approximately four weeks before beginning work onsite at the client’s business location.
The training class included 18 other new employees. The trainers for the training class, Keith Dauris (general trainer for Jacksonville production class) and David Hodgins (primary trainer for the production class), expressed concerns about perceived deficiencies in Ms. Chau’s performance during the training.
Specifically, Mr. Dauris conducted an assessment of the performance of each trainee based on categories described as follows:
Very Good: No issues at all. Will hit the ground running;
Good: No major concerns. Should settle in well on site;
Behind on the learning curve: Still need work. Will take time to settle in on site and will need support; and
Major concerns: Serious concerns as to their ability to hold down the job.
Mr. Darius placed Ms. Chau in the category of “major concerns” and further commented, “Really does not understand coding at all. General problem skills is [sic] lacking. Serious concerns about her ability to perform on site.”
Mr. Dauris shared his assessment with Mr. Hodgins who then communicated his concerns with Ms. Keefe. Similar to Mr. Dauris,
Mr. Hodgins was concerned about Ms. Chau’s struggle with technical content, and asked whether she could benefit from additional training. Despite the concerns about Ms. Chau’s performance, she was assigned to work at Deutsche Bank.
In October 2017, Ms. Chau began working at Deutsche Bank as a production support analyst. Ms. Chau’s supervisor at Deutsche Bank was Ranjith S. Nair, a line manager and permanent employee of Deutsche Bank. At all times material to this matter, Mr. Nair was not employed by MThree.
Ms. Chau testified that Mr. Nair treated her unfairly by refusing to help her on projects and refusing to train her. Instead, he helped other employees namely, Boubacar Barry. Ms. Chau stated that when she expressed interest in disaster recovery projects, Mr. Nair refused to give her the opportunity to complete the training. She also claimed that he did not train her on other work tasks. While Ms. Chau did not believe the training Mr. Nair provided at Deutsche Bank was sufficient, there is no evidence in the record that she asked for training through MThree until after her performance review.
Ms. Chau also testified about two incidents where her work performance was impacted by Mr. Nair’s mistakes. The first incident was related to an assignment request, which required Mr. Nair’s approval to complete. Mr. Nair delayed the necessary approval, which caused the work she performed to be cancelled. The second incident involved Mr. Nair yelling at her when she was asked to enter a particular command on a website and the website failed. Ms. Chau testified that Mr. Nair claimed she was responsible but he gave her the incorrect website. Mr. Nair did not testify at the hearing and there was no evidence offered at the hearing to corroborate Ms. Chau’s assertions.
Ms. Chau testified that she never received complaints about her work performance while she worked at Deutsche Bank. However, Mr. Nair’s review reflects he had concerns with her performance.
On or about April 18, 2018, Mr. Nair completed a six month performance review for Ms. Chau. The review assessed her performance in several areas, including: 1) application of skills in core role; 2) behavior at work and collaboration; 3) objectives; 4) meeting objectives; and 5) rating.
The overall performance rating scale was as follows:
All objectives fully achieved and most have been exceeded throughout the year and
Outstanding levels of the required [behaviors] are always demonstrated across the majority of job competencies
All objectives fully achieved and some have been exceeded throughout the year and
All required [behaviors] have been demonstrated and consistently exceeded
Fully achieved key objectives throughout the year and
All required [behaviors] have been demonstrated
One or more key objectives not achieved and/or
Further development required for current role and/or behavior compares les [favorably] relative to expectations
Performance unacceptable and/or
Objectives not achieved and/or [behavior] levels not achieved
A second rating scale used by line managers focused on potential for improvement, which provided as follows:
Capable of thinking of the “bigger picture,” is a good problem solver and very self-motivated
Performs very well in current role with potential to do more if given stretch assignments to help prepare for the next level
More focus on “tactical” thinking than “strategic” thinking but coaching and/or mentoring would help broaden that focus
A valuable asset but requires encouragement to develop further in a number of areas
Effective performer, but without coaching on how to become more innovative, achieve more lateral thinking etc. they may have reached their career potential
No evidence that potential would improve even
with extensive coaching or mentoring
Consider reassignment or exit from the organization
The review format permitted the associate to review him or herself, and then the manager would provide a final review. Petitioner provided favorable comments on her own behalf regarding her work performance in all categories. Ms. Chau’s evaluation of her performance was a clear contrast from Mr. Nair’s evaluation.
In the evaluation, Mr. Nair identified a number of issues with Ms. Chau’s work performance. He commented that Ms. Chau needed improvement with the quality of her work, adhering to deadlines, and
improvement of organization and communication skills. Mr. Nair reported
1 The rating range designated for managers only included to rating designated as “C.” However, a reasonable inference can be made that the second “C’ was due to a typographical area and was intended to be an “E” rating.
that Ms. Chau needed to improve commitment to completion of assigned tasks. He also noted that Ms. Chau needed to be able to operate independently and proactively contribute to team tasks.
The objectives set for Ms. Chau were also an area where Mr. Nair believed Ms. Chau could improve. Specifically, he stated that “Objectives/ Targets required by role is [sic] not met. Expect improvements in all areas noted in earlier sections.”
Overall, Mr. Nair assigned a 2 out of 5 performance rating and “D” potential rating. In addition to the ratings, he commented that Ms. Chau’s performance was below the standard expected at the bank. He recommended that Ms. Chau improve her technical and organizational skills and engage in effective dialogue with stakeholders. Despite the low performance review, Mr. Nair was willing to give Ms. Chau additional time to improve her performance.
After the evaluation, Mr. Nair discussed his concerns with Ms. Keefe who communicated the results to the MThree leadership team.
Ms. Nair discussed the review with Ms. Chau. A few days later
Ms. Chau emailed Ms. Keefe with concerns about her review and complaints that Mr. Nair treated her unfairly related to “something else personal.”
Ms. Chau later withdrew her request for Ms. Keefe to escalate her complaint because she had spoken with Mr. Nair about areas for improvement.
By June 2018, Deutsche Bank was prepared to progress toward terminating Ms. Chau from her assignment at Deutsche Bank due to low performance. Patti Burge, Director of Safety and Soundness at Deutsche Bank, and Ms. Keefe agreed Ms. Chau’s last day at Deutsche Bank would be July 27, 2018. Although Ms. Chau’s last day working onsite was July 27, 2018, she received payment from MThree through August 31, 2018.
Ms. Keefe could not find a suitable different job site at which she could place Ms. Chau, and, thus, she was terminated from her employment with MThree as well.
Ms. Chau offered Mr. Barry, an African man, as a comparator in this case. She believed Mr. Barry was similarly-situated and treated more favorably than her. He was trained on different projects and received help when needed. She asserted that he also received a six month raise for the same job. However, during training, Mr. Barry was placed in the “good” category and was assigned a 4 out of 5 rating for his work performance. Finally, Ms. Chau testified Mr. Barry was permitted to work from home, which Ms. Chau believed was favorable treatment. However, Ms. Chau by her own admission was also permitted to work from home.
While not offered as a comparator, another associate, S.W., an African- American man, also scored 2 out of 5 for his six month review and was terminated on the same day as Ms. Chau.
It is clear Petitioner believed she was treated unfairly by Respondent and by Mr. Nair in particular. However, Petitioner identified no instance of racially-disparaging direct comments or behavior directed toward her. There was also no evidence of disparaging comments related to her sex. In fact,
Ms. Chau wrote in her email that her supervisor, Ms. Keefe, was like a sister to her.
Although Respondent terminated another person at the same time as Ms. Chau, there was no evidence of a pattern of conduct, or inference of racial discrimination directed toward Asian women.
Further, there was no evidence to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made due to Petitioner’s race or sex. Rather, the decision was based on dissatisfaction with Petitioner’s job performance while assigned to work at Deutsche Bank.
There was also no evidence to prove that a person of a different race or sex than Petitioner, who was otherwise similarly-situated to Petitioner, was treated more favorably than Petitioner.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this cause pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1).
The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”) prohibits discrimination in the workplace. Among other things, FCRA makes it unlawful for an employer:
To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
§ 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
Petitioner alleges that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of her race and sex.
Section 760.11(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of ss. 760.01-760.10 may file a complaint with the [FCHR] within 365 days of the alleged violation.” Petitioner timely filed her complaint. However, FCHR determined there was no reasonable cause to find Respondent discriminated against Petitioner.
Section 760.11(7) provides that upon a determination by FCHR that there is no reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the FCRA has occurred, “[t]he aggrieved person may request an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 and 120.57, but any such request must be made within 35 days of the date of determination of reasonable cause.” Following the
FCHR determination of no cause, Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practices and Request for Administrative Hearing requesting this hearing.
Florida’s chapter 760 is patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. As a result, when “a Florida statute is modeled after a federal law on the same subject, the Florida statute will take on the same
constructions as placed on its federal prototype.” Brand v. Fla. Power Corp., 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Valenzuela v. GlobeGround
N. Am., LLC, 18 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Fla. State Univ. v. Sondel, 685 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Fla. Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant, 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Since Petitioner alleges disparate treatment on the basis of race and sex were factors in termination of her employment, she has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice. See St. Louis v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 60 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d
778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Employees may prove discrimination by direct, statistical, or circumstantial evidence. Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC, 18 So. 3d at 22.
Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would prove the
existence of discriminatory intent without resort to inference or presumption.
Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997). It is well-established that “‘only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate . . .’ will constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted).
The record in this case did not establish unlawful race or sex discrimination by direct evidence.
Likewise, Petitioner presented no statistical evidence of discrimination by Respondent in its personnel decisions affecting her.
In the absence of any direct or statistical evidence of discriminatory intent, Petitioner must rely on circumstantial evidence of such discriminatory intent. Petitioner has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination following the procedure established by the United
States Supreme Court. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and as refined in Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Under McDonnell Douglas, to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for the position; 3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and
4) her employer treated similarly-situated employees outside of her protected class more favorably than she was treated. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty.,
447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).
To meet the fourth "comparator" element of a disparate treatment claim, Petitioner must show she is similarly situated in all relevant respects to Mr. Barry, the employee she claims was given preferential treatment. See Woods v. Cent. Fellowship Christian Acad., 545 F. App'x 939, 945 (11th
Cir. 2013). Specifically, to be a valid comparator for disparate discipline, such as termination, the comparator must have "(1) dealt with the same supervisor, (2) been subject to the same standards, and (3) engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it." Sanguinetti v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
If Petitioner is able to prove her prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts to Respondent to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255; Dep’t of Corr. v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d
1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). An employer has the burden of production, not persuasion, to demonstrate to the finder of fact that the decision was non- discriminatory. Chandler, 582 So. 2d 1183. This burden of production is "exceedingly light." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d at 1564; Turnes v. Amsouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994).
If the employer produces evidence that the decision was non- discriminatory, then the complainant must establish that the proffered reason was not the true reason but merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516-18. In order to satisfy this final step of the process, Petitioner must “show[] directly that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the decision, or
indirectly by showing that the proffered reason for the employment decision is not worthy of belief.” Dep’t of Corr. v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d at 1186 (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56). “[A] reason cannot be a pretext for discrimination ‘unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’” Fla. State Univ. v. Sondel,
685 So. 2d at 927, citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515; see also Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995). The demonstration of pretext “merges with the plaintiff's ultimate burden of showing that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d at 1565.
In a proceeding under the Civil Rights Act, “[w]e are not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d at 1361. As established by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984). Moreover, “[t]he employer’s stated legitimate reason . . . does not have to be a reason that the judge or jurors would act on or approve.” Dep’t of Corr. v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d at 1187.
Race and Sex Discrimination
Petitioner demonstrated that she is a member of a protected class as an Asian woman.
Petitioner established that she met the qualifications for the position of production support analyst. The dispute with Respondent was not over whether Petitioner was qualified for employment for production support, but was related to the quality of her performance.
Petitioner established she was terminated from employment, which is an adverse employment action.
Where Petitioner falls short in the establishment of her prima facie case is her failure to demonstrate that similarly-situated employees outside of her protected class were subject to personnel decisions that differed from those applied to her. In other words, she failed to establish that a similarly- situated non-Asian employee was treated more favorably than her.
The only evidence of a similarly-situated employee comparator Petitioner offered was Mr. Barry, an African male, who she believed was treated more favorably than her.
Petitioner established that both she and Mr. Barry were supervised by Mr. Nair and were subject to the same policies regarding evaluations. They were also both hired at the same time. Both were in the same training class and received the same salary.
The evidence establishes that the primary basis for Petitioner’s termination was poor work performance. The record establishes that the poor work performance began during her training and continued while she working onsite. Specifically, Petitioner had problems with understanding coding and problem solving skills during training. She had problems with the quality of her work when she began working onsite, including deficiencies in technical, organizational, and communication skills. Even after her review, Petitioner’s work performance did not improve.
Mr. Barry, however, had prior IT background experience with coding. During training, the trainers identified him as someone who would do well onsite. Further, he received a 4 of 5 rating on his review. Consistent with his work performance, Mr. Barry was awarded a raise in his salary. Thus, there were distinguishing circumstances that warrant different treatment of
Mr. Barry as there is no evidence that there was a basis for Mr. Barry to be subject to an adverse personnel decision regarding his work performance.
Mr. Barry, in fact, had work performance indicating he exceeded objectives.
For the reasons set forth herein, there is no evidence to establish that Mr. Barry had problems with his work performance similar to those that resulted in Ms. Chau’s termination, and is, therefore, not a proper similarly- situated employee comparator.
Moreover, another MThree employee, S.W., experienced poor work performance and received a low rating of 2 of 5 on his review. Similar to Ms. Chau, S.W. was also terminated.
The evidence establishes Ms. Chau did not establish a prima facie case for race or sex discrimination.
Legitimate, Non-discriminatory Reason
Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner made a prima facie showing of race or sex discrimination, the burden would shift to Respondent to proffer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action.
Respondent met its burden by producing credible evidence that Petitioner was terminated solely on the basis of what Respondent legitimately believed to be poor performance of her job duties. Issues of poor work quality, organization, and communication skills have been discussed herein. In addition, Respondent had a legitimate concern that Petitioner had low potential for improvement after given opportunities to improve.
In short, Respondent had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner because she was performing below a level expected of
support production analysts, and Respondent had a reasonable belief that there was low potential for improvement of Petitioner’s performance.
Although Respondent’s burden to refute Petitioner’s prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of both race and sex was light, the evidence showing the reason for its personnel decision to be legitimate and non- discriminatory was substantial.
Pretext
Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner made a prima facie showing, then upon Respondent’s production of evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifted back to Petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent’s stated reasons were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.
In determining whether Respondent’s actions were pretextual, the undersigned “must evaluate whether the [petitioner] has demonstrated ‘such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could find them unworthy of credence.’” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, Meadowcraft, Inc., 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).
Petitioner did not present any credible evidence that Respondent’s reason for terminating her was a pretext for discrimination. Petitioner disagreed with Respondent’s action based on her belief that her termination was unfair because she was given no warning of performance issues, and she believed Mr. Nair did not like her for personal reasons, but disagreement with the employer’s decision falls short of the showing necessary to establish pretext. Chambers v. Walt Disney World Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1356,
1366 (M.D. Fla. 2001). In addition, like Ms. Chau, S.W., was terminated due to poor work performance.
Conclusion
Respondent put forth persuasive evidence that Petitioner was terminated from employment as a result of her inability to perform at a level
expected of a production support analyst, and not as a result of discrimination on the basis of race or sex.
“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the [employer] intentionally discriminated against the [employee] remains at all times with the [employee].” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. In this case, Petitioner did not meet her burden.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice.
DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
Yolonda Y. Green Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk
Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
Sidara Chau
705 Pennsylvania Avenue
Winchester, Virginia 22601 (eServed)
Ian M. Jones, Esquire
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP 50 North Laura Street, Suite 2600
Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed)
Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Nov. 09, 2020 | Recommended Order | Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent subjected her to unlawful employment practice. |
