–09. 
The district court criticized this argument as “conflat[ing]” the “factual

question” of consent “with a legal one.”
 Id. at 109. 
And it held that, because it is

                                             4
clearly established that sexual abuse—including nonconsensual, coerced sex—

violates the Constitution, Flowers violated a clearly established right. Thus, the

district court found that Flowers was not entitled to qualified immunity and denied

his motion for summary judgment.

                                         Analysis

      On appeal, Flowers argues that the district court erred in finding a

constitutional violation and in finding Brown’s right clearly established. Flowers also

moves to seal a portion of the record.

I.    Qualified Immunity

      When reviewing a summary-judgment order denying qualified immunity,

“[w]e review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, employing the

same legal standard applicable in the district court.” Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 
584

F.3d 1304
, 1311 (10th Cir. 2009). Under that standard, we must grant Flowers

qualified immunity unless “(1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a

violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of

[Flowers’s] conduct.” Henderson v. Glanz, 
813 F.3d 938
, 952 (10th Cir. 2015).

      Given the procedural posture of this case, we have jurisdiction to review

“abstract issues of law” but not the “district court’s factual conclusions.” Fancher v.

Barrientos, 
723 F.3d 1191
, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2013) (second quoting 
Fogarty, 523

F.3d at 1154
). Here, the district court determined that “consent and coercion are

issues for the fact[]finder in this case.” App. vol. 1, 108. And, even on Flowers’s

appeal from a denial of qualified immunity, we “view the facts in the light most

                                            5
favorable to [Brown] and resolve all factual disputes and reasonable inferences in

[her] favor.” 
Henderson, 813 F.3d at 952
. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we must

assume that the sex was coerced and nonconsensual. Moreover, “[w]hen the factual

and legal inquiries blur because the district court fails to make its factual assumptions

explicit,” we review the record to determine which facts “the district court ‘likely

assumed.’” 
Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1154 
(quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 
516 U.S. 299
,

313 (1996)). Therefore, “[t]hose facts explicitly found by the district court, combined

with those that it likely assumed, . . . form the universe of facts upon which we base

our legal review of whether [Flowers is] entitled to qualified immunity.” Id.; see also

Henderson, 813 F.3d at 949
–50 (assuming fact that district court did not explicitly

find because fact supported district court’s conclusion to deny summary judgment

based on qualified immunity and was construed in light most favorable to nonmoving

plaintiff).

       A.     Constitutional Violation

       On appeal, Flowers argues that the district court erred in finding a

constitutional violation. As a preliminary matter, we note that because Brown was a

pretrial detainee, she was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Colbruno v.

Kessler, 
928 F.3d 1155
, 1162 (10th Cir. 2019). And although the district court stated

as much, it analyzed her claim as an Eighth Amendment violation. As such, it

considered both prongs of the Eighth Amendment test: the objective component, or

whether “the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough,” and the

subjective component, or whether “the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable

                                           6
state of mind.” 
Smith, 339 F.3d at 1212 
(alteration in original) (quoting Giron v.

Corr. Corp. of America, 
191 F.3d 1281
, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999)). And on appeal, the

parties likewise consider both prongs.

      Such an analysis is in line with our previous statement that the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment analyses are “identical.” Lopez v. LeMaster, 
172 F.3d 756
,

759 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). But this statement is no longer good law after the Supreme

Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 
135 S. Ct. 2466 
(2015). There, the

Court held that “the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive[-]force

claim is solely an objective one” and that therefore “a pretrial detainee can prevail by

providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not

rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in

relation to that purpose.” 
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473
–74; see also 
Colbruno, 928

F.3d at 1163 
(“[T]here is no subjective element of an excessive-force claim brought

by a pretrial detainee.”). And because we “treat sexual abuse of prisoners as a species

of excessive-force claim,” Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 
741 F.3d 1118
, 1126

(10th Cir. 2013), after Kingsley, a pretrial detainee bringing such claim is not

required to meet the “subjective element” required of Eighth Amendment excessive-

force claims, 
Colbruno, 928 F.3d at 1163
. Thus, to make out a constitutional

violation, Brown must only demonstrate that Flowers’s conduct “was objectively




                                            7
harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” 
Smith, 339 F.3d at 1212
.

(quoting 
Giron, 191 F.3d at 1289
). 2

       In making this demonstration, Brown cites to our longstanding precedent

indicating that “[w]ith regard to . . . sexual assault claims, . . . an ‘inmate has a

constitutional right to be secure in her bodily integrity and free from attack by prison

guards.’” Barney v. Pulsipher, 
143 F.3d 1299
, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Hovater v. Robinson, 
1 F.3d 1063
, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993)); see also, e.g., 
Giron, 191

F.3d at 1290 
(finding that “sexual abuse” and “rape” by guard violates Constitution);

Castillo v. Day, 
790 F.3d 1013
, 1020 (10th Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that “sexual

abuse” by guard violates Constitution). Thus, Flowers’s nonconsensual, coerced sex

with Brown violated her constitutional rights. See, e.g., 
Giron, 191 F.3d at 1290
.

       Relying on Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, Flowers asserts that the

district court erred in finding that “consent and coercion are issues for the fact[]finder

in this case.” App. vol. 1, 108. In Graham, we determined that guards who had sex



       2
         Brown’s briefing treats the analysis of an Eighth Amendment claim as
identical to the analysis of a Fourteenth Amendment claim. As such, she does not
argue that, in the context of sexual abuse by prison guards, the objective standard of
the Fourteenth Amendment is meaningfully different than the objective standard of
the Eighth Amendment. Compare, 
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473
–74 (describing the
Fourteenth Amendment standard as whether there is “objective evidence that the
challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose”), with 
Smith, 339 F.3d at
1212 
(describing the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment standard as whether
“the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional
violation” (quoting 
Giron, 191 F.3d at 1289
)). But because, as explained below, we
affirm the district court by relying on Eighth Amendment cases, our analysis does not
require us to resolve this issue here.
                                             8
with an inmate did not violate her constitutional rights because there was

“overwhelming evidence of consent.” 
Graham, 741 F.3d at 1126
. Flowers analogizes

the facts here to those in Graham and contends that the undisputed facts here show

that, as in Graham, there was “overwhelming evidence of consent.” Aplt. Br. 46

(quoting 
Graham, 741 F.3d at 1126
). In doing so, he insists that we have jurisdiction

to consider this argument, claiming that it does not call for a “reconsideration of the

[d]istrict [c]ourt’s factual findings.” Rep. Br. 2. But the district court found that a

jury could find that the sex was coerced and nonconsensual. And, when considering

this interlocutory appeal, “we are not at liberty to review a district court’s factual

conclusions, such as the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to

decide.” 3 
Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1154
; see also Sawyers v. Norton, 
962 F.3d 1270
,

1284 (10th Cir. 2020) (reasoning that “[a]lthough the [defendants] attempt to frame

[their] argument as a legal issue, they challenge the district court’s factual

determination of what a reasonable jury could infer”; concluding that it lacked

jurisdiction to review); Cox v. Glanz, 
800 F.3d 1231
, 1242 (10th Cir. 2015) (“When

the [d]istrict [c]ourt ‘concludes that a reasonable jury could find certain specified

facts in favor of the plaintiff, . . . we usually must take them as true—and do so even

if our own de novo review of the record might suggest otherwise as a matter of


       3
        Although we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s factual
conclusions de novo where they are “blatantly contradicted by the record,” Flowers
does not make this argument. 
Lewis, 604 F.3d at 1226 
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 
550
U.S. 372
, 380 (2007)). Further, we note that the district court explicitly found that the
record did not “blatantly contradict[]” Brown’s construction of facts. App. vol. 1, 105
(quoting 
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380
).
                                             9
law . . . .’” (third alteration in original) (quoting Lewis v. Tripp, 
604 F.3d 1221
, 1225

(10th Cir.2010))). Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider Flowers’s argument, and we

affirm the district court’s conclusion that a reasonable jury could find facts

supporting Brown’s claim that Flowers violated her constitutional rights.

       B.     Clearly Established Law

       Flowers next argues that Brown failed to demonstrate that he violated a clearly

established right. A right can be clearly established through a factually similar

“Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit decision,” or through “the clearly

established weight of authority from other courts.” Perry v. Durborow, 
892 F.3d

1116
, 1123 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Quinn v. Young, 
780 F.3d 998
, 1005 (10th Cir.

2015)). Although we may “not . . . define clearly established law at a high level of

generality,” “a case directly on point” is not required. Mullenix v. Luna, 
136 S. Ct.

305
, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 
563 U.S. 731
, 741, 742

(2011)). Instead, “[t]he precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official

would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” District

of Columbia. v. Wesby, 
138 S. Ct. 577
, 590 (2018) (emphasis added); see also

Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 
(explaining that right must be “sufficiently clear that

every reasonable official would have understood that what he [or she] is doing

violates that right” (emphasis added)); cf. Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730
, 741 (2002)

(“[G]eneral statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear

warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the

decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.”).

                                            10
      To determine whether a right is defined with sufficient specificity, we consider

the “specific context of the case.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 
543 U.S. 194
, 198 (2004)

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194
, 201 (2001), overruled on other grounds by

Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223 
(2009)). In some cases—such as those “in the

Fourth Amendment [excessive-force] context” dealing with the “hazy border between

excessive and acceptable force”—“specificity is especially important.” 
Mullenix, 136

S. Ct. at 308
, 312 (second quoting 
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201
); see also A.N. ex rel.

Ponder v. Syling, 
928 F.3d 1191
, 1199 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining “concern”

animating need for specificity “is particularly acute in Fourth Amendment cases”;

finding that more specific case was not needed to establish equal-protection right). In

other cases, a “general rule” will result in “law [that] is not extremely abstract or

imprecise under the facts [of the case], but rather is relatively straightforward and not

difficult to apply.” 
A.N., 928 F.3d at 1199
.

      Here, Brown again cites to our longstanding precedent establishing that sexual

abuse of those in jail or prison violates the Constitution. See, e.g., 
Giron, 191 F.3d at

1290
. These cases involve similar types of abuse, including nonconsensual sex. See,

e.g.
, id. And notably, these 
cases do not delineate between sexual abuse carried out

through physical and nonphysical coercion. 4 See, e.g., 
Castillo, 790 F.3d at 1016
,



      4
        We note that, on appeal, these cases involve allegations that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to sexual abuse and not that the defendants themselves
committed sexual abuse. See Castillo v. Day, 
790 F.3d 1013
, 1015 (10th Cir. 2015);
Barney, 143 F.3d at 1308
, 1310. Nevertheless, these cases are relevant here because
they support the broader proposition for which we rely on them: our caselaw does not
                                           11
1022 (finding constitutional violation based on sexual abuse carried out through both

physical and nonphysical coercion without differentiating between the two); 
Barney,

143 F.3d at 1304
, 1310 (finding jailer’s conduct, which included sexual abuse where

jailer “threatened to keep [inmate] in jail longer” if she did not comply, “sufficiently

serious to constitute a violation under the Eighth Amendment”). Brown also cites to

Graham, which explained that “we think it proper to treat sexual abuse of prisoners

as a species of excessive-force claim, requiring at least some form of coercion (not

necessarily physical) by the prisoner’s 
custodians.” 741 F.3d at 1126 
(emphasis

added).

      Flowers argues that both Brown and the district court define the right at issue

at too high of a level of generality. He concedes that “Brown obviously had a

constitutional right to be free from sexual abuse while in state custody.” Aplt. Br. 25.

But he contends that her right was not clearly established here because there is no

case on point to inform him that the sex under these particular circumstances was

nonconsensual and that therefore a reasonable officer in his position would not know

that this conduct amounted to sexual abuse. In doing so, however, Flowers

misunderstands both the facts as we must construe them and our caselaw.

      Flowers asserts that “the issue is whether [he] should have known that subtle,

nebulous forms of non-physical coercion before or after sexual intercourse with

Brown (giving cigarettes) violated her constitutional rights, even when everything


draw a constitutionally relevant line between sexual abuse of inmates carried out
through physical coercion and that carried out through nonphysical coercion.
                                           12
else suggested that she had consented to intercourse with him.” Aplt. Br. 24–25. But

framing the issue in this manner mischaracterizes the facts that the district court

found or “likely assumed” in determining that coercion and consent are jury

questions. 
Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1154 
(quoting 
Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313
). Flowers’s

framing assumes that the district court found coercion and lack of consent based on

only his “gift of cigarettes.” Aplt. Br. 25. It is true that the district court order

explained that the cigarettes could have created coercion in the form of a quid pro

quo. But, as Brown points out, the district court also relied on her testimony, and she

testified the sex was not consensual and that afterward, she told her family she had

been “raped.” App. vol 5, 564–65. Moreover, the district court emphasized that “[t]he

power dynamics between prisoners and guards make it difficult to discern consent

from coercion.” App. vol. 1, 103 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Graham, 741 F.3d

at 1126
). Indeed, Brown’s testimony reflects the role this power dynamic played

here. For example, Brown explained that she went to the control tower because she

was in jail and “had to do what [she] was told.” App. vol. 5, 566. Further, Brown

began crying while Flowers was penetrating her, causing Flowers to turn her around.

Thus, based on how we must construe the facts in this interlocutory appeal, there was

more than “subtle” and “nebulous” coercion here, and, contrary to Flowers’s

argument, it is not the case that “everything else suggested that [Brown] had

consented to intercourse with [Flowers].” Aplt. Br. 24–25. Therefore, Flowers’s

contention that Brown fails to “identify a single case that discusses a jailer’s ‘gift’ to

an inmate after sexual activity” does not doom Brown’s case. Rep. Br. 10.

                                             13
      In addition to misconstruing the facts, Flowers’s argument also misunderstands

our caselaw. He asserts that “the case[]law on ‘not necessarily physical[ly coercive]’

sexual relations between inmates and jailers is not the same as the law governing

forceful rape.” Aplt. Br. 33–34 (citation omitted) (quoting 
Graham, 741 F.3d at

1126
). But, as discussed above, our caselaw does not make a distinction between

sexual abuse carried out through physical and nonphysical coercion. And we

confirmed this principle in Smith v. Cochran. There, we found a constitutional

violation for sexual abuse and rape where a state employee who “acted as the

functional equivalent of a prison guard” told an inmate that “if she did not have sex

with him[,] he would report her misconduct.” 
Smith, 339 F.3d at 1209
, 1216. Thus,

our existing caselaw on sexual abuse of inmates is relevant and defines the contours

of Brown’s rights.

      Flowers also critiques Brown’s reliance on Graham. He argues that because it

established that consensual sex does not violate the Constitution, Graham includes

“conduct that does not necessarily violate an inmate’s rights.” Aplt. Br. 27. And

therefore, he maintains, Graham does not put officers on notice of conduct that does

violate an inmate’s rights. He acknowledges Graham’s statement that prisoners’

sexual-abuse claims “requir[e] at least some form of coercion (not necessarily

physical) by the prisoner’s 
custodians.” 741 F.3d at 1126 
(emphasis added). But he

suggests that this description of “‘not necessarily physical’ [coercion] refers to

conduct that might violate an inmate’s rights in a future case,” and that it is therefore

dicta and cannot control the outcome in this case. Aplt. Br. 27 (quoting Graham, 
741

                                           14
F.3d at 1126
). True, Graham did determine that consent is a defense to a

constitutional claim for sexual 
abuse. 741 F.3d at 1125
–26. But it also granted

summary judgment only after finding “overwhelming evidence of consent,” including

the plaintiff’s testimony.