Filed: Jul. 16, 2020
Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-4391 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. AHMOD SAQYAN HOOPER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00198-CCE-1) Submitted: July 8, 2020 Decided: July 16, 2020 Before THACKER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Alle
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-4391 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. AHMOD SAQYAN HOOPER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00198-CCE-1) Submitted: July 8, 2020 Decided: July 16, 2020 Before THACKER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Allen..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4391
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AHMOD SAQYAN HOOPER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00198-CCE-1)
Submitted: July 8, 2020 Decided: July 16, 2020
Before THACKER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Ira Knight, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Matthew G.T. Martin, United States Attorney, Meredith C. Ruggles, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ahmod Saqyan Hooper appeals the sentence imposed upon revocation of his
supervised release. Although he does not challenge the 18-month term of imprisonment
imposed by the district court, he argues that the additional term of supervised release is
plainly unreasonable because the district court failed to explicitly articulate how the
imposition of supervised release comported with the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018)
factors. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb,
738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We . . .
must determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,”
evaluating the same general considerations “‘employ[ed] in our review of original
sentences.’” United States v. Slappy,
872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). We will affirm a revocation sentence
if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and not “‘plainly unreasonable.’” United
States v. Padgett,
788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437).
“Only if a revocation sentence is unreasonable must we assess whether it is plainly so.”
Id.
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”
Slappy,
872 F.3d at 207 (footnotes omitted). “[A] revocation sentence is substantively reasonable
if the court sufficiently state[s] a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed,” up to the statutory maximum.
Id. (internal quotation marks
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omitted). “A sentence within the policy statement range is presumed reasonable.”
Padgett,
788 F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record, we conclude that the district
court relied on appropriate factors and adequately justified imposing an additional term of
supervised release. Hooper’s 12-month term of supervised release is not unreasonable and,
therefore, not plainly so. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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