Filed: Sep. 30, 2020
Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2020
Summary: FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _ No. 1D19-4089 _ TERRANCE M. GARRISON, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. _ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—Original Jurisdiction. September 30, 2020 PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits. See Taylor v. State, 608 So. 2d 804 , 805 (Fla. 1992) (“[W]e hereby reiterate that aggravated assault is not a category-one necessarily lesser included offense of armed robbery.”)); Bell v. State, 114 So. 3d 229,
Summary: FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _ No. 1D19-4089 _ TERRANCE M. GARRISON, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. _ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—Original Jurisdiction. September 30, 2020 PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits. See Taylor v. State, 608 So. 2d 804 , 805 (Fla. 1992) (“[W]e hereby reiterate that aggravated assault is not a category-one necessarily lesser included offense of armed robbery.”)); Bell v. State, 114 So. 3d 229, ..
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D19-4089
_____________________________
TERRANCE M. GARRISON,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
_____________________________
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—Original Jurisdiction.
September 30, 2020
PER CURIAM.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits.
See Taylor v. State,
608 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 1992) (“[W]e hereby
reiterate that aggravated assault is not a category-one necessarily
lesser included offense of armed robbery.”)); Bell v. State,
114 So.
3d 229, 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“Since that clarification [in
Taylor], the district courts have uniformly held that separate
convictions for robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault with
a firearm do not violate double jeopardy.”) (citations omitted); see
also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(o) (providing that an information will
not be dismissed nor the judgment arrested nor a new trial granted
based on a defect in the form of the information “unless the court
shall be of the opinion that the . . . information is so vague,
indistinct, and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass
him or her in the preparation of a defense or expose the accused
after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new
prosecution for the same offense”).
RAY, C.J., and BILBREY and JAY, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Terrance M. Garrison, pro se, Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
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