ORDER

EILEEN S. WILLETT, Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court is Krista Purnell's ("Plaintiff") appeal of the Social Security Administration's ("Social Security") decision on her application for disability benefits. The Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff's appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 10).

After reviewing the Administrative Record ("A.R.") and the parties' briefing (Docs. 21, 25, 28), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision contains harmful legal error. For the reasons explained in Section II below, the decision is reversed and the case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further administrative proceedings.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Disability Analysis: Five-Step Evaluation

The Social Security Act (the "Act") provides for disability insurance benefits to those who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act also provides for Supplemental Security Income to certain individuals who are aged 65 or older, blind, or disabled and have limited income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382. To be eligible for benefits based on an alleged disability, the claimant must show that he or she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prohibits him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(A)(3)(A). The claimant must also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.

To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four steps:1

If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner:2

B. Standard of Review Applicable to ALJ's Determination

The Court must affirm an ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although "substantial evidence" is less than a preponderance, it is more than a "mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). "Substantial evidence" means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ's conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. See Morgan v. Comm'r of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be upheld."); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence and determining credibility. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).

Finally, the Court considers the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an ALJ's decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ's decision need not be remanded or reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is "inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision and the error "does not negate the validity of the ALJ's ultimate conclusion") (citations omitted).

II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, who was born in 1984, has been employed as an office clerical worker, warehouse worker, hostess, and caregiver. (A.R. 702, 724). In February 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits. (A.R. 137-38). Plaintiff's application alleged that on September 28, 2012, she became unable to work due to ependymoma. (A.R. 40). Social Security denied the application on May 2, 2013. (A.R. 79-82). Social Security also denied Plaintiff supplemental security income. (A.R. 83-86). On December 6, 2013, upon Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, Social Security affirmed the denial of disability benefits. (A.R. 88-89). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. (A.R. 91-92). An ALJ conducted a hearing in July 2014. (A.R. 697-728). In her August 18, 2014 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. (A.R. 22-23). The ALJ found that Plaintiff's disability ended on October 27, 2013 due to medical improvement. (A.R. 23).

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's ruling that Plaintiff's disability ended. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6). On December 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requesting judicial review and reversal of the ALJ's decision.

B. The ALJ's Application of the Five-Step Disability Analysis

1. Step One: Engagement in "Substantial Gainful Activity"

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 28, 2012. (A.R. 17). Neither party disputes this determination.

2. Step Two: Presence of Medically Severe Impairment/Combination of Impairments

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: (i) degenerative disc disease; (ii) status post C5-C7 laminectomy and resection of cervical spinal cord tumor; and (iii) obesity. (A.R. 18). This determination is undisputed.

3. Step Three: Presence of Listed Impairment(s)

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 19). Neither party disputes the ALJ's determination at this step.

4. Step Four: Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work

i. September 28, 2012 Through October 26, 2013

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013 to perform light exertional work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except that:

(A.R. 19). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") and Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. (A.R. 22). The parties do not dispute this determination.

ii. October 27, 2013 Through Present

The ALJ found that beginning on October 27, 2013, there was medical improvement in Plaintiff's ability to function. (A.R. 23). The ALJ adjusted Plaintiff's RFC by removing the condition that there be the option to lie down throughout the workday. The ALJ wrote:

(A.R. 23). After considering the testimony of the VE and Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ determined that beginning on October 27, 2013, Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work as an office clerical worker. (A.R. 26-27). Plaintiff appeals this determination.

5. Step Five: Capacity to Perform Other Work

At the final step, the ALJ found that from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013, there were no jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed. (A.R. 22-23). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. (A.R. 23). The ALJ's finding at Step Five is undisputed.

C. The ALJ's Determination that Medical Improvement Occurred on October 27, 2013

Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled for a finite period of time, this is a "closed period" case. See Shepherd v. Apfel, 184 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) ("In a `closed period' case, the decision maker determines that a new applicant for disability benefits was disabled for a finite period of time which started and stopped prior to the date of his decision.") (quoting Pickett v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 288, 289 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987).

Under Ninth Circuit law, "once a claimant has been found disabled, a presumption of continuing disability arises in [the claimant's] favor."3 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bellamy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 755 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985)); see Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1983). However, Social Security may terminate disability benefits when medical improvement restores a claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594, 416.994. "Medical improvement" means "any decrease in the medical severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s) which was present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that [the claimant was] disabled or continued to be disabled." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(1), 416.994(b)(1)(i). "A determination that there has been a decrease in medical severity must be based on changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings associated with [the claimant's] impairment(s) (see § 404.1528)4." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(1), 416.994(b)(1)(i). To determine whether medical improvement has occurred, Social Security compares the "current medical severity of th[e] impairment [ ] . . . to the medical severity of that impairment[] at th[e] time" of the most recent favorable decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(7), 416.994(b)(1)(vii).

Pursuant to Social Security regulations, an ALJ must use an eight-step sequential analysis in determining whether to terminate a claimant's disability insurance benefits due to medical improvement.5 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f). The sequential analysis applies to "closed period" cases such as Plaintiff's case.6 The analysis is to assure that "any decisions to stop disability benefits are made objectively, neutrally and are fully documented." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f). The eight steps are as follows:

20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(1)-(8).

In making the above sequential analysis, Step 3 must not be given short shrift. "[A]n ALJ may not move to the evaluation of a claimant's RFC without first finding medical improvement, and the Act does not authorize an ALJ to find medical improvement without making the comparison of prior and current medical evidence." Medina v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-01967-DMR, 2015 WL 5448498, at * 12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015); Osborn v. Barnhart, No. 03M-2529, 2004 WL 2091480, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 6, 2004) ("While earlier medical records are in the file and the ALJ said that he gave careful consideration to all the evidence, he did not say how he compared the symptoms, signs and laboratory findings, in those earlier records with the later reports. . . . [Thus] [t]he ALJ's analysis was improper under the law and the decision therefore must be reversed for legal error.").

The ALJ's decision in this case discussed and followed the five-step sequential analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) when finding that Plaintiff was disabled from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. Although the ALJ's decision recites the eight-step analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f), the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ applied correct legal standards in determining that Plaintiff was no longer disabled as of October 27, 2013.

The ALJ's finding that medical improvement occurred rests entirely on Dr. Mark Binette's October 26, 2013 examination of Plaintiff.9 (A.R. 23). Dr. Binette is a consulting physician who did not review any of Plaintiff's medical records. (A.R. 582). The ALJ's reference to Dr. Binette's report does not satisfy the ALJ's obligation under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(7) to compare Plaintiff's prior and current medical evidence in determining whether medical improvement has occurred.10 The ALJ has not met her burden of showing that Plaintiff has experienced medical improvement that would allow Plaintiff to engage in substantial gainful activity. See McCalmon v. Astrue, 319 F. App'x 658, 659 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The Commissioner bears the burden of establishing that a claimant has experienced medical improvement that would allow him to engage in substantial gainful activity."). The ALJ's failure to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 in determining that Plaintiff is no longer disabled as of October 27, 2013 is not inconsequential.11 Reversal is required. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (court may reverse Social Security Commissioner's decision only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error); Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[I]f the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence.").

In addition, the ALJ's decision contains many inconsistencies and errors that cause the Court to question the ALJ's decision. For example, the ALJ found that beginning on October 27, 2013, Plaintiff's statements regarding her symptoms were not credible. (A.R. 24). The ALJ stated that Plaintiff's trip to Las Vegas in June 2013 "at least raises the question whether she was as limited as alleged." (A.R. 25). This conflicts with the conclusion reached earlier in the decision that Plaintiff's statements regarding her symptoms were "generally credible" from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. (A.R. 21). The decision also contains a large number of incorrect references. For example, the decision states that "great weight is given to Dr. Paul Bendheim, a consultative physician." (A.R. 25). However, the record reflects that Plaintiff was not examined by Dr. Bendheim. In another paragraph, Plaintiff's mother (Ms. Purnell) is referred to as a "he" and as "Mr. Bradley." (A.R. 21). No individual named Mr. Bradley is referenced in the record.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and remanding the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ shall issue a new decision that is consistent with the applicable law as set forth in this Order. The ALJ, however, is not precluded from reopening the hearing to receive additional evidence if deemed appropriate. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.