MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Steven G. Cryar brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 13, 18) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument held February 2, 2018, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of § 405(g).1

I. Background

On January 26, 2014, Cryar filed an application for a period of disability and DIB with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). On November 17, 2015, he also filed an application for SSI. Both applications alleged disability beginning October 15, 2009.2 After his applications were initially denied, Cryar requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") with the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review; a hearing was held on January 15, 2016. On February 29, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Cryar's applications, finding him not entitled to benefits. (See R. 17-31).

The Commissioner's decision on Cryar's applications became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied Cryar's request for review of the ALJ's decision on April 28, 2017. (R. 1-5). Cryar then filed this action under §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. See (Doc. 1); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) ("The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title."); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II. Standards of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts.").3 "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must . . . tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) . . . As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).4

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But "when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous." Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. Nevertheless, "when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the applicant attacks only the ALJ's decision, the Court may not consider evidence that was presented to the Appeals Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324.

III. Analysis

A. Summary of ALJ Decision

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Cryar met the applicable insured status requirements through December 31, 2014, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date, October 15, 2009. (R. 22). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Cryar had the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder and personality disorder. (R. 22-23). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Cryar did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of one of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of Impairments. (R. 23-25).

At Step Four,

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Cryar had the RFC "to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels[6] but with the following nonexertional limitations[:] The claimant is limited to the simple, routine[] tasks of unskilled work involving short simple instructions and simple workplace decisions, with minimal change in the work setting. The claimant can maintain concentration, persistence, and pace for two-hour periods. He can interact with coworkers on a basic level, but it would be best for him to have a well-spaced work environment that would reduce the amount of interaction required. Contact with the public should not be a usual part of the job. He also cannot perform work at a production pace, though he can do goal-oriented type work." (R. 25-29).

Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Cryar was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 29). At Step Five, after taking testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ found that there exist a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Cryar could perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 29-30). Thus, the ALJ found that Cryar was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 30-31).

B. Medical Opinion of Dr. Starkey

Evidence considered by the Commissioner in making a disability determination may include medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). "`Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). "There are three tiers of medical opinion sources: (1) treating physicians; (2) nontreating, examining physicians; and (3) nontreating, nonexamining physicians." Himes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App'x 758, 762 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2)). "In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician's opinion; (4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the physician's specialization. These factors apply to both examining and non-examining physicians." Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)).

Among the medical opinions reviewed by the ALJ in this case was that from psychologist Dr. Kenneth Starkey, who conducted a consultative examination of Cryar on April 21, 2014. (See R. 23). The ALJ summarized Dr. Starkey's opinion as follows:

(R. 27). While recognizing "that the opinions of examining sources are generally to be accorded more weight than those of non-examining sources," the ALJ nevertheless assigned "little weight to Dr. Starkey's opinion that [Cryar] has a `marginal' ability to interact with coworkers or deal with common work pressures because such opinions are inconsistent with Dr. Starkey's own diagnosis of depressive disorder `in partial remission' and his assessment of a global assessment of functioning (GAF) score of 63." (R. 28) The ALJ assigned "the remainder of Dr. Starkey's opinions . . . some weight," without elaboration. (R. 28). Cryar argues that the ALJ reversibly erred "by failing to give adequate weight to" Dr. Starkey's opinion. (Doc. 13 at 4).

Unlike treating physicians, an ALJ is not required to afford special deference to the opinions of one-time examining physicians. See McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Nevertheless, the law of this Circuit holds that "the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor[,]" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179, and those reasons must be supported by substantial evidence.7 While the undersigned expresses no opinion as to what weight Dr. Starkey's opinion should ultimately be assigned, the undersigned finds that the ALJ did not adequately explain his reasons for the weight he assigned to Dr. Starkey's opinion, and that his decision to assign more weight to the opinion of a non-examining physician was thus unjustified.

First, the ALJ stated no reason for giving only "some weight" to the portion of Dr. Starkey's opinion that was not given "little weight."

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.8

Second, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's two reasons for assigning "little weight" to Dr. Starkey's opinions of "marginal" abilities. As to Dr. Starkey's diagnosis of depressive disorder in partial remission, the ALJ does not elaborate on why he believes such a diagnosis is inconsistent with a marginal ability to interact with coworkers or deal with common work pressures, and generally "the mere existence of . . . impairments does not reveal the extent to which they limit [a claimant's] ability to work . . ." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213 n.6. For all it appears, the ALJ simply substituted his own judgment as to the significance of a diagnosis for that of a medical professional. See Freeman v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that the ALJ reversibly erred when he "improperly substituted his judgment of the claimant's condition for that of the medical and vocational experts"); Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 840-41 (11th Cir. 1992) (Johnson, J., concurring specially) ("An ALJ may, of course, engage in whatever idle speculations regarding the legitimacy of the claims that come before him in his private or personal capacity; however, as a hearing officer he may not arbitrarily substitute his own hunch or intuition for the diagnosis of a medical professional.").

As for Dr. Starkey's assessment of a 63 GAF score for Cryar, the Eleventh Circuit has explained the significance of GAF scores in disability determinations as follows:

Thornton, 597 F. App'x at 613. In short, "GAF scores do not necessarily reflect a person's ability to do work." id. The ALJ himself further diminished any significance that could have been attached to Dr. Starkey's GAF score when he later assigned "little weight" to the various GAF scores in evidence, observing that "a GAF score is of limited value in assessing functional capacity[,] can be based upon factors not relevant to a determination of disability, and are not designed for adjudicative determinations." (R. 28).

While assigning "little" weight to some of Dr. Starkey's opinion and only "some" to the rest, and assigning "some" weight to the opinion of consultative examining psychologist Dr. Thomas Bennett, the ALJ appeared to attach greater weight to the opinion of non-examining state agency consultant Dr. Donald Hinton because he "was able to review much of the claimant's medical records, including the assessments of both consultative examiners." (R. 28). By assigning more weight to Dr. Hinton's opinion than the opinions of the examining physicians, the ALJ indicated, at least in his judgment, that Dr. Hinton's opinion materially differed from those of the examining physicians. However, "[t]he opinions of nonexamining, reviewing physicians, . . . when contrary to those of the examining physicians, are entitled to little weight . . ." Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).9

Dr. Starkey's examination of Cryar occurred a mere 8 days before Dr. Hinton rendered his opinion, and Dr. Starkey's report states that the "medical evidence of record provided by the DDS was reviewed and those findings were considered in the overall assessment of the patient" (R. 440), thus indicating that Dr. Starkey largely reviewed the same evidence as Dr. Hinton.10 As explained above, the ALJ gave no reason for assigning "some weight" to part of Dr. Starkey's opinion, and his reasons for assigning "little weight" to the rest of the opinion were based on two perceived, insubstantial discrepancies between the opinion and Dr. Starkey's notes. The ALJ gave no clear indication he found Dr. Starkey's opinion to be inconsistent with the other medical evidence of record.11 As such, when presented with two medical opinions that, by all appearances, were based on review of the same evidence, the ALJ erred in crediting the opinion of the non-examiner over that of the examiner, absent other reasons for doing so that were both clearly stated and supported by substantial evidence.

In sum, the ALJ failed to give reasons for assigning "little" to "some" weight to Dr. Starkey's opinion that were both clearly articulated and supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the ALJ was not entitled to assigned greater weight to the opinion of a non-examining physician. These mistakes constitute reversible error.12 Thus, the Commissioner's final decision denying Cryar's applications for benefits is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of § 405(g).13

Cryar requests that his case be remanded to the Commissioner with directions he be "found disabled," and only requests a remand for further proceedings in the alternative. (Doc. 13 at 7). Generally, remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings "is warranted where the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards." Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 534 (11th Cir. 1993). While this Court may enter an order "awarding disability benefits where the [Commissioner] has already considered the essential evidence and it is clear that the cumulative effect of the evidence establishes disability without any doubt[,]" id., Cryar has failed to convince the undersigned that this standard is met here.14 Moreover, the reversible error in this case stems from the ALJ's failure to state sufficient reasons for assigning "some" to "little" weight to a one-time examining physician's opinion. As noted previously, the Commissioner is not required to afford special deference to such an opinion, and the undersigned finds no reason to believe that the Commissioner would be unable, on remand, to offer clearly articulated, substantially supported reasons for assigning the same weight to Dr. Starkey's opinion.15 Accordingly, the undersigned finds it appropriate in this case to remand for further proceedings.

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner's final decision issued April 28, 2017, denying Cryar's applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI is REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), for further proceedings consistent with this decision. This remand under sentence four of § 405(g) makes Cryar a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993), and terminates this Court's jurisdiction over this matter.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), should Cryar be awarded Social Security benefits on the subject applications following this remand, the Court hereby grants Cryar's counsel an extension of time in which to file a motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) until thirty days after the date of receipt of a notice of award of benefits from the SSA.16 Consistent with 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c), "the date of receipt of notice . . . shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of such notice, unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary." If multiple award notices are issued, the time for filing a § 406(b) fee motion shall run from the date of receipt of the latest-dated notice.

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED.