VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Arlene Green brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. She seeks review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), who denied her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").
Ms. Green was 53 years old at the time of her hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Compare Tr. 171 with Tr. 23. She has a high school equivalent education. Tr. 193. Her past work experience includes employment as a nurse's aid. Tr. 190. She claims she became disabled on November 13, 2008,
On January 7, 2009, Ms. Green protectively filed a Title II application for a application for SSI on that date. Id. On April 2, 2009, the Commissioner initially denied these claims. Id. Ms. Green timely filed a written request for a hearing on April 7, 2009. Id. The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on March 21, 2011. Id. On September 13, 2011, she issued her opinion concluding Ms. Green was not disabled and denying her benefits. Tr. 34. She timely petitioned the Appeals Council to review the decision on September 28, 2011. Tr. 18. On January 18, 2013, the Appeals Council issued a denial of review on her claim. Tr. 1.
Ms. Green filed a Complaint with this court on March 20, 2013, seeking review of the Commissioner's determination. Doc. 1. The Commissioner answered on June 28, 2013. Doc. 7. Ms. Green filed a supporting brief (doc. 10) on August 12, 2013, and the Commissioner responded with her own (doc. 11) on September 11, 2013.
The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must "scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. It is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id.
This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ's legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ's decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Id.
After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:
Tr. 25-34.
The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "This does not relieve the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding." Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). However, the court "abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Id. (citation omitted).
Ms. Green primarily alleges pain as the source of her disability. The court will thus examine whether the ALJ properly evaluated Ms. Green's's pain-based allegations under the prevailing standards in this Circuit. A claimant who seeks "to establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other symptoms" must show the following:
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). An ALJ must articulate "explicit and adequate reasons" in order to discredit subjective testimony. Id. (citation omitted). Failure to do so "requires, as a matter of law, that the testimony be accepted as true." Id. (citation omitted). However, the ALJ does not need to "specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision," so long as the decision shows that the ALJ considered the claimant's medical condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
The ALJ here was both explicit and convincing in explaining why she discredited Ms. Green's allegations regarding the disabling effects of her pain. She first conceded that Ms. Green's claims were credible to a limited extent. Tr. 28-29. Specifically, the ALJ credited Ms. Green's descriptions of back and neck pain, left wrist and right finger pain, and breathing difficulties. Id. The ALJ clarified that she accounted for these limitations by prescribing certain postural, manipulative, and environmental restrictions in her RFC assessment. Id. However, the ALJ ultimately discounted Ms. Green's assertion that her pain was totally disabling because of "significant inconsistencies in the record as a whole." Tr. 29.
The ALJ then meticulously documented which parts of the record undermined Ms. Green's disability claims. This included the following evidence:
Tr. 29-30. Altogether, the ALJ provided "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support [her] conclusion." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. The ALJ assessed Ms. Green's condition in its entirety and identified specific parts of the record that supported her RFC determination. The court therefore finds that substantial evidence supports it.
Ms. Green next argues that the ALJ misinterpreted the opinion evidence offered by two consultative examiners: Dr. Frank G. Gillis, M.D., and by Dr. Pramelia D. Goli, M.D. Doc. 10 at 5, Tr. 258-59. In his April 26, 2007, report summarizing his examination of Ms. Green, Dr. Gillis noted Ms. Green's persistent reports of pain. Tr. 296. He further observed that she was generally "a well nourished[,] well developed white female who is alert and oriented with no acute distress noted. [She was] [a]ppropriately attired and cooperative with examiner." Tr. 297. He finally concluded that she "would have difficulty with job requirements involving prolonged standing, sitting, walking, bending, lifting, pushing, pulling, bending or twisting of head and/or waist." Tr. 299. In her opinion, the ALJ noted this conclusion and stated the following:
Tr. 32. Later on, the ALJ found this opinion consistent with that of Dr. Goli, who rendered the following conclusions regarding Ms. Green in June 2011:
Id. The ALJ also gave this opinion great weight and found that it and Dr. Gillis's report further supported her conclusion that Ms. Green could perform a reduced range of light work. Id.
Ms. Green argues that the ALJ essentially mischaracterized this evidence. Specifically, Ms. Green maintains that the ALJ somehow "rejected" Dr. Gillis's opinion by construing the word "prolonged" to mean "constant." Tr. 258-59. Ms. Green also contends that Dr. Goli in fact "assessed an ability to lift no more than ten pounds." Doc. 10 at 5. In her judgment, both doctors' opinions support a finding that she could only perform sedentary, rather than light, range of work. Id. at 5-6.
The evidence does not support Ms. Green's interpretation. As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the opinion of a one-time examiner is not entitled to deference. McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Gibson v. Heckler, 729 F.2d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1986)). However, the ALJ may credit such an opinion if record evidence otherwise supports it. Such was the case here. The Regulations define "light work" in the following manner:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). This description — along with the detailed restrictions the ALJ prescribed to tailor her RFC assessment to Ms. Green's condition — cohere with the judgments offered by Drs. Gillis and Goli. Contrary to Ms. Green's contention, Dr. Goli did not opine that she could lift no more than ten pounds. Rather, he indicated that she could "frequently" — i.e. one-third to two-thirds of the time — lift up to 10 pounds. Tr. 351. Such a conclusion is consonant with a reduced range of light work as described above. Moreover, the ALJ's construction of Dr. Gillis's use of "prolonged" to mean "constant" is both reasonable and supported by the general thrust of the doctor's report. Altogether, then, the court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated this opinion evidence.
Ms. Green finally argues that the ALJ failed to assess the collective effect of Ms. Green's various severe impairments. She complains that the ALJ only evaluated her impairments separately and did not provide her overall condition with the holistic analysis it merited.
"When a claimant has alleged [multiple impairments], a claim for [disability benefits] may lie even though none of the impairments, considered individually, is disabling." Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (internal quotation omitted). An ALJ must therefore make "specific and well-articulated findings" as to the combined effect of all impairments that a claimant has. Id. (citations omitted); see also Gibson v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that ALJ must address the degree of impairment cased by the "combination of physical and mental medical problems") (citations omitted); Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that an ALJ did not give adequate consideration to effect that combination of exertional and non-exertional impairments had on claimant's ability to work). The ALJ's failure to consider properly a claimant's condition requires remand. Vega v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 2001).
The record here reveals that the ALJ adequately evaluated the cumulative effect of Ms. Green's impairments. In her opinion, she did not evaluate the impact of each of these impairments simply in isolation. Instead, she assigned Ms. Green an RFC designation that clearly reflected the breadth of Ms. Green's medical history. Moreover, the ALJ considered medical evidence from Ms. Green's various physicians — who, in turn, were obviously assessing Ms. Green's entire condition and not just specific ailments. Altogether, the court finds the ALJ's analysis in this area sufficient under the standards prevailing in this Circuit.
Based upon the court's evaluation of the evidence in the record and the parties' submissions, the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and that she applied proper legal standards in arriving at it. Accordingly, the decision will be affirmed by separated order.
