ORDER

JAMES A. TEILBORG, Senior District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Eulandas J. Flowers' Motion to Amend/Correct the Clerk's Judgment. (Doc. 183). Plaintiff's motion is in response to the Court's August 18, 2016, Order entering judgment in favor of Defendants and terminating the case, (Docs. 175, 176, 177), on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) (the "PLRA"). This finding was premised on evidence presented to the Court during a bench trial held on June 16, 17, and August 2, 2016. Plaintiff takes exception to the Court's finding, and seeks amendment. Having considered Plaintiff's filing, the Court now rules on the motion.1

I.

Plaintiff's motion seeks post-judgment relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a provision enacted to allow litigants to seek substantive change to a judgment entered by the Court.2 Indeed, the Rule's drafters intended Rule 59(e) to "mak[e] clear that the district court possesses the power to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment." Maxwell v. Sherman, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61852, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2016) (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982)).

"Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule offers an `extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.'" Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). "[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error,3 or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law." Id. (quoting 389 Orange Street Partners, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)).4 "A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation." Id. (emphasis in original).

II.

Plaintiff's motion contends that the Court clearly erred in finding that he failed to satisfy the requirements of the PLRA, a theory resting on two arguments. Plaintiff argues that: (1) he utilized all available administrative remedies, and (2) that he should have been represented by counsel at the bench trial. The Court begins by addressing the latter.

A. Denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel

There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Johnson v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991). But the Court may request that counsel represent an indigent civil litigant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2012) under "exceptional circumstances."5 Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (quoting Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103). On May 6, 2016, the Court set the issue of exhaustion under the PLRA for bench trial. (Doc. 116). On May 12, 2016, the Court then denied a pending Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. 117). In this Order, the Court specifically noted that Plaintiff's request deserved close scrutiny, as a disputed material fact existed and the forthcoming bench trial would require Plaintiff to "handle issues of conflicting testimony and credibility on his own." (Doc. 117 at 3). After more closely scrutinizing Plaintiff's request, the Court found both that the structure of the bench trial would allow the Court to "take special precautions to `avoid undue prejudice to the pro se litigant,'" (id. at 4 (citation omitted)), and that Plaintiff had demonstrated ample ability to competently prosecute his own civil case in light of its complexities. (Id. at 3). Thus, the "exceptional circumstances that might require appointment of counsel [we]re not present," and Plaintiff's motion was denied. (Id. at 4).

Plaintiff's reliance on this basis in support of his pending motion is improper. The Court denied Plaintiff's most recent Motion to Appoint Counsel on May 12, 2016. (Doc. 117). A motion to reconsider this Order pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(g)6 was due within fourteen days of the Order's issuance. Plaintiff filed no such motion, and did not thereafter renew his efforts to request appointment of counsel. Re-litigation of this issue is both untimely and falls outside of the scope of review of the Court's August 18, 2016, Order. It is not a proper basis to support amending the judgment under Rule 59(e).

Nonetheless, even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff's argument, it is not persuasive. Plaintiff relies primarily on Solis v. County of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2008), asserting that because the mechanism of a bench trial was used to adjudicate the issue of exhaustion, Plaintiff needed legal representation as he is "ill-suited to conduct a trial." (Doc. 183 at 4-5). But the court in Solis did not hold that the plaintiff was entitled to legal representation. Rather, the Ninth Circuit held that "the district court failed to articulate its reasons for denying" the plaintiff's request for counsel, and remanded for the district court to "reconsider his request," taking into account the fact that the plaintiff was incarcerated, had no legal training, possessed an eighth grade education, and would be required to litigate his case before a jury. Solis, 514 F.3d at 958.

Here, the Court provided ample reasoning in its May 12, 2016, Order to support its finding that Plaintiff failed to make the necessary showing to justify a request for counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). (See Doc. 117 at 2-5). Moreover, the trial at issue in Solis was a jury trial, whereas a bench trial was held in the instant matter, allowing the Court to enact appropriate measures to ensure that Plaintiff was not subjected to undue prejudice. And, as the Court noted in the May 12 Order, Plaintiff has demonstrated ample ability to intelligently argue his position in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Having observed Plaintiff's conduct during trial, the Court's finding has been bolstered significantly. Plaintiff displayed a keen ability to carry out both direct examination of himself and cross-examination of Defendants' witnesses, he displayed sound knowledge of the facts of his case, the PLRA, as well as ADOC internal regulations, and he made succinct, cogent arguments in his favor, acquitting himself exceptionally well as a pro se litigant.

Even now—seeking post-judgment relief—Plaintiff has not demonstrated an inability "to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved." Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (citation omitted). The "exceptional circumstances," necessary to grant a request under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) are not present. Plaintiff's argument is both improper and unpersuasive.

B. Satisfaction of Available Administrative Remedies

Turning to the second argument in support of Plaintiff's Motion to Alter/Amend the Clerk's Judgment, he begins by noting that pursuant to Department Order (DO) 802.01.1.8.1, Inmate Grievance Procedure, which governs the ADOC grievance policy, an inmate may submit a verbal or written emergency complaint and is not required to use the formal inmate grievance procedure. (Doc. 183 at 3). Plaintiff further asserts that the evidence at trial established that he made a formal, emergency grievance to Sergeant J. Johnson,7 in which he alerted Johnson to a "substantial risk of medical harm, personal injury and a serious risk of irreparable harm." (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff claims that he also "formally . . . grieved on video" from April 3 through April 5, 2014. (Id.). Plaintiff thus contends either that the Court clearly erred in finding that Sergeant Johnson did not lead him to believe he could file a grievance on the provided video camera or, alternatively, that Plaintiff filed an emergency, oral grievance in accordance with ADOC regulations and exhausted his administrative remedies.

The Court is not persuaded by either argument. In the Court's April 25, 2016, Order granting in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court expressly noted that "[t]here [was] no dispute that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his claims to the Director's level as required by the [ADOC's] grievance policy." (Doc. 109 at 12). Thus, the issue at summary judgment was "whether there [was] something particular in this case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to Plaintiff." (Id.). With respect to all of Plaintiff's alleged efforts to file a grievance—save for his claim that he was told by Sergeant Johnson that he could file an oral, emergency grievance on video camera between April 2 and April 5, 2014— Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Focusing on Plaintiff's alleged oral grievances on camera between April 2 and April 5, the Court explained that there were several material facts in dispute that necessitated trial to resolve. These facts were "whether Sergeant Johnson told Plaintiff that he could orally file an emergency grievance via videotape while Plaintiff was on defecation watch, whether Plaintiff relied on that alleged assertion to believe that he was properly exhausting and did not need to follow the general grievance process, and whether Plaintiff made such a recording of his grievances relating to his claims of assault and denial of medical care and necessities." (Doc. 109 at 14 n.5). If Sergeant Johnson had reasonably led Plaintiff to (wrongly) believe he could comply with ADOC regulations by speaking into the provided video camera, then that could constitute misinformation from a prison official to an inmate rendering the existing and generally available administrative remedies unavailable to Plaintiff.

In the Court's August 18, 2016, Order, the Court made a negative finding with respect to the first disputed factual issue. Thus, there was no particular fact or circumstance that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies unavailable to Plaintiff between April 2 and April 5.8 And as there was no dispute between the parties that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his claims to the Director's level as required by ADOC's grievance policy, Defendant had carried its burden and established by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff failed to exhaust under the PLRA.

Nothing argued in Plaintiff's post-judgment motion persuades the Court that it clearly erred in finding that Sergeant Johnson did not lead Plaintiff to reasonably believe he could comply with ADOC grievance procedures by utilizing the video camera placed in front of his cell. Plaintiff's principal argument amounts to an invitation to reassess the Court's prior finding.9 "Rule 59 motions cannot be used to ask the Court `to rethink what the court has already thought through," merely because a [party] disagrees with the Court's decision." Stejic v. Aurora Loan Servs., L.C.C., CV 10-1547-PHX-JAT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37134, at *11 (D. Ariz. March 20, 2012), rev'd on other grounds by In re Mort. Elec. Registration Sys., 754 F.3d 772, 797 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting U.S. v. Bus. Recovery Servs., LLC, No. CV 11-390-PHX-JAT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119973 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2011)). Such a disagreement "should be dealt with in the normal appellate process." Stejic, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37134, at *11 (citation omitted).

But, as noted supra, Plaintiff's post-judgment motion makes a second argument. Plaintiff contends that pursuant to DO 802.01.1.8, an inmate may "submit a verbal or written emergency complaint" and need not "use the formal Inmate Grievance Procedure." (Doc. 183 at 2). Thus, Plaintiff appears to assert, regardless of whether Sergeant Johnson led him to believe he could use the video camera, he made an emergency complaint pursuant to ADOC's internal regulations, which was captured on camera, and he satisfied the available administrative remedies.

Plaintiff's argument—raised expressly for the first time post-judgment—is arguably improper, as it stretches to the limit the appropriate scope of reconsideration of the Court's prior Order. Whether Plaintiff's statements into the video camera constituted a grievance was conditioned on a finding that (a) Sergeant Johnson led him to reasonably believe he could initiate a grievance via video camera, and (b) Plaintiff relied on Sergeant Johnson's instruction. Whether Plaintiff initiated such an "emergency grievance" was not a separate inquiry presented to the Court, freeing Plaintiff from establishing the aforementioned factual conditions. To the extent that Plaintiff was seeking a factual finding on this issue at summary judgment or at trial, Plaintiff failed to articulate it.10 Indeed, in the adopted Final Pretrial Order, Plaintiff argued that he "relied on Sgt. Johnson's knowledge of D.O. 802.01.1.8.1 that under the emergency grievance provision" he "would verbally be able to enact an emergency grievance," and then that he initiated such a grievance on camera. (Doc. 136 at 3-4).

Nonetheless, even disregarding or ignoring the Court's prior orders and its present concerns—to the extent that the Court must make a separate factual finding—there is no evidence to support Plaintiff's claim that he made an on-camera, oral, emergency grievance under DO 802.01.1.8 between April 2 and April 5 while on defecation watch. ADOC regulations define an emergency condition as one "which, if processed through the normal grievance time frames, would subject the inmate to substantial risk of medical harm, personal injury or cause other serious and irreparable harm." DO 802.01.1.8.1. Testimony at trial described it as applying to "life-threatening situations."

Evidence submitted on June 16 and June 17, 2016, established neither that an emergency condition existed, nor that Plaintiff filed an "emergency grievance" on video camera.11 On June 30, 2016, the Court issued an Order continuing the bench trial and giving Plaintiff "the opportunity to, once again, view the video records on which he purports to have orally filed emergency grievances in early April of 2014." (Doc. 155). Having viewed all portions of the video evidence Plaintiff believes "constitutes a grievance," approximately an hour in total, the Court finds nothing to suggest either that an emergency condition existed or that Plaintiff filed what could be construed as an emergency grievance. To the extent Plaintiff offered testimonial evidence in support of his claim, the Court does not credit the testimony on the issue. The Court's negative credibility finding is based on conflicting evidence in the form of video recordings viewed in Court, and the rationale set forth in the Court's August 18, 2016, Order. (Doc. 177). Additionally, CO III Spears—whom the Court has found to be credible—testified that while Plaintiff was on defecation watch, Plaintiff had daily contact with prison staff frequently enough that there were "upwards of 53 times in a 24-hour block that" he could either declare an emergency or seek to initiate the grievance process. Plaintiff was unable to marshal any testimonial support for his claim that an emergency condition existed or that he declared an "emergency" under ADOC regulations.

Accordingly, nothing in Plaintiff's motion persuades the Court that in finding that Defendants established by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff failed to comply with the PLRA's requirements, it committed clear error. Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890. Plaintiff simply asks the Court "to rethink what the court has already thought through," which is not an appropriate basis for reconsideration under Rule 59. Stejic, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37134, at *11 (citation omitted). And even considering Plaintiff's alternative argument—raised post-judgment—that he filed an emergency grievance thereby satisfying the PLRA, the Court makes the factual finding that Plaintiff made no such grievance. It follows that no basis for reconsideration exists, and the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion.

III.

For the reasons discussed above,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct the Clerk's Judgment, (Doc. 183), is DENIED.