DEBRA M. BROWN, District Judge.
These consolidated actions are before the Court for consideration of "Partial Objection of Defendants Meritor Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc. and the Boeing Company to the Magistrate Judge's Ruling (Doc. #526) and Appeal to the District Court." Doc. #530.
On March 16, 2016, Brenda Cooper, Sylvia Caffey, Margaret Odems, Bernice Richardson, Dora Ward, Rosie Brady, Pearl Seldon, Betty Phillips, Alice Crumley, and Sylvia Cunningham filed a complaint in this Court against Rockwell International Corporation and the Randall Division of Textron, Inc. Doc. #1. On June 30, 2016, the case was consolidated with four member cases: No. 4:16-cv-53, No. 4:16-cv-54, No. 4:16-cv-55, and No. 4:16-cv-56. Doc. #41. The day after consolidation, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Meritor, Inc., Rockwell Automation Inc., The Boeing Company, and Textron, Inc. Doc. #43.
In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs, residents or former residents of Grenada County, Mississippi, seek to recover for injuries to their homes and property caused by a manufacturing plant located in Grenada, Mississippi. The plaintiffs allege that they "are residents or former residents of a neighborhood adjacent" to the manufacturing plant, specifically the "Eastern Heights" neighborhood, and that the plant was operated by: (1) Rockwell International Corporation, the predecessor to Rockwell Automation, Inc., which itself is a predecessor to The Boeing Company, from 1965 until 1985; and (2) Randall Wheel Trim, a subsidiary of Textron, Inc., from 1985 until the present. Doc. #43 at 1-6, 9. The plaintiffs further allege that the plant, which was used to manufacture chrome-plated wheel covers, utilized numerous chemicals, including hexavalent chromium and trichloroethylene ("TCE"), and that these chemicals were illegally placed into the environment, including the air and groundwater, with the defendants concealing such disposal. The plaintiffs assert six claims arising from the allegedly wrongful acts: (1) Fraud and Fraudulent Concealment (Count I); (2) Civil Conspiracy (Count II); (3) Negligence (Count III); (4) Nuisance (Count IV); (5) Trespass (Count V); and (6) Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VI). Subsequently, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Count I and Count II. Doc. #174.
On August 19, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden issued a case management order which set: (1) the discovery deadline as November 29, 2017; (2) the amendment deadline as October 20, 2016; (3) the plaintiffs' expert designation deadline as April 28, 2017; (4) the defendants' expert designation deadline as July 28, 2017; and (4) the dispositive motions deadline as December 29, 2017. Doc. #83. Later, Judge Virden, acting on motion of the defendants, extended the defendants' expert designation deadline until August 18, 2017. Doc. #263.
On June 21, 2017, the plaintiffs issued a subpoena to T&M Associates, Inc., an environmental firm which has contracted with Meritor for a number of years. Doc. #498-4. The subpoena sought seven categories of documents:
Id. at 8.
Following service of the subpoena, Meritor provided the plaintiffs with an index of potentially responsive documents. Then, the plaintiffs and Meritor engaged in a meet-and-confer process for production. This process resulted in the production of approximately 550,000 pages of material and a preliminary privilege log.
On August 18, 2017, Meritor, Boeing, and Rockwell, served their joint experts designation. Doc. #511-1. The document provided, in relevant part:
Id. at 3.
Exhibit F to the designation listed the following eighteen documents:
Id. at Ex. F. According to representations of the plaintiffs' counsel, Meritor provided copies of the enumerated documents, which included over 9,000 "pages of testing reports, analysis, logs, and other information, as well as . . . 46 megabytes of information contained in the EQUiS Database." Doc. #511 at 2 n.1.
On December 18, 2017, counsel for the plaintiffs sent an e-mail to counsel for Meritor asking Meritor to clarify what it "intended regarding Mr. Peeples' disclosure." Doc. #498-2 at 5. The next day, counsel for Meritor responded:
Id. at 3-4.
Over the ensuing months, the parties quarreled over the scope of discovery resulting from Peeples' dual designation. Ultimately, this Court granted two motions to compel filed by the plaintiffs and ordered disclosure of approximately 1,000 documents. See Doc. #612; Doc. #690.
On March 8, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to strike both designations of Peeples. Doc. #509. As grounds for such relief, the plaintiffs argued:
Doc. #510 at 2. Meritor, Boeing, and Rockwell ("Appealing Defendants") responded in opposition to the motion on March 22, 2018. Doc. #521. In response, the Appealing Defendants argued:
Id. at ¶¶ 9-10 (citations and paragraph numbering omitted). The Appealing Defendants further argued that the documents disclosed as part of Exhibit F satisfied the disclosure requirements for both Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and Rule 26(a)(2)(C). The plaintiffs replied on March 26, 2018. Doc. #524.
On April 2, 2018, Judge Virden entered an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to strike. Doc. #526. In her order, Judge Virden found that: (1) Peeples was not a specially retained expert under Rule 26(a)(2)(B); (2) even if Peeples could be deemed a specially retained expert, reports six through eighteen submitted in Exhibit F were inadequate under Rule 26(a)(2)(B); and (3) the reports in Exhibit F were inadequate under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) but, with the exception of the EQuIS Database report, were not so inadequate as to justify striking Peeples' Rule 26(a)(2)(C) designation with respect to the subject matter of such reports. Id. Accordingly, Judge Virden struck Peeples' Rule 26(a)(2)(B) designation in its entirety. Judge Virden also struck Peeples' Rule 26(a)(2)(C) designation insofar as it related to the subject matter of the EQuIS Database. However, Judge Virden declined to strike Peeples' Rule 26(a)(2)(C) designation insofar as it related to the other documents included in Exhibit F.
The Appealing Defendants appealed Judge Virden's order to the undersigned on April 16, 2018. Doc. #530.
"A party may serve and file objections to the order [of a magistrate judge] within 14 days after being served with a copy. . . . The district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see L.U. Civ. R. 72(a)(1)(B) ("No ruling of a magistrate judge . . . will be reversed, vacated, or modified on appeal unless the district judge determines that the magistrate judge's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, or that the magistrate judge's ruling is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.").
In their objections,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 governs discovery in federal court. With regard to experts, Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires that "a party must disclose . . . the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705." "[I]f the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony," Rule 26(a)(2)(B) mandates that the disclosure be accompanied by an expert report. In the event a report is not required, the disclosure must identify "the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence. . . and a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).
In her order, Judge Virden held that "it is the means by which a person who is expected to testify has gained the knowledge and reached the opinions to be expressed that governs the determination of whether the person is to be considered a specially retained reporting expert or a non-reporting expert." Doc. #526 at 6-7 (citing Tolan v. Cotton, No. H-09-1324, 2015 WL 5332171, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 14, 2015)). From there, Judge Virden held that because "Peeples's knowledge about the site was gained from years of working at or near the site on behalf of Meritor," he is precluded from serving as a specially retained expert witness. Id. at 7. In their objections, the defendants assert that this "reasoning ignores the possibility that an expert — such as a treating physician — could gain knowledge of the (historical) facts, treat the patient (or provide remediation services for an environmental site), and later be recruited to provide expert opinion testimony. . . ." Doc. #530 at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court agrees, to an extent.
When an "expert is part of the ongoing sequence of events and arrives at his causation opinion during [the events], his opinion testimony is not that of a retained or specially employed expert." Downey v. Bob's Discount Furniture Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011). In contrast, if "the expert comes to the case as a stranger and draws the opinion from facts supplied by others, in preparation for trial, he reasonably can be viewed as retained or specially employed for that purpose, within the purview of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)." Id. This is not to say, however, that a retained witness may not rely on facts which he personally observed.
A treating physician ordinarily subject to disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(C)
As explained above, a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) designation is only warranted when an expert will give an opinion based on facts beyond those observed in the expert's non-retained role. In this case, due to Meritor's unartful expert designation, the scope of Peeples' Rule 26(a)(2)(C) testimony mirrors the scope of Peeples' purported Rule 26(a)(2)(B) testimony. In light of this complete overlap, there is simply no indication that, in formulating his opinions, Peeples relied on any information obtained uniquely in his role as a retained expert. In the absence of uniquely obtained evidence, the Court concludes that Judge Virden did not err in finding Peeples to be an improperly designated Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert. Having reached this conclusion, the Court declines to address Meritor's arguments regarding the adequacy of the Exhibit F reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), or the potential prejudice arising from such disclosures.
For the reasons above, the Appealing Defendants' objections [530] are