MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. DAVID PROCTOR, District Judge.

The court has before it Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Albert van Bilderbeek and Francisco Ramirez Cuellar. (Docs. # 121 and 122). The Motions have been fully briefed (Docs. # 125, 126, 128 and 129), and are ripe for decision.

I. Introduction

On March 27, 2015, Plaintiffs Drummond Company, Inc. and Drummond Ltd. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Plaintiff" or "Drummond") filed its Complaint in this action. The Complaint alleges (1) violations of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count I), (2) conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count II), (3) willful and/or reckless misrepresentation in violation of Alabama Code § 6-5-101 (1975) (Count III), (4) fraudulent concealment/suppression of material facts in violation of Alabama Code § 6-5-102 (1975) (Count IV), and (5) civil conspiracy (Count V). (Doc. # 1-1). Van Bilderbeek and Ramirez, like Ivan Alfredo Otero Mendoza before them, seek to have the claims against them dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (See Docs. #121 and 122).

II. Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(2) motion tests the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). "A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction." United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir.2009); see also Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir.1999) ("A plaintiff seeking to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant initially need only allege sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction."). If a plaintiff satisfies his initial burden and a defendant then submits affidavit evidence in support of its position, the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction. See Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir.2002); see also Posner, 178 F.3d at 1214 ("`The plaintiff bears the burden of proving `by affidavit the basis upon which jurisdiction may be obtained' only if the defendant challenging jurisdiction files `affidavits in support of his position.'" (citation omitted)). When the issue of personal jurisdiction is decided on the record evidence, but without a discretionary hearing, a plaintiff demonstrates a "prima facie case of personal jurisdiction" by submitting evidence sufficient to defeat a motion made pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.2006). At this evidentiary juncture, the court construes the complaint's allegations as true if they are uncontroverted by affidavits or deposition testimony, id. at 1317; where there are conflicts, the court "construe[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 199 Fed. Appx. 738, 741 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) if a plaintiff fails to provide "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). That is, if a plaintiff "ha[s] not nudged [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [her] complaint must be dismissed." Id.; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 139 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (holding that Twombly was not limited to antitrust cases but rather was based on an interpretation and application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must "accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998)). "[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal." Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). Further, "[a] complaint may not be dismissed because the plaintiff's claims do not support the legal theory he relies upon since the court must determine if the allegations provide for relief on any [plausible] theory." Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original) (citing Robertson v. Johnston, 376 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967)). Nevertheless, conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal. Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002); see Kane Enters. v. MacGregor (USA) Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[A] plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusional allegations, to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim. We will thus not accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact.") (internal citations omitted); Kirwin v. Price Commc'ns. Corp., 274 F.Supp.2d 1242, 1248 (M.D. Ala. 2003) ("[A]lthough the complaint must be read liberally in favor of the plaintiff, the court may not make liberal inferences beyond what has actually been alleged."), aff'd in part, 391 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Relevant Factual Allegations

The court addresses separately the allegations made against the two moving Defendants.

A. Allegations Regarding Albert van Bilderbeek

Van Bilderbeek is defined in the Complaint as one of the "RICO Defendants." (Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 1. Therefore, all general allegations regarding the "RICO Defendants" made in the Complaint apply to van Bilderbeek.1 Additionally, the Complaint contains very specific factual allegations about van Bilderbeek:

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 17).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 37).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 62).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 63).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 65).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 91).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 94).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 96).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 97).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 98).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 99).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 100).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 106).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 158).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 159).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 160).

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 174(d)).

Plaintiff's RICO claim against van Bilderbeek is premised on violations of (1) the obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Doc. # 1-1 at 164) and (2) the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (Doc. # 1-1 at ¶¶ 176-77). Plaintiff's conspiracy to violate RICO claim, misrepresentation and fraudulent suppression claims, and civil conspiracy claim are all also stated against van Bilderbeek. (Doc. # 1-1 at ¶¶ 98-104).

In support of his Motion to Dismiss, van Bilderbeek has presented his own affidavit, as well as the affidavit of Terrence Collingsworth. (Doc. 121-1 and 121-2). In his affidavit, van Bilderbeek states that both he and Collingsworth were involved in litigation against Drummond and that they discussed their respective cases. (Doc. # 121-1 at ¶¶ 25, 26). He further admits that Collingsworth provided him "with statements concerning Drummond for dissemination in the Netherlands" and that he "was able to refer contact details of Dutch government officials to assist Mr. Collingsworth in sending certain statements about Drummond to them." (Doc. # 121-1 at ¶ 26). Van Bilderbeek confirms that "[p]ublic media statements issued by Mr. Collingsworth and others were placed on Llanos Oil's website." (Doc. # 121-1 at ¶ 27). However, van Bilderbeek denies any nefarious intent in these actions and asserts that these statements did not influence any Alabama proceedings. (Doc. # 121-1 at ¶ 28). Van Bilderbeek further admits to arranging payments to Jaime Blanco, but denies that those payments were for the purpose of securing testimony against Drummond. (Doc. # 121-1 at ¶¶ 30-31).

In response to van Bilderbeek's evidentiary submission, Plaintiff has cited to evidence developed in the record in Drummond v. Collingsworth, et al., Case No. 2:11-cv-03695-RDP-TMP ("the Defamation case"). More specifically, Plaintiff points to factual evidence filed in support of its Renewed Motion for Sanctions and to the court's Memorandum Opinion and Order on that Motion. (Case No. 2:11-cv-03695-RDP-TMP Docs. # 174, 417) Evidentiary materials and testimony taken in that case show the following:

(Case No. 2:11-cv-03695-RDP-TMP, Doc. # 417 at 23).

On February 21, 2011 Collingsworth made email contact with Blanco.

(Id.).

(Id.).

(Id.).

(Id.).

(Id.).

(Case No. 2:11-cv-03695-RDP-TMP, Doc. # 417 at 24).

(Id.).

(Id.).

(Id.).

B. Allegations Regarding Francisco Ramirez Cuellar ("Ramirez")

Ramirez is also named in the Complaint as one of the "RICO Defendants." (Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 1). Therefore the Complaint's general allegations regarding the "RICO Defendants" apply to him. Additionally, the Complaint contains the following specific factual allegations as to Ramirez:

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 15).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 35).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 39).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 42).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 43).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 44).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 46).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 88).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 108).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 110).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 111).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 112).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 114).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 115)

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 116).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 154).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 160 161).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 167).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 174(b)).

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 189).

The same claims asserted against van Bilderbeek are also asserted against Ramirez. (Doc. # 1-1 at pp. 84-105.).

IV. Analysis

Defendants' Motions present challenges to both the court's personal jurisdiction over them, the manner of service, and the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleadings. This court is bound to address the issue of personal jurisdiction first. "As a general rule, when the court is confronted by a motion raising a combination of 12(b) defenses, it will pass on the jurisdictional issues before considering whether a claim was stated by the complaint." C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, 1351 at 243-44; see also Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l., 320 F.2d 219, 221 (2d. Cir. 1963) (holding that it was error for district court to dismiss action for failure to state a claim prior to addressing challenges to personal jurisdiction and venue, because dismissal on the former ground would be with prejudice, while dismissal for either of the two latter grounds would be without prejudice).

A. Personal Jurisdiction

The court applies a two-part analysis in determining whether there is personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir.1990); see also Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 919 (11th Cir. 1989). First, the court considers the jurisdictional question under the state long-arm statute.2 See Cable/Home Communication Corp., 902 F.2d at 855; see also Alexander Proudfoot Co., 877 F.2d at 919. If there is a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction under the state statute, the next determination to be made is whether sufficient minimum contacts exist to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that "maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also Cable/Home Communication Corp., 902 F.2d at 855; Alexander Proudfoot Co., 877 F.2d at 919. The nature and quality of the contacts may vary depending on the type of jurisdiction being asserted (specific or general). See Consolidated Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000). Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied may a federal or state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

The reach of the Alabama long-arm statute is interpreted according to Alabama law. Federal courts are required to construe the statute as would the Supreme Court of Alabama. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-891 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama has made clear that its long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." Ala.R.Civ.P.. 4.2(b). Thus, the question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., Inc., 979 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983)). The requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause are met where the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, and where the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Olivier, 979 F.2d at 830-831; Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general. Plaintiff contends that this court has personal jurisdiction over van Bilderbeek and Ramirez based upon specific jurisdiction. (See Docs. # 125 at 14 and 126 at 10). Specific jurisdiction is based on a party's contacts with the forum state that arise out of or are related to the cause of action. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984); see also Consolidated Dev., 216 F.3d at 1291.

The exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper over a nonresident defendant when he has "`purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that `arise out of or relate to' those activities." Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473, 475 (1985) (internal citations omitted); Consolidated Dev., 216 F.3d at 1291. Requiring there to be minimum contacts before a court exercises personal jurisdiction is grounded in fairness. That requirement assures that "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State [is] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In cases of international defendants, the court should also consider "[t]he unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system." Asahi Metal Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).

In assessing whether litigation "arises out of" the activities in the forum state, the Eleventh Circuit does not use "mechanical or quantitative" tests, see Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1222 (11th Cir. 2009); however, it is "not enough that there [merely] be some similarity between the activities that connect the defendant to the forum and the plaintiff's claim." Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1285 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2008). The defendant's contacts with the forum must be related to the "operative facts of the controversy." Id. Questions of specific jurisdiction are examined in the context of the particular claims asserted — here, those claims are grounded in intentional tort. To properly determine jurisdiction, "a court properly focuses on `the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'" Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).

The court applies this analysis in considering whether it has personal jurisdiction over van Bilderbeek and Ramirez.

1. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Analysis regarding van Bilderbeek

Plaintiff focuses on the Calder effects test in arguing that this court has personal jurisdiction over van Bilderbeek. (Doc. # 125 at 14-21). Under Calder, a nonresident defendant is subject to a court's jurisdiction so long as his alleged conduct was "(1) intentional; (2) aimed at the forum state; and (3) caused harm that the defendant should have anticipated would be suffered in the forum state." Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008). The test is used regularly in Alabama when determining whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. See, e.g., Duke v. Young, 496 So.2d 37 (Ala. 1986) (holding that defendants' intentional and allegedly tortious actions were expressly aimed at Alabama); Shrout v. Thoren, 470 So.2d 1222 (Ala. 1985) (holding that defendant had acted aggressively to further a plan which specifically contemplated the injury of an Alabama resident); Alfa Corp. v. Alfagres, S.A., 385 F.Supp.2d 1230 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (holding that defendant knew it was committing a tort against an Alabama entity and continued to do so anyway).

As set forth in detail above, Plaintiff has alleged that van Bilderbeek perpetrated intentional, tortious and/or criminal acts that were intended to cause, and actually caused, injury in Alabama. In particular, Plaintiff makes the following allegations in its Complaint:

(Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 37).

Plaintiff has alleged, and cited to evidence of, intentional acts by van Bilderbeek directed at Plaintiff, an Alabama resident. Where intentional acts are at issue, "`the defendant may be held to have expected its conduct to have an effect in that state, and further to have expected that the victim will bring suit for redress there.'" Alfa Corp. v. Alfagres, S.A., 385 F.Supp.2d 1230, 1235 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (quoting Coblentz v. General Motors Corp., 724 F.Supp. 1364 (M.D. Ala. 1989)). "`[W]hen the origin of a deliberate, nonfortuitous tort is in one state, and the intended injury to a recognized victim is in another state, the tortfeasor has affirmatively established minimum contacts with the state in which the injury occurred, if the tortfeasor knew at the time it committed the alleged tort that the victim would be injured in that state.'" Alfa Corp., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (quoting Coblentz, 724 F.Supp. at 1369 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). At least for Calder effects purposes, this rule applies equally to extraterritorial conduct which is intended to cause injury in a particular state in the United States.

Van Bilderbeek is alleged to have intentionally paid witnesses for their testimony in a case that was being litigated in Alabama and it is further alleged he intended to cause harm to an Alabama business and this court (each located in Alabama). Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1286; see also Calder, 465 U.S. at 791 ("jurisdiction over petitioners in California is proper because of their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to respondent in California). That van Bilderbeek alleges that the payments were for a legitimate purpose is inconsequential, at least at this stage. See Garrett v. Stanton, 2008 WL 4853388 at *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2008) ("Defendants' reasoning disregards the Rule 12(b) standard and would instead have the court conjure facts from thin air to favor defendants' position, thereby bending over backwards to grant their motion to dismiss.").

The Complaint alleges that Collingsworth and van Bilderbeek discussed financing the fraudulent litigation against Drummond, as well as a media campaign designed to disseminate false allegations of Drummond's complicity in human rights violations and mass murder characterized as "objective facts." (Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 158-59). The court agrees with Plaintiff that it has sufficiently established purposeful availment under the Calder "effects test." "`Under the "effects test," a nonresident defendant's single tortious act can establish purposeful availment, without regard to whether the defendant had any other contacts with the forum' if the intentional conduct has a direct impact on [an Alabama] resident." Gubarev v. Buzzfeed, Inc., 2017 WL 2293550, at *7 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2017) (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1356 (11th Cir. 2013)); see also Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1285-88 (summarizing cases employing Calder test and concluding that non-resident was subject to jurisdiction in Florida because his out-of-state conduct was calculated to cause injury to a person in Florida). Accordingly, van Bilderbeek cannot claim to be surprised that he has been haled into court in the Northern District of Alabama. For these reasons, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over van Bilderbeek in Alabama is reasonable, and his Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 121) on this ground is due to be denied.3

Because Plaintiff has established the relatedness and purposeful availment prongs of the specific jurisdiction inquiry, the burden shifts to van Bilderbeek to present a "compelling case" that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him in Alabama would be unreasonable. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-78. In considering this issue, the court must consider the following factors: (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and (4) the judicial system's interest in resolving the dispute. Lovelady, 544 F.3d at 1288. When litigation involves international defendants, courts are to consider "[t]he unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system." Asahi Metal Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987). However, "it is only in highly unusual cases [where] that inconvenience Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

Van Bilderbeek argues that he cannot be haled into court in Alabama because (1) he conducts no business in the United States; (2) he has no relationship with Alabama whatsoever; and (3) the only conspiracies in which van Bilderbeek is alleged to have participated took place in Europe and Colombia. (Doc. # 121 at 12-14).

However, van Bilderbeek's argument fails to acknowledge that Plaintiff has alleged that his activities were "purposefully directed" at an Alabama resident and allegedly caused injuries to a resident in this forum. See Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1284. Therefore, van Bilderbeek had "fair warning" that his activities could subject him to jurisdiction in Alabama. Finally, any issues of burden (which, notably, have not been articulated by van Bilderbeek) are quickly ameliorated because of modern technology. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F.Supp.2d 362, 628 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) ("Even if forcing the defendant to litigate in a forum relatively distant from its home base were found to be a burden, the argument would provide defendant only weak support, if any, because the conveniences of modern communication and transportation ease what would have been a serious burden only a few decades ago.").

Nor has van Bilderbeek, a United States citizen (Doc. # 1-1 at ¶ 37), shown that he faces "especially onerous" burdens from litigating in this forum or that the inconvenience of litigating in this forum rises to a "constitutional magnitude." Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers International, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010). Indeed, van Bilderbeek has provided little indication to the court of what specific burdens he faces from litigating in this forum, and generalized statements that litigation in a particular forum is burdensome are typically insufficient to show that the forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction offends due process. See Grail Semiconductor, Inc. v. Stern, 2012 WL 5903817, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2012). Moreover, for at least two decades, our court of appeals has recognized that "modern methods of transportation and communication have significantly ameliorated" the burdens that corporations face when defending suits in states where they are not incorporated and do not have places of business. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th Cir. 1996).

But even if that were not the case, Plaintiff's interest in litigating here would nevertheless outweigh any purported prejudice to van Bilderbeek. Plaintiff "is not required to travel to a nonresident's [country] of residence to obtain a remedy" because it was injured by the alleged intentional misconduct of van Bilderbeek expressly aimed at it in Alabama. Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1288 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 1487). And the state of Alabama "has a very strong interest in affording its residents a forum to obtain relief from intentional misconduct of nonresidents causing injury in [Alabama]." Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1288. Finally, the judicial interest in efficient resolution of this action is best served by the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over van Bilderbeek in this action. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979 F.2d 827, 830, 834 (11th Cir. 1992) (concluding that multiple suits would waste judicial resources).

In conclusion, van Bilderbeek is subject to personal jurisdiction under the Calder effects doctrine of personal jurisdiction, and this court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over van Bilderbeek comports with due process.

2. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Analysis regarding Ramirez

Plaintiff again focuses on the Calder effects test in arguing that this court has personal jurisdiction over Ramirez. Ramirez argues that the "allegations lodged directly against [him] are sparing," and that he "is not mentioned once" in the Appendices of the Complaint "in which Plaintiffs purport to set forth the predicate acts of the alleged RICO and RICO conspiracy claims." (Doc. # 122 at 2). This argument is, frankly, disingenuous. (See Section III(B) above).

The Complaint alleges, among other things, that Ramirez:

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 15). Further,

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 43).

That is, Ramirez is alleged to have been involved in bribing witnesses to provide false testimony against Plaintiff, an Alabama resident, in lawsuits pending in Alabama, in which he had a contract to receive a contingency fee. He is also alleged to have appeared in Birmingham, Alabama at depositions related to those cases.

As discussed above, "`[u]nder the "effects test," even a nonresident defendant's single tortious act can establish purposeful availment, without regard to whether the defendant had any other contacts with the forum' if the intentional conduct has a direct impact on [an Alabama] resident." Gubarev, 2017 WL 2293550, at *7 (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A., 736 F.3d at 1356; see also Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1285-88. But, here, Ramirez is alleged to have been involved in more than one tortious act directed at an Alabama resident and causing damage here.

Moreover, Ramirez's due process concerns simply cannot be squared with the well-pled facts: he is alleged to have held a contingency fee interest in cases litigated in Birmingham, Alabama, and appeared at depositions in Birmingham, Alabama in those cases. Nor has he shown that he faces "especially onerous" burdens from litigating in this forum or that the inconvenience of litigating in this forum rises to a "constitutional magnitude." Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers International, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010). Ramirez has previously voluntarily participated in litigation in Alabama. Therefore, any such concerns are unwarranted.

Like Otero and van Bilderbeek, Ramirez cannot claim surprise at being haled into court in the Northern District of Alabama. Therefore, Ramirez's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 122) on this ground is due to be denied.4

B. Service by E-Mail Was Proper

Van Bilderbeek and Ramirez also assert that service by e-mail on them was improper. Rule 4(f) provides that "[u]nless federal law provides otherwise, an individual — other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed —may be served at a place not within any judicial district of the United States:. . . . (3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). Alternative service under Rule 4(f) is proper where the method of service is (1) not prohibited by international agreement, and (2) is reasonably calculated to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Aliaga, 272 F.R.D. 617, 619 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916, 927-28 (11th Cir. 2003). "[A] proposed alternative method of service of process is not offensive to the forum's law if such method is not "expressly prohibited" by the forum's law. TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Hernandez, 126 F.Supp.3d 1357, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (citing TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Distelec Distribuciones Electronicas, S.A. de DV, 268 F.R.D. 687, 690-91 (S.D. Fla. 2010).

A court is afforded wide discretion in ordering service of process under Rule 4(f)(3). See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts have authorized a wide variety of alternative methods of service. See SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1094 (2d Cir. 1987) (service of process by publication); Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 176-78 (2d Cir. 1979) (service by mail to last known address); New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F.Supp. 73, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (service by telex for Iranian defendants); Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 248 F.Supp. 537, 541-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (service by ordinary mail); Forum Fin. Group, LLC v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 199 F.R.D. 22, 23-24 (D. Me. 2001) (service on defendant's attorney); In re Int'l Telemedia Assoc., 245 B.R. 713, 719-20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (service by email).

An order for alternative service must comply with due process requirements, which call for notice that is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Where a defendant cannot be reached by mail, service of process via email may be appropriate. Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1017-18. "E-mail service on defendants is not prohibited by the Hague Convention or the law of the Netherlands." McBride v. Wille, 2013 WL 12130463, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2013) (citing Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. March, 2011 WL 197838, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. 2011)).

1. Van Bilderbeek

On September 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of an Order Allowing Alternative Methods of Service on Albert van Bilderbeek and Francisco Ramirez Cuellar. (Doc. # 99). Prior to filing the Motion, Plaintiff had conducted discovery regarding van Bilderbeek's location. Plaintiff enlisted a private investigation firm in an attempt to locate van Bilderbeek, but was unsuccessful. (Doc. # 99-12). In response to discovery requests, Defendant Collingsworth responded that van Bilderbeek's contact information was "highly confidential for security reasons." (Doc. # 99-4).

Van Bilderbeek argues that Plaintiff's claims against him should be dismissed because the court allowed him to be served by e-mail and the Hague Convention does not provide for service by email. (Doc. # 121 at 15). However, that argument is simply off the mark. Numerous federal courts, including district courts within this circuit, have found the lack of an express prohibition on a type of service is dispositive. See Cartwright v. Fokker Aircraft U.S.A., Inc., 713 F.Supp. 389, 395 (N.D. Ga. 1988), disapproved of on other grounds by Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A. Inc., 965 F.2d 1014 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Defendant has not pointed to any provision in the internal law of The Netherlands which would suggest that service by mail violates a deeply-rooted local policy of that nation; the mere fact that the internal laws of The Netherlands make no provision for service of process by mail is insufficient to demonstrate that any use of the mails for service is incompatible with the law of The Netherlands."); see also Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d at, 1365 ("[T]his district has confirmed that a proposed alternative method of service of process is not offensive to the forum's law if such method is not `expressly prohibited' by the forum's law.").

Van Bilderbeek does not deny that he received a Summons and a copy of the Complaint via e-mail. (See Doc. # 121). Nor does van Bilderbeek argue that this method of service failed to apprise him of the allegations against him and afford him an opportunity to respond. (See Doc. # 121 at 14-16). It clearly did both — he has appeared in this action, retained able counsel, and moved to dismiss the claims against him. Therefore, e-mail service on van Bilderbeek was appropriate.

2. Ramirez

Ramirez, too, argues that service by e-mail was improper. He bases this argument on the assertion that Colombia's Code of Civil Procedure makes no mention of e-mail. (Doc. # 122 at 5). Plaintiff responds that the Code referred to by Ramirez has been repealed, and that the General Procedure Code, which replaced it, expressly allows service by e-mail. (Doc. # 126 at 8). Plaintiff provided the Declaration of a Colombian attorney attesting to this fact. (Doc. # 126-1). In reply, Ramirez argues that Plaintiff did not comply with certain Colombian pre-requisites to e-mail service. (Doc. # 129). However, like van Bilderbeek, Ramirez does not argue that this method of service failed to apprise him of the allegations against him and afford him an opportunity to respond. (See Doc. # 121 at 14-16). Again, it clearly did both — he has appeared in this action, retained able counsel, and moved to dismiss the claims against him. Therefore, email service on Ramirez was appropriate.

Because e-mail service on both van Bilderbeek and Ramirez was "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action," their Motions to Dismiss on this issue are due to be denied. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.

E. Plaintiff's RICO Claims Apply Extraterritorially

Van Bilderbeek, but not Ramirez, makes the argument that Plaintiff's RICO claims should be dismissed because RICO does not apply extraterritorially. (Doc. # 121 at 17-18; Doc. # 122). In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S.Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016), the Supreme Court considered whether 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (the substantive RICO statute) applies to conduct committed abroad. Section 1962 prohibits certain activities that are conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c). Section 1961 includes all of the possible crimes, or "predicate acts," that can constitute racketeering activity for the purposes of RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The Supreme Court determined that, because some RICO predicates "plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct," Section 1962 was intended to apply and, so long as a private RICO plaintiff alleges and proves a domestic injury to its business or property, does apply to racketeering conduct abroad "to the extent that the predicates alleged in the particular case themselves apply extraterritorially." RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S.Ct. at 2102, 2106. The Court concluded that "[t]his unique structure makes RICO the rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of extraterritoriality." Id. at 2103. That is, "the domestic and extraterritorial reach of the RICO statute is coterminous with that of the underlying predicate offenses in a given case." United States v. Hawit, 2017 WL 663542, at *10 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017).

The Complaint alleges that van Bilderbeek paid Blanco on at least three separate occasions for his testimony and participation in cases filed in Alabama. Based on those allegations, it further asserts that "The Enterprise's conduct with respect to Blanco violates 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 201 (witness bribery), 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (money laundering), 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (obstruction of justice), and 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (witness tampering)." (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 107). The Complaint further alleges that the "adverse effects" of van Bilderbeek's witness bribery, witness tampering, money laundering, obstruction of justice and wire fraud were felt by Plaintiff here in Alabama, and asserts a domestic injury. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 107, 164-70). Therefore, RICO may apply extraterritorially, depending on the underlying predicate offense.

All of the predicate offenses for Plaintiff's RICO claims have extraterritorial application. "Congress expressly provided for extraterritorial application of jurisdiction in the obstruction of justice statute." United States v. Bocachica, 57 F.Supp.3d 630, 632 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)). Section 1512(h) states that "[t]here is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section." 18 U.S.C. § 1512(h). See also United States v. DSD Shipping, A.S., 2015 WL 5444094, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 15, 2015) ("[T]he obstruction statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 1519, apply extraterritorially because such foreign offenses cause domestic harm and are not logically dependent on their locality."). The money laundering statute also specifically provides for extraterritorial application where the alleged conduct is by a United States citizen. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f) ("There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this section if — (1) the conduct is by a United States citizen."). The Complaint alleges that van Bilderbeek is a United States citizen. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 37). Although his affidavit addresses his residence, it does not contradict the allegation regarding his citizenship. (Doc. # 121-1). There is authority for the proposition that the witness bribery statute applies extraterritorially. Cockerham v. Willis, 2016 WL 345590, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2016), aff'd, 671 F. App'x 348 (5th Cir. 2016) (18 U.S.C. § 201 has extraterritorial reach). And, as to the extraterritorial application of the wire fraud statute,

Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, 2017 WL 519066, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017). The First and Third Circuits have specifically held that "Section 1343 applies extraterritorially." Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 137, cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 401 (2015); see also Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 718 ("the wire fraud statute punishes frauds executed in `interstate or foreign commerce,'" and therefore can be applied extraterritorially because Congress did not have "only `domestic concerns in mind.'") (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371-72 (2005), in turn quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343). The court concludes that the First and Third Circuits have the better side of the debate. Therefore, van Bilderbeek's argument that Plaintiff's RICO claim fails due to its extraterritorial application is without merit.

F. The RICO Claim Against Ramirez is Appropriately Pled

Ramirez, but not van Bilderbeek makes the argument that Plaintiff's RICO claims are due to be dismissed as conclusory and insufficiently pled. The court disagrees. In the Complaint, Ramirez is defined as one of the "RICO Defendants" and a member of the "RICO Enterprise." (Doc. # 1-1 at 2). The Complaint further alleges that the Enterprise (which includes Ramirez) made witness payments to Charris which were sent "from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States . . . with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity" — namely, witness bribery, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and wire fraud. (Doc. # 1-1 at 38-42, 107-125). Ramirez is also alleged to have facilitated virtually all of the witness payments. (Doc. # 1-1 at 38-43). The Complaint further alleges that Ramirez was active in disseminating the Enterprise's false message and fraudulent testimony. (Doc. # 1-1 at 80, 86).

The court understands that certain RICO claims must be pled with particularity, but Plaintiff has done that here. As explained at length in the court's March 8, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. #58), and also in the court's August 12, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. #91), predicate acts of mail and wire fraud are prohibited acts under RICO which must be pled with particularity. (Doc. #58 at 8-9). Other predicate acts, such as bribery, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and money laundering need only meet the Iqbal/Twombly standard of pleading. (Doc. #58 at 6). Applying these standards here, the court concludes Plaintiff has successfully (and with particularity) stated a claim against Ramirez. (See, e.g. Doc. # 1-1 at 28-30, 55-59, 76-77, 86).

For these reasons, as well as those stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. #58) of March 8, 2016, and the Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. # 91), the Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's RICO claims filed by Van Bilderbeek and Ramirez are due to be denied.

G. Plaintiff's State Law Fraud Claims

In its Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two fraud claims: Count III, a willful and/or reckless misrepresentation claim, and Count IV, a fraudulent concealment/suppression claim. (Doc. 1-1 at 100-01). Van Bilderbeek and Ramirez argue that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege these claims against them. The elements of the two fraud claims differ and are addressed, in turn, below.

1. Misrepresentation Fraud Claim

The elements of a misrepresentation fraud claim are: "(1) a false representation; (2) concerning a material fact; (3) reliance upon the false representation, and; (4) damage as a proximate result." Aliant Bank, a Div. of USAmeribank v. Four Star Investments, Inc., 2017 WL 1787935, at *18 (Ala. May 5, 2017) (quoting Harmon v. Motors Insurance Corp., 493 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Ala. 1986)). "[R]eliance is an essential part of any fraud claim." Aliant Bank, 2017 WL 1787935, at *18. "`Although the terminology varies from state to state, the underlying principle is the same — for a plaintiff to state a fraud claim, he must show that a misrepresentation induced him to act in a way that he would not otherwise have acted, that is, that he took a different course of action because of the misrepresentation.'" Aliant Bank, 2017 WL 1787935, at *19 (quoting Hunt Petroleum Corp. v. State, 901 So.2d 1, 4-5 (Ala. 2004)).

Although Plaintiff has properly alleged misrepresentations made by van Bilderbeek and Ramirez, the court agrees with these Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to properly allege facts supporting the reliance element of the claim. Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants made misrepresentations about it and that it was damaged as a result. But Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that it took any action or changed its course in reliance on the misrepresentations. Nor could it have done so because its position is that it knew all along the misrepresentations were false. Without the reliance element, Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim is essentially a repackaged defamation claim. Therefore, Plaintiff's misrepresentation claims against van Bilderbeek and Ramirez are due to be granted.

2. Suppression Fraud Claim

"The elements of a suppression claim[under Alabama Code § 6-5-102] are (1) a duty on the part of the defendant to disclose facts; (2) concealment or nondisclosure of material facts by the defendant; (3) inducement of the plaintiff to act; (4) action by the plaintiff to his or her injury." Aliant Bank, 2017 WL 1787935, at *23 (internal quotations omitted but quoting Freightliner, L.L.C. v. Whatley Contract Carriers, L.L.C., 932 So.2d 883, 891 (Ala. 2005) and in turn quoting Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 682 So.2d 61, 63 (Ala. 1996)).

Defendants van Bilderbeek and Ramirez argue that Plaintiff has not properly alleged any duty to speak on their part. (Docs. # 121 at 19-20 and # 122 at 7). Plaintiff responds that, by electing to speak on a topic, Defendants undertook a duty to do so truthfully. (Docs. # 126 at 24 and 125 at 30). The court agrees with Plaintiff on this point:

Freightliner, 932 So. 2d at 895. See also First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. First State Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1045, 1056 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Finally, even if one is not under a duty to speak, if he decides to do so, `he must make a full and fair disclosure,' without concealing any facts within his knowledge." (quoting Ellis v. Zuck, 409 F.Supp. 1151, 1158 (N.D. Ala. 1976), and citing Jackson Co. v. Faulkner, 55 Ala.App. 354, 315 So.2d 591 (1975))).

Van Bilderbeek and Ramirez are both alleged to have disseminated the RICO Enterprise's message that Plaintiff was complicit in murder to the media and government officials in the Netherlands. Neither Defendant had any duty to speak on this issue, but once they chose to speak, they assumed a duty to speak truthfully. Freightliner, 932 So. 2d at 895. Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a duty to speak truthfully on the part of both van Bilderbeek and Ramirez.

However, Plaintiff's concealment/suppression claims suffer from the same infirmity as its misrepresentation claims — Plaintiff has failed to allege that it was induced to act by any suppression or concealment, or that it acted to its injury because of any suppression or concealment. Again, Plaintiff could not have acted on the suppressed information to its detriment because its position is that it knew the concealed truth. Plaintiff cannot establish the inducement to act element, and therefore its concealment/suppression claims fail, and the Motions to Dismiss the concealment/suppression claims are due to be granted.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Albert van Bilderbeek and Francisco Ramirez Cuellar (Docs.# 121 and 122) are due to be granted in part and denied in part. A separate order will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED.