L. SCOTT COOGLER, District Judge.
Plaintiffs move this Court for an order compelling Alabama's Governor, Kay Ivey, in her official capacity (hereinafter "the Governor")
Plaintiffs, Greater Birmingham Ministries, the Alabama State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Giovana Ambrosio, Debra Silvers, Elizabeth Ware, and Shameka Harris ("Plaintiffs"), originally sued the State of Alabama ("the State"), the Governor, Steven T. Marshall in his official capacity as Alabama's Attorney General ("the Attorney General"), John Merrill in his official capacity as Alabama's Secretary of State ("the Secretary of State"), and Stan Stabler in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency ("the ALEA Secretary"), seeking invalidation of Ala. Code § 17-9-30, or Alabama's "Photo ID Law," on grounds that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"), 52 U.S.C. § 10301, and Section 201 of the VRA, 52 U.S.C. § 10501.
Plaintiffs originally sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction enjoining enforcement of the Photo ID Law. In May 2016, however, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to request that this Court require the State, the Governor, and the ALEA Secretary to return 31 partially-closed ALEA offices, where individuals may purchase driver's licenses and non-driver ID cards, to full hours of operation. [Doc. 112 ¶ 197.] Plaintiffs alleged that in response to recent budget cuts required by the Alabama Legislature, the Governor and the ALEA Secretary significantly reduced the already limited hours of operation of ALEA offices in 27 largely poor, rural counties. [Doc. 112 ¶ 119.] Plaintiffs further alleged that on September 30, 2015, the Governor and the ALEA Secretary announced that ALEA would permanently close 31 part-time ALEA offices issuing driver's licenses and non-driver ID cards, including offices in eight of 11 contiguous counties in the so called "black belt"—a string of counties where nearly half of the 130,000 eligible voters are African American and where the African American poverty rate is 41 percent. [Id. ¶ 120.] Plaintiffs additionally alleged that in response to public outcry over the proposed ALEA closures, on October 16, 2015, the Governor announced that rather than close completely, these 31 locations, which were previously open one to two days per week, would remain open one day per month. [Id. ¶ 122.] Plaintiffs alleged that the Legislature and Governor's decisions to drastically decrease ALEA office hours in certain parts of Alabama had a disparate impact on African Americans, particularly those in the "black belt." [Id. ¶¶ 103-05, 118-21.] According to Plaintiffs, those decisions guaranteed that, ahead of the 2016 elections, it would be more difficult for black belt voters to obtain ALEA photo IDs, which are the most commonly known and used form of photo ID. [Id. ¶¶ 103-05.]
Defendants the State, the Governor, the Attorney General, and the ALEA Secretary argued that they were not proper parties to this case because Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek relief against them, and they had sovereign immunity to Plaintiffs' claims and did not fall within the exception to sovereign immunity under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This Court agreed and dismissed those defendants on March 1, 2017, which left the Secretary of State as the only remaining defendant in this action. [Docs. 156 & 157.]
Plaintiffs served the Governor with document requests on May 6, 2016, while he was still a party. The Governor initially produced 2,500 documents, withholding or redacting 396 documents on the basis of one or more of the following privileges: deliberative process, legislative, attorney-client, work product, common interest and joint defense. Plaintiffs challenged the privilege assertions for 320 documents. In addition, counsel for the Governor advised the Governor's former consultant Rebekah Mason, also a third-party subpoena recipient, not to produce six documents in her possession as to which the Governor asserted deliberative process privilege ("the Mason documents"), which Plaintiffs also challenge. During a meet-and-confer process, the Governor's office withdrew privilege assertions as to 94 documents, and Plaintiffs withdrew their challenge with respect to three documents. Plaintiffs moved to compel production of the remaining 223 documents, plus the six Mason Documents, attaching charts that reflect, among other things, the Bates number of each document, when each document was created, and the original description of each document from the Governor's privilege log. [Doc. 161-1 & 2.]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs discovery from non-parties by subpoena. If an objection is made, the party serving the subpoena may, upon notice to the person commanded to produce, seek an order from the Court to compel the production. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B). The scope of permissible discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 is that which is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), which provides that "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The Court first addresses the Governor's argument that he need not disclose these 223 documents (plus the six Mason documents) because even if they are not found to be privileged, they are not relevant to any party's claim or defense as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
As stated previously, Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the Photo ID Law violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment, and Sections 2 and 201 of the VRA. To succeed on the Equal Protection and Fifteenth Amendment claims, Plaintiffs must prove that the Alabama Legislature enacted the Photo ID Law for racially discriminatory reasons.
The parties agree that the vast majority of these 229 documents concern the Alabama Legislature's 2015 budget cuts, including the decision to significantly limit the days and hours that ALEA satellite offices, many of which are located in Alabama's "black belt," would remain open. The fact that these ALEA satellite offices now have reduced hours may help Plaintiffs make the argument that the Photo ID law has a discriminatory impact on African-American and Latino citizens' ability to vote. This is because Plaintiffs will argue that, at least for African-American and Latino citizens residing in the "black belt" counties, after that decision, it is now more difficult to obtain the most commonly-used form of photo ID, a driver's license. Accordingly, the fact that the ALEA satellite offices now have reduced hours is relevant to Plaintiffs' claims insofar as those claims are premised on the allegedly disparate impact of the Photo ID Law.
What is not relevant, however, is why the Alabama Legislature and/or the Governor decided to limit the ALEA satellite office hours. As the Court has said before, Plaintiffs have not alleged a cause of action challenging the decision to limit the ALEA office hours. Even if Plaintiffs could show that the ALEA office hours decision was made for racially discriminatory reasons in 2015, such a showing would do nothing to help Plaintiffs prove that the Alabama Legislature enacted the Photo ID Law for racially discriminatory purposes in 2011. Accordingly, the Governor may withhold from production all documents that concern his or the Alabama Legislature's reasons or motivations behind the 2015 budget cuts including but not limited to the decision to limit the ALEA satellite office hours.
It appears that virtually all of the documents withheld by the Governor on the ground of deliberative process privilege concern these topics.
Why the Alabama Legislature and the Governor decided to limit the ALEA office hours and how the Governor's staff chose to explain or announce that decision to the public is of no help to Plaintiffs in proving that the Photo ID Law violates the Equal Protection Clause, Fifteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the VRA. Accordingly, any document that purports to concern these topics may be withheld as irrelevant to this litigation.
The Governor has also withheld 51 documents on the ground of legislative privilege.
This Court previously quashed Plaintiffs' subpoena duces tecum to various nonparty Alabama legislators, ruling that the legislative privilege shielded from disclosure documents pertaining to acts that occurred during the regular legislative process (such as drafting and debating the Photo ID Law) and documents pertaining to the motivation for those acts (such as statements and opinions of legislators). [Doc. 158.] The Eleventh Circuit has held that the legislative privilege also applies to documents in the possession of a Governor's office concerning his or her legislative role in signing or vetoing a bill. See In re Hubbard, 803 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2015) ("The privilege protects the legislative process itself, and therefore covers both governors' and legislators' actions in the proposal, formulation, and passage of legislation."). The Court has already rejected the arguments Plaintiffs make in their attempts to override the Governor's assertion of the legislative privilege, and this Court incorporates its previous discussion here. [See doc. 158 at 6-25.] Accordingly, the legislative privilege applies with respect to these 51 documents Plaintiffs have sought from the Governor, and they may be withheld on that ground.
The Governor has also withheld 30 documents on grounds that they constitute attorney work product.
Although protected from disclosure because they are irrelevant to Plaintiffs' claims, see Section III.B., supra, this section will explain why these 30 documents are also protected as attorney work product.
The Governor bears the burden of establishing that these documents constitute attorney work product. See Hinchee, 741 F.3d at 1189. "[T]o be shielded from discovery the document must be (1) produced by an attorney or her agent and (2) created in anticipation of litigation." Adams v. City of Montgomery, 282 F.R.D. 627, 633 (M.D. Ala. 2012), supplemented, No. 10-CV-924, 2012 WL 1952294 (M.D. Ala. May 30, 2012). With regard to the first requirement, attorney work product protection applies not only to documents prepared by attorneys, but to those prepared by parties themselves and/or other non-attorney representatives, as long as the documents are prepared in anticipation of litigation. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 254 n.16 (1975). With regard to the second requirement, the former Fifth Circuit explained that "as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation," it receives work product protection. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that on or about October 5, 2015, Plaintiffs sent the Governor's office a letter threatening "immediate legal action" related to the subject of the ALEA satellite office closures that had been announced five days earlier, on September 30, 2015. The Governor further states that during the same time, a number of elected officials and other public figures echoed Plaintiffs' calls for litigation in the press and elsewhere. For example, United States Representative Terri Sewell publicly asked the United States Department of Justice to investigate the Photo ID Law; the Reverend Jesse Jackson met with the Governor; and then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton publicly criticized the decision to permanently close the ALEA satellite offices.
Plaintiffs interpret the attorney work product doctrine too narrowly, considering the particular facts of this case. Plaintiffs specifically threatened litigation, while other elected officials announced publicly that the budget cuts and ALEA office closures should be investigated or "fought in court." Documents prepared by the Governor's staff in the days and weeks following this public outcry, which considered how the Governor should respond, were prepared "in anticipation of litigation."
Plaintiffs also argue that even if they are protected, they have a "substantial need for the materials to prepare [their] case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). But Plaintiffs do not point to any specific reason why they have a substantial need for these documents and merely state that the "documents are likely to reflect the collective thinking of the Governor's office about the effects of the Photo ID Law and the closures." [Doc. 161 at 30.] If that were a sufficient reason to overcome the protection of attorney work product, the doctrine would be diminished significantly. These 30 documents satisfy the requirements for protection under the attorney work product doctrine and they may also be withheld on that ground.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion to compel (doc. 161) is hereby