VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
The above-entitled civil action is before the Court on Plaintiff Adrian Cain's Motion for Default Judgment (the "Motion"). (Doc. 28). Cain seeks a judgment by default against Defendants Consumers Solutions Group, LLC ("CSG") and Jonathan C. Frank & Associates, LLC ("Jonathan Frank").
Cain filed the complaint in this action on December 19, 2016. (Doc. 1). She filed her Amended Complaint on August 18, 2017. (Doc. 27). In her Amended Complaint, Cain alleges that the Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (Id. at 2-6).
CSG was served on December 21, 2016. (Doc. 6). On January 24, 2017, after CSG failed to appear, answer, or otherwise defend, Cain filed a Motion for Entry of Default. (Doc. 10). The Clerk filed the Entry of Default against CSG on January 25, 2017. (Doc. 12).
Jonathan Frank was served on May 2, 2017. (Doc. 19). On May 24, 2017, after Jonathan Frank failed to appear, answer, or otherwise defend, Cain filed a Motion for Entry of Default. (Doc. 20). The Clerk filed the Entry of Default against Jonathan Frank on May 26, 2017. (Doc. 22).
On August 4, 2017, Cain moved to dismiss his class claims against CSG. (Doc. 25). The Court then ordered Cain "to file an amended complaint that eliminates the class allegations in Count IV." (Doc. 26 at 3). Cain was instructed to seek leave from the Court to make any
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Motion is due to be
The Court ordered the Defendants to show cause by April 11, 2018, why the motion should not be granted. (Doc. 29). The Court received an opposition to Cain's Motion on May 4, 2018. (Doc. 36). As outlined in this Court's memorandum opinion and order from May 8, 2018, this opposition was untimely, inadequate, and improper. (Doc. 37). The Court's opinion laid out a detailed explanation of the inadequacies of the opposition. (Id. at 4-6). However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court gave the Defendants an additional seven days from May 8, 2018, to enter the appearance of an attorney admitted to practice in the Northern District of Alabama and to move the Court to set aside the entry of default. (Id. at 7). Those seven days have come and gone with no response-further showing that the Defendants have no serious intention of defending in this action. Accordingly, the following opinion is due to be entered.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides in pertinent part:
FED.R.CIV.P. 55.
Because default has been entered against the Defendants, the allegations of Cain's Amended Complaint are taken as true. See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2688 (3d ed. 1998) ("If the court determines that defendant is in default, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.").
The Court's analysis of Cain's Motion for Default Judgment involves a two-step process. First, the Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the lawsuit. See Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that district courts "always have an obligation to examine sua sponte their jurisdiction before reaching the merits of any claim"). Second, the Court must ensure that Cain has satisfied the elements of Rule 55 and is entitled to the default judgment it seeks. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)
It is an elementary requirement that personal jurisdiction must be established in every case before a court has power to render any judgment. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104 (1982).
Cain submitted supplemental briefing on the issue of personal jurisdiction after the Court entered a show cause order. (Doc. 35). Upon review, the Court is satisfied that it has specific personal jurisdiction over both Defendants in this matter. CSG is registered as a foreign LLC in Alabama. (Doc. 35-1). Both Defendants have directed actions into Alabama. (Doc. 35-2). This lawsuit arises out of those actions. (See generally Doc. 27). Cain suffered the harms resulting from those actions in Alabama. (See Doc. 35-2). The Defendants purposefully availed themselves of Alabama through their activities, and requiring them to be haled into Court here to answer for these intentional acts is fair. The Court has specific personal jurisdiction over both Defendants.
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case arises under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a federal statute. (Doc. 27 at 1, 6). For that reason, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) allows the Court to enter a default judgment when the Clerk has entered default and the party seeking judgment has applied to the court for a default judgment. To determine whether the moving party is actually entitled to a default judgment, the court must review the sufficiency of the complaint and its underlying merits. See Stegeman v. Georgia, 290 F. App'x 320, 323 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). The law is well-settled that "a defaulted defendant is deemed to `admit[] the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact.'" Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App'x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206). However, the court has "an obligation to assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it enters." Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007).
"In order to prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that: `(1) the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.'" Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc., 88 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1360-61 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (quoting Sibley v. Firstcollect, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 469, 470 (M.D. La. 1995)).
As an initial matter, the Court determines that Cain is a "consumer" under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3); (Doc. 27 at ¶14). Each Defendant is a "debt collector." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6); (Doc. 27 at ¶15). The Defendants engaged in "communications" under the FDCPA "for the purpose of collecting a `debt.'" 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)(2), (5); (Doc. 27 at ¶¶16, 17). This means that Cain has established the first two elements of a FDCPA claim.
Cain's Motion is unclear regarding the agency relationship between CSG and Jonathan Frank. (See Doc. 28 at 3) ("Defendant CSG was an agent of Defendant Jonathan Frank at all times material to this lawsuit."); (see id. at 4) (noting that Jonathan Frank's website indicates that CSG is one of its "department[s]"); (but see id. at 4) ("Defendant CSG has received benefit from its agent's [sic], Defendant Jonathan Frank."). The Amended Complaint similarly shows this confusion. (Doc. 27 at ¶¶19-20); (but see id. at ¶21). The Court interprets this inconsistency to be the result of a typographical error and that Cain alleges that CSG was Jonathan Frank's agent, not vice versa.
Cain established that both Defendants violated the FDCPA in February 2016. (Doc. 27 at ¶¶23-26). Cain established that the Defendants violated §1692b(2),
Since Cain makes no argument regarding these counts in the Motion, default judgment on them is inappropriate.
Cain requests damages. (Doc. 28 at 7-9).
Cain is entitled to a default judgment on Count I against both Defendants on the issue of liability. The issue liability as to Counts II and III, and the issue of damages will go to trial. The Court will enter a separate order setting this case for a pretrial conference.
15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2).
15 U.S.C. §1692e(2).
15 U.S.C. §1692e(11).