JOHN Z. BOYLE, Magistrate Judge.
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Petitioner William Kangas has filed Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b). (Doc. 31.)
Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent because other individuals could have placed pornographic materials on his computer without his knowledge. But Petitioner's claim is nothing more than additional argument regarding claims already considered by the state courts and this Court. Petitioner's claim must be dismissed because it is a disguised, successive § 2254 motion.
On March 16, 2018, Petitioner filed a Rule 60 Motion arguing there is "proof of actual innocence" in his case. (Doc. 31 at 15.) He submits "there are five (5) different ways that Mr. Lamm could have put the [pornographic] pictures and videos on Mr. Kangas' computer." (Id.) He asserts that the prosecution's computer experts were not experts on "hacking" and had "no knowledge concerning how computers can be `hacked' or `manipulated.'" (Id. at 18.) He also asserts that "with the amount of pictures and videos allegedly found on Mr. Kangas' computer, and given the fact that Mr. Kangas held a job, took care of his son and participated in activities outside his home, it is feasable that these pictures and videos were placed on his computer by `hackers' and/or Mr. Lamm." (Id. at 20.) He argues that if "trial counsel acted with the customary skill and diligence" and argued that Petitioner's computer had been hacked, then Petitioner would not have been convicted. (Id. at 20.)
Petitioner also includes a summary of facts and findings related to the disbarment of his trial counsel for conduct between November 2012 and January 2015. The Court notes that Petitioner's trial and appeal concluded before 2009.
The Court includes a recitation of the facts because they are relevant to Petitioner's claim of actual innocence. The Arizona Court of Appeals found the following:
State v. Kangas, 2008 WL 3856357, at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
On May 7, 2007, Petitioner filed an appeal. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. I, at 70.) On March 4, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. K, at 169.) On May 1, 2008, the mandate issued. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. L, at 181.)
On May 14, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. P, at 8.) On October 9, 2015, the trial court reviewed Petitioner's claims and denied relief. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. S, at 119.)
Petitioner did not file for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals.
On October 3, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition. (Doc. 7.) On November 14, 2017, the Court denied the Petition. Docs. 26-27; Kangas v. Ryan, 2017 WL 5443167, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2017).
On February 22, 2018, Petitioner's request for a Certificate of Appealability was denied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 30.)
Petitioner requests relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), which states that "on motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial [under Rule 59(b)]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
Rule 60(b) "allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances." Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005)).
Id. (citing Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 530-32) (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner does not argue there was a defect in the prior habeas proceeding. Instead, Petitioner asserts there is "proof of actual innocence" (doc. 31 at 15) and "defense counsel never developed Mr. Lamm as a potential suspect" (id. at 18). Petitioner's claim is nothing more than a disguised motion in support of his trial claim that another person placed pornography on his computer. Petitioner's Motion should be dismissed. See Washington, 653 F.3d at 1063; Jones v. Ryan, 2013 WL 5348294, at *5 (D. Ariz. 2013) (dismissing Rule 60 motion because "the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the new IATC claims raised therein absent authorization from the court of appeals."); Schad v. Ryan, 2013 WL 5276407, at *7 (D. Ariz. 2013) (dismissing Rule 60(b) motion because it sought to "litigate a claim already adjudicated on the merits by this Court").
Further, even a claim of actual innocence must be approved by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals before it can be reviewed by this Court.
Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner's proposed Rule 60(b) motion would be a second or successive habeas petition because it does not attack the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding and instead argues a prior claim.
Also, Petitioner's argument is neither newly discovered nor evidence. Instead, Petitioner raises a claim that he raised during trial. Petitioner argues that "defense counsel never developed Mr. Lamm as a potential suspect." (Doc. 31 at 18.) Petitioner is incorrect. The trial jury and the Arizona Court of Appeals considered Petitioner's claim regarding Mr. Lamm.
Kangas, 2008 WL 3856357, at *2. The trial court denied Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial claim and found:
(Doc. 10-2, Ex. S, at 120.) Petitioner's claim is not new.
Petitioner's claim is not evidence. Petitioner argues that "with the amount of pictures and videos allegedly found on Mr. Kangas' computer, and given the fact that Mr. Kangas held a job, took care of his son and participated in activities outside his home, it is feasable that these pictures and videos were placed on his computer by `hackers' and/or Mr. Lamm." (Id. at 20.) But this assertion is mere argument and not proof of actual innocence. Petitioner must present "new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) ("Actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency"). Petitioner does not present new evidence.
Regarding Petitioner's trial counsel, Mr. Tilson, Petitioner argues that his disbarment "brings into question the effectiveness of his representation of Mr. Kangas, at trial." (Doc. 31 at 25.) But Petitioner previously raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as noted above. Petitioner's claim regarding counsel is also not an attack against the integrity of the habeas proceedings. As the Supreme Court noted in Gonzalez, "an attack based on . . . habeas counsel's omissions, ordinarily does not go to the integrity of the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits determined favorably." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.5.
The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court recommends the Rule 60 Motion for Relief (doc. 31) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the objections.
Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.