JOHN E. OTT, Chief Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Marquetta Dennes Vinson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") finding that she is not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1).
The plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits on December 10, 2008. (R. 38, 98-99, 197-200).
The Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request for review on December 5, 2013. (R. 1-5). On that date, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. The plaintiff then filed this action for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1).
The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The function of the court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1422 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must "scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. It is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id.
The court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ's legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ's decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v) and 416.920(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir.1986). An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question or, at steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of "not disabled." Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920.
The plaintiff was 29 years old at the time of her hearing before the ALJ. (R. 62). She has past relevant work experience as a cashier checker, nurse assistant, cashier and fast food worker. (R. 91). She alleges she has been unable to work since November 8, 2010, due to low back pain, sleep apnea, diabetes mellitus, morbid obesity, and depression/anxiety. (R. 41, 197, 236-44, 249-56, 260-72, 283-86; Doc. 10 at 4). Following a hearing, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff had severe impairments of degenerative disk disease and morbid obesity and other impairments including obstructive sleep apnea, narcolepsy, tonsilar enlargement, and generalized anxiety. (R. 41). However, none of her impairments, individually or in combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (R. 42). The ALJ further found that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work with limitations. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ determined, premised on the testimony of the VE, that the plaintiff could perform her past work as a cashier checker, fast food worker, and cashier. (R. 47).
The plaintiff claims that the decision of the ALJ is due to be reversed and benefits awarded to her or the decision is due to be remanded for further proper consideration because the ALJ should have found her to be disabled pursuant to SSR 96-7 and the Eleventh Circuit's three-part pain standard. (Doc. 10 at 8). The Commissioner argues that the contention is without merit and that the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 15 at 3-10).
It is well-settled that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(D)(5)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a), (c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) ("In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or disabled. This means that you must furnish medical and other evidence that we can use to reach conclusions about your medical impairment(s)."); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(c) ("Your responsibility. You must provide medical evidence showing that you have an impairment(s) and how severe it is during the time you say that you are disabled. You must provide evidence, without redaction, showing how your impairment(s) affects your functioning during the time you say that you are disabled, and any other information that we need to decide your claim."); Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) ("An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that she is disabled."); Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that "the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim").
In evaluating a disability claim involving subjective complaints such as pain, United States District Judge L. Scott Coogler has stated:
Parker ex rel. Parker v. Colvin, 2013 WL 2635696, *3 (N.D. Ala. June 10, 2013). A reversal is warranted if the decision of the ALJ contains no indication of the proper application of the three-part pain standard. Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223.
In support of the plaintiff's contention that she is disabled, counsel points to the plaintiff's medical records evidencing "chronic and severe pain." (Doc. 10 at 7). These records include (1) x-ray results demonstrating "moderately severe degenerative disc disease at L5-S1 (R. 370); (2) diagnoses by Dr. Bharat Vakharia of crepitus in both knees and a demonstrated positive leg raise, sleep apnea, morbid obesity, low back pain, and osteoarthritis of the knee (R. 366); and (3) severe complaints of pain. (Doc. 10 at 7). Counsel concludes that the plaintiff should have been found disabled based upon her pain pursuant to SSR 96-7
The plaintiff initially claimed in her early filings that she was disabled as of February 12, 2008. (R. 198, 204, 208). At her disability hearing, however, the plaintiff amended her onset date until November 8, 2010. (R. 60, 220). The ALJ noted that she was terminated for "bringing her wallet/purse to work." (R. 43). The plaintiff stated, however, that she would not be working regardless because of her pain in her knees and back and because she could not do the required lifting. (R. 80). The plaintiff further stated at the disability hearing that they were trying to find a pain clinic for her back problems. (R. 87). She rated her pain as 7 out of 10 without medication and 5 out of 10 with medication. (R. 72). It begins after she stands about two hours. (R. 71). It will last anywhere from an hour to an hour and a half. (R. 72).
The plaintiff's medical records initially record a complaint of lower back pain on February 5, 2009, during an emergency room visit. (R. 294). The onset date for the pain was listed as one month earlier. (R. 294). She rated it as a 7 on a 10-point scale. (R. 294, 296).
In her February 2009 disability examination with Dr. Bharat K. Vakharia, the plaintiff complained "of back pain, mainly in the lower back, on and off, more pain with prolonged standing, bending, sometimes, lying on her back also, causes pain. Change in position helps relieve[] the pain." (R. 364). She also complained that the back pain had been ongoing for one and a half years. She described the "pain [a]s dull, aching pain, other times sharp pain." (Id.) She was taking over-the-counter pain medication as needed. (Id.) She also stated that the pain did not radiate into her legs. (Id.) She did have crepitus in both knees.
An April 7, 2009 x-ray evaluated by Dr. Gill indicates evidence of moderately severe degenerative disc disease at L5-S1. The remaining disc spaces appeared well preserved. There also appeared to be some facet arthropathy at L5. (R. 370).
The ALJ noted the following concerning the plaintiff's pain:
(R. 43). After reviewing the evidence, he concluded that the plaintiff's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with" the RFC assessment. (R. 44). In assessing the plaintiff's pain, the ALJ stated:
(R. 44-45). He subsequently noted:
(R. 46). Concerning the plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ noted:
(R. 46-47). Finally, he noted that the plaintiff's motivation to work is suspect. He premised this on the following: (1) she stopped working because she broke a work rule and was terminated, "not because of any medical condition or symptoms;" (2) she lives with her parents and receives Medicaid coverage for herself and her daughter; (3) she receives food stamps and aide for dependent children totaling $790 per month, "an amount which [is] greater than her usual income when working;" (4) her April 2011 report to Dr. Gowda describing she is "`taking care of her father with Alzheimer's' but feeling well and doing well other than being `stressed out' from that work;" (5) her daughter requires frequent medical care; and (6) "a review of the earnings evidence finds the claimant's work history does not suggest a strong motivation for regular employment even prior to her alleged disability onset date and does not serve to bolster her credibility." (R. 47).
The plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not properly consider her pain under the Eleventh Circuit's pain standard. (Doc. 10 at 7-10). The court disagrees. As noted above, the ALJ is required to examine the evidence of any underlying medical condition and if the plaintiff establishes an impairment that could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, the ALJ is obligated to evaluate the plaintiff's subjective complaints, including intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms and their effect on the plaintiff's ability to work. Parker ex rel. Parker, 2013 WL 2635696, *3. Thereafter, the ALJ may discredit pain testimony only by articulating "explicit and adequate reasoning" based on substantial evidence from the record. Id. (citing Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561; Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225).
The ALJ cited the applicable authorities, considered the plaintiff's allegations in relation to the evidence in the record, and articulated detailed reasons and analysis for determining that the plaintiff's claims were not totally credible. The plaintiff has failed to show how the ALJ legally or factually misapplied applicable Eleventh Circuit precedent. To the extent she argues that "[t]he medical evidence of record documents chronic and severe pain," the court finds that the determination of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. While the plaintiff is correct that the x-rays evaluated by Dr. Gill show "moderately severe degenerative disc disease at L5-S1," that does not demonstrate that the pain was such that she could not work — a conclusion that was supported by other evidence. (R. 370). First, Dr. Gill did not state that the plaintiff could not work. Second, no other medical provider stated that she could not work due to her pain. Third, there is no evidence of acute distress due to pain in her physical examinations during the relevant period.
To the extent the plaintiff cites to Dr. Vakharia's evaluation and conclusion that she suffers from "crepitus in both knees and demonstrated a positive straight leg raise," this is not sufficient to challenge the ALJ's determination. (R. 360). Dr. Vakharia does not attribute this malady to severe, or even moderate, pain in her knees, much less her lower back.
Finally, the plaintiff's statements that "the medical evidence of record documents an underlying medical contradiction confirmed by examination and diagnostic testing," and that "examining physicians have noted known pain indicators suggesting severe pain," are conclusory assertions. (Doc. 10 at 7). Neither Dr. Gill nor Dr. Vakharia state that the plaintiff's conditions cause her severe pain. Additionally, her activities, including cooking, doing laundry, interacting with her daughter, caring for her invalid father, driving regularly, and attending church, indicate her ability to function with her medical conditions. (R. 459, 465).
In sum, substantial evidence supports the determination of the ALJ that the plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. (R. 49). The plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or to last twelve or more continuous months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is due to be
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996).
Definition of Crepitus, MedicineNet.com,
