WILLIAM H. STEELE, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Jeremiah Hale's filing styled "Motion to Have Conviction and Sentence Declared Void for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction" (doc. 192). On January 24, 2008, Hale entered a guilty plea in this District Court to the offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (See docs. 39, 37 at ¶ 2.) On July 1, 2008, the undersigned imposed the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months because of Hale's prior conviction in state court for felony possession of cocaine. (Doc. 62, at 36.) Judgment on Hale's conviction was entered on the docket on August 4, 2008. (Doc. 60.) Hale did not pursue a direct appeal.
Beginning in May 2010 and on several occasions since then, Hale has periodically petitioned this Court for relief from his conviction and sentence on the ground that the Indictment is defective because Count I (the count to which he pleaded guilty) charges that Hale conspired "to attempt to possess with intent to distribute" cocaine. According to Hale, this formulation constitutes a jurisdictional defect in the Indictment. The Court has repeatedly addressed and rejected this claim as time-barred under the strict AEDPA one-year filing deadline. (See docs. 121, at 18-22; doc. 156, at 4; doc. 167; doc. 169.) Hale's appeals of these rulings have all been fruitless.
Now, more than 11 years after entering his guilty plea, Hale endeavors once again to obtain relief from his conviction and sentence based on the "conspiring to attempt" language of the Indictment. His present Motion frames his theory as being that such language deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction because the charged offense is not a crime against the United States. The fundamental problem with Hale's argument is that it is untimely. Hale first raised this ground for collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence in May 2010, well after the one-year filing deadline prescribed by AEDPA had expired. As the Court has previously explained to him (see doc. 121 at 18-19 & n.19), dressing up this argument with a "jurisdictional" label does not exempt it from compliance with AEDPA and does not resuscitate an untimely argument that he now seeks to relitigate more than a decade after the fact. A veritable avalanche of federal precedent forecloses Hale's stratagem. Confronting an argument akin to Hale's, the Eleventh Circuit has written, "This is wrong. The habeas statute specifically includes jurisdictional challenges in its enumeration of grounds for relief from sentence that may be asserted under § 2255. . . . Nothing in the statutory language suggests that jurisdictional challenges are exempt from the one-year limitations period that applies to a motion under this section." Williams v. United States, 383 Fed.Appx. 927, 929-30 (11
In light of this unbroken line of authorities negating his claim, Hale's latest attempt to litigate the purported "jurisdictional defect" in his Indictment must fail. He raised this issue for the first time back in May 2010, well after expiration of the one-year AEDPA limitations period. Some nine years ago, this Court held that Hale's jurisdictional—defect argument — the very same one he seeks to pursue today — is time-barred by a substantial margin. (Doc. 121, at 22.) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that ruling. (Doc. 137.) His "Motion to Have Conviction and Sentence Declared Void for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction" (doc. 192) is
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court
DONE and ORDERED.