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U.S. v. CRUZ-ROMERO, 1:13cr28-MHT. (2013)

Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama Number: infdco20130711708 Visitors: 10
Filed: Jul. 10, 2013
Latest Update: Jul. 10, 2013
Summary: OPINION AND ORDER MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge. This cause is before the court on defendant Alejandro Cruz-Romero's motion to continue made on July 9, 2013. The government does not oppose the request. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that jury selection and trial, now set for July 22, 2013, should be continued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7). While the granting of a continuance is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, United States v. Stitzer , 785 F.2d 15
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OPINION AND ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on defendant Alejandro Cruz-Romero's motion to continue made on July 9, 2013. The government does not oppose the request. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that jury selection and trial, now set for July 22, 2013, should be continued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

While the granting of a continuance is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1516 (11th Cir. 1986), the court is limited by the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The Act provides in part:

"In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs."

18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act excludes from the 70-day period any continuance based on "findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." § 3161(h)(7)(A). In granting a continuance, the court may consider, among other factors, whether the failure to grant the continuance would "result in a miscarriage of justice," § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), or "[w]hether the case is so unusual or so complex ... that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation" without granting a continuance. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).

The court concludes that, in this case, the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the interest of the public and Cruz-Romero in a speedy trial. Counsel for Cruz-Romero has indicated that Cruz-Romero wants this court to hear de novo certain matters involved in Cruz-Romero's pending motion to suppress that were previously heard by the magistrate judge. As this court will hear the matter de novo, additional time is needed between this date and the currently set trial date in order to adjudicate the matter. The matters raised in the motion to suppress encompass both private and public interests, and the interest in adjudicating those matters in advance of trial is strong.

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) The motion to continue made by defendant Alejandro Cruz-Romero (doc. no. 71) is granted. (2) The jury selection and trial for defendant Cruz-Romero, now set for July 22, 2013, are reset for November 4, 2013, at 10:00 a.m., at the Federal Courthouse in Dothan, Alabama.
Source:  Leagle

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