RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TERRY F. MOORER, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION1

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by Mark Allen Jordan ("Jordan"), an indigent state inmate, challenging actions which occurred during a prior term of incarceration at the Staton Correctional Facility. Jordan names Capt. Willie Copeland, Lt. William Tate and Lt. Willie Burks as defendants in this cause of action.2 Specifically, Jordan complains that defendants Copeland and Tate acted with deliberate indifference to his safety when they failed to protect him from attack by inmate Deangelo Short on October 8, 2014. Doc. No. 1 at 2. Jordan also alleges that defendant Burks denied him equal protection and due process on October 15, 2014 when Burks confiscated a portion of his store draw and gave it to another inmate. Id. at 3. Jordan seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Id.

The defendants filed a special report, supplemental special report and relevant evidentiary materials in support of their reports, including affidavits, prison documents and medical records, addressing the claims presented by Jordan. In these filings, the defendants deny they acted in violation of Jordan's constitutional rights.

The court issued an order directing Jordan to file a response, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials, to the arguments set forth by the defendants in their report. Order of September 16, 2015 -Doc. No. 36 at 2. The order specifically cautioned the parties that "unless within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order a party files a response in opposition which presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response to the order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law." Id. at 2-3. Jordan filed unsworn responses to the defendants' reports which he limits to addressing the merits of his failure to protect claim. Doc. No. 34 and Doc. No. 37.

Pursuant to the order directing a response from the plaintiff, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendants' reports as a motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the sworn complaint, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

"Summary judgment is appropriate `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").3 The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [now dispute] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Williamson Oil Company, Inc. v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (moving party bears the initial burden of establishing there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324; Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (the moving party discharges his burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial).

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden. The burden therefore shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) ("If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it."); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts "must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage." Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal citation omitted).

To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250. "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff's "conclusory assertions . . ., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment."); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond "his own conclusory allegations" challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Mere verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment."); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value."). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (summary judgment appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must "consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. — and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists." Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question." Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Liberty Lobby, supra).

To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine [dispute] for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Jordan v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.

The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. After such review, the court finds that Jordan has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

III. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

To the extent Jordan lodges claims against the defendants in their official capacities and seeks monetary damages, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity. Official capacity lawsuits are "in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). "A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state's immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated Alabama's immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities." Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).

In light of the foregoing, the defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (state officials sued in their official capacities are protected from suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment); Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (damages are unavailable from state official sued in his official capacity).

IV. DISCUSSION4

A. Deliberate Indifference to Safety

"A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety, a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials' unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844-845 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Officials responsible for prison inmates may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's safety when the official knows that the inmate faces "a substantial risk of serious harm" and with such knowledge disregards the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 828. A constitutional violation occurs only "when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the official does not respond reasonably to the risk." Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003). "It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." Id. at 834. "Within [a prison's] volatile `community,' prison administrators are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of . . . the prison staffs and administrative personnel. . . . They are [also] under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984). The Eleventh Circuit has, however, "stress[ed] that a `prison custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner's safety. Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990)[.]" Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005). "Only `[a] prison official's deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.' Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).'" Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). "In order to state a § 1983 cause of action against prison officials based on a constitutional deprivation [under the Eighth Amendment], there must be at least some allegation of a conscious or callous indifference to a prisoner's rights, thus raising the tort to a constitutional stature." Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982).

The law is well settled that establishment of both objective and subjective elements are necessary to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). With respect to the requisite objective elements of a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must first show "an objectively substantial risk of serious harm . . . exist[ed]. Second, once it is established that the official is aware of this substantial risk, the official must react to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner." Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028-1029 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). As to the subjective elements, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual `conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual `punishments.'. . . [A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838 (emphasis added); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) ("Proof that the defendant should have perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient."); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). The conduct at issue "must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause[.]" Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). A defendant's subjective knowledge of the risk must be specific to that defendant because "imputed or collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. . . . Each individual Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person [knew at the time of the incident]." Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, "[t]he known risk of injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before a [state official's] failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference." Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[m]erely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability under section 1983." Id.

Consequently, to proceed beyond the properly supported motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Jordan must first demonstrate an objectively substantial risk of serious harm existed to him from inmate Short and "that the defendant[s] disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it in an objectively reasonable manner." Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App'x 719, 721 (11th Cir. 2014), citing Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1100. If he establishes these objective elements, Jordan must then satisfy the subjective component. To do so, Jordan "must [show] that the defendant[s] subjectively knew that [he] faced a substantial risk of serious harm. The defendant[s] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference." Id. (internal citation omitted).

Johnston v. Crosby, 135 F. App'x 375, 377 (11th Cir. 2005).

Jordan maintains that on September 23, 2014 he engaged in a physical altercation with "another inmate named `Halfbreed' in D-dorm, [their] assigned dorm." Doc. No. 1-1 at 1. Jordan asserts he spoke with defendant Copeland a short time after this altercation and Copeland "then moved me from D-dorm to B-dorm." Id. Copeland maintains he has no knowledge of this incident and denies issuing the order to move Jordan from D-dorm; rather, the defendants aver and the prison records demonstrate that defendant Tate, one of the shift commanders, ordered that Jordan be moved from D-dorm to B-dorm on September 23, 2014. Doc. No. 35-9 at 1. Jordan did submit an inmate request to defendant Copeland on September 25, 2014 referencing his previous "physical altercation" with Halfbreed "concerning some [money] I owed him[.]" Doc. No. 1-2 at 1. Jordan stated he did not have the money owed to Halfbreed and requested that Copeland speak to inmates Halfbreed and Cooper on his behalf. Id. Copeland responded that he did not "have any knowledge" of the altercation and advised Jordan to "report the incident to the shift commanders[.]" Id.

Jordan maintains that on October 3, 2014 Halfbreed and other unidentified inmates "came to B-dorm, . . . approached me, [and] threatened me with bodily harm if I did not pay them some money." Doc. No. 1-1 at 1. Jordan asserts he reported this incident to Lt. Tate who simply ignored his request for help. Id. Tate denies any interaction with Jordan on this date. Doc. No. 22-2 at 1-2.

Jordan contends that on the morning of October 8, 2014 inmate Deangelo Short entered B-dorm from D-dorm and "demanded money from me. I refused to pay him and he punched me in the face." Doc. No. 1-1 at 1. Jordan reported the incident to defendant Burks who immediately "sent Jordan to the Health Care Unit for a body chart due to his allegations." Doc. No. 22-3 at 1. A nurse conducted an examination of Jordan and noted some "swelling to [his right] eye. Small abrasion to area under [right] eye." Doc. No. 1-3 at 1. Later this same day, Jordan passed out in the dining hall, an incident he believed resulted from being "knocked out" by inmate Short. Doc. No. 1-1 at 2. Correctional officers transported Jordan to the health care unit for treatment. Jordan advised the attending nurse he "fell out in the kitchen." Doc. No. 22-5 at 4. The nurse examined Jordan and noted "no new injuries. Breathing unlabored. No acute distress[.]" Id. Upon completion of her examination, the nurse released Jordan to correctional officials for return to his assigned area.5

Jordan alleges defendants Copeland and Tate acted with deliberate indifference to his safety with respect to the attack perpetrated against him by inmate Short. In support of this assertion, Jordan argues that defendants Copeland and Tate failed to ensure his safety from attack by inmate Short after his requests for protection from some unidentified inmates, inmate Halfbreed and inmate Cooper. Jordan, however, does not allege that he complained to any prison official that he was in danger of being attacked by inmate Short. Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence that Jordan notified any prison official of a previous incident or credible threat made by inmate Short from which the official could infer that a substantial risk of harm existed to Jordan prior to the attack at issue. Specifically, there is no evidence before the court that the defendants had knowledge of any impending risk of harm, substantial or otherwise, posed by inmate Short to Jordan.

There is no evidence before the court of "an objectively substantial serious risk of harm" posed by inmate Short to Jordan prior to the October 8, 2014 attack as is necessary to establish deliberate indifference. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028-29. Furthermore, even if Jordan had satisfied the objective component, his deliberate indifference claim nevertheless fails as he presented no evidence that the defendants were subjectively aware of any risk of harm to him posed by Short. Johnson, 568 F. App'x at 722 (holding that complaint properly dismissed for failure to state a claim because "[n]owhere does the complaint allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that the defendants subjectively foresaw or knew of a substantial risk of injury posed by [inmate-attacker]."); Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F. App'x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e readily conclude the district court did not err by dismissing [Plaintiff's] failure-to-protect charge for failure to state a claim. While [Plaintiff] alleged he requested protection from certain inmates and that the defendants knew about his request for protection from his original cellmate, prisoner Neisler, he did not allege that the defendants had notice that he was in danger from Thomas, the inmate who attacked him. Simply put, the allegations of [Plaintiff's] complaint do not show the requisite subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, and, thus, do not state a claim for deliberate indifference resulting from a failure to protect from the attack by Thomas. Put another way, because [Plaintiff] alleged no facts indicating that any officer was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to him from [the inmate who actually attacked him] and failed to take protective measures, his claim fails."); Johnston, 135 F. App'x at 377 (holding that defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff provided no evidence that prison officials "had subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm presented by [inmate attacker]" and "introduced no evidence indicating that he notified [the defendants] of any particularized threat by [his attacker] nor of any fear [he] felt [from this particular inmate]."); see McBride v. Rivers, 170 F. App'x 648, 655 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants as Plaintiff "failed to show that the defendants had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm" because plaintiff merely advised he "had problems" with fellow inmate and was "in fear for [his] life."); Chatham v. Adcock, 334 F. App'x 281, 293-294 (11th Cir. 2009) (Where Plaintiff did "not identif[y] any specific `serious threat' from [fellow inmate]" or report any such threat to the defendants, mere "fact that [attacker] was a `problem inmate' with `violent tendencies' simply `does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.'"). In light of the foregoing, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of defendants Copeland and Tate on the claim alleging they acted with deliberate indifference to Jordan's safety.

B. Confiscation of Property — Due Process

Jordan complains that on October 15, 2014 defendant Burks intentionally, unlawfully and without authorization confiscated a portion of his store draw, i.e., five packs of Top cigarette tobacco, and gave this property to another inmate in violation of his right to due process. Doc. No. 1 at 3; Doc. No. 1-1 at 3 (The actions of Lt. Burks on October 15, 2014 "violated my due process when he . . . took (5) five packs of Top from me and gave it to inmate Stacks."). Burks denies this allegation. Doc. No. 22-3.

The aforementioned claim fails to implicate the due process protection afforded by the Constitution as "an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause . . . if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984); Rodriguez-Mora v. Baker, 792 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986) (Inmate's claim that deputy marshal failed to return ring to inmate, whether due to negligence or an intentional act, provided no basis for relief as neither a negligent loss of property nor an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property constitutes a violation of due process.); Holloway v. Walker, 790 F.2d 1170, 1173-1174 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding no breach of federally guaranteed constitutional rights, even where high level state employee intentionally engages in tortious conduct, as long as the state system as a whole provides due process).

This court has routinely and consistently applied the holding of Hudson to dismiss due process claims brought by inmates challenging actions of state officials regarding deprivations of their property. McClellan v. Alabama, Civil Action No. 2:11-CV-466-ID, 2011 WL 3423940 (M.D. Ala. 2011); Flournoy v. Culver, et al., Civil Action No. 1:10-CV-104-ID, 2010 WL 916577 (M. D. Ala. 2010); Dunklin v. Riley, et al., Civil Action No. 2:06-CV-1063-MEF, 2009 WL 3624706 (M.D. Ala. 2009); Malone v. Boyd, et al., Civil Action No. 2:09-CV-217-TMH, 2009 WL 1064903 (M.D. Ala. 2009); Carter v. Valeska, et al., Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-858-TMH, 2008 WL 5245618 (M.D. Ala. 2008); Salmon v. Turner, Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-554-TMH, 2008 WL 3286982 (M.D. Ala. 2008); and Todd v. Jones, et al., Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1021-WKW, 2007 WL 4510340 (M.D. Ala. 2007).

The State of Alabama, through its Board of Adjustment, provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for Jordan to seek redress of the defendant's allegedly improper taking of his personal property. Ala. Code § 41-9-60 et seq. "Furthermore, the post-deprivation remedies available to the plaintiff under Alabama tort law [are] sufficient to satisfy due process." Radford v. Mitchem, et al., Civil Action No. 2:09-CV-02426-KOB-JEO (N.D. Ala. 2011) — Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation — Doc. No. 24 at 8, adopted as opinion of the court October 24, 2011. Consequently, assuming arguendo defendant Burks confiscated personal property from Jordan, such confiscation did not implicate Jordan's constitutional right to due process. Defendant Burks is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

C. Equal Protection

Jordan makes a purely conclusory allegation that the action of defendant Burks deprived him of equal protection. This claim provides Jordan no basis for relief because merely labeling an action violative of equal protection fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

"Despite the tendency of all rights `to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme,' there are obviously limits beyond which the equal protection analysis may not be pressed. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment `does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,'. . . nor does it require the State to `equalize [prison] conditions.'" Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-612 (1974); Hammond v. Auburn University, 669 F.Supp. 1555, 1563 (M.D.Ala. 1987) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require all persons to be treated either identically or equally."). In order to present a claim of discrimination cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, "a prisoner must [at a minimum] demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and Prob. Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986)." Sweet v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006). "[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a . . . disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of . . . discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977). "`Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected . . . a particular course of action at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). Evidence which merely indicates disparity of treatment or even arbitrary administration of state powers, rather than instances of purposeful or invidious discrimination, is insufficient to show discriminatory intent. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).

Jordan fails to identify any similarly situated inmate who received differential favorable treatment from defendant Burks. Thus, Jordan's "equal protection claim necessarily fails first because he has not [asserted] that he was treated differently from other, similarly situated prisoners." Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1319. This claim likewise provides no basis for relief because [Jordan] has not alleged . . . that he was treated differently on account of some form of invidious discrimination tied to a constitutionally protected interest. He has not even claimed that he was treated differently from others because of race, religion, or national origin. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 S.Ct. 497 (1944) ("The unlawful administration . . . of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination."); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting a claim that a state prisoner's equal protection rights were violated because he received a longer sentence than some other prisoners and holding that "a mere demonstration of inequality is not enough; the Constitution does not require identical treatment. There must be an allegation of invidiousness or illegitimacy in the statutory scheme before a cognizable claim arises: it is a settled rule that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cruz v. Skelton, 543 F.2d 86, 92-93 (5th Cir.1976) (affirming dismissal of prisoner's equal protection claim because there was no allegation of "`invidious discrimination' based on such considerations as race, religion, national origin, or poverty").

Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1319 (emphasis in original). Consequently, the conclusory allegation of an equal protection violation entitles Jordan to no relief in this cause of action.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

It is further

ORDERED that on or before June 29, 2017 the parties may file objections to this Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall "waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions" except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide a copy of the Recommendation to the plaintiff at his address of record and the Fountain Correctional Facility, his address as identified by the Alabama Department of Corrections on its inmate database maintained by the Alabama Department of Corrections, http://doc.state.al.us/InmateSearch.