KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Ladonna C. Timmons has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying her applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 17, 19).
Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 13, 14) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised,
On September 27, 2012, Timmons filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"),
The Commissioner's decision on Timmons's applications became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied Timmons's request for review of the ALJ's decision on February 1, 2016. (R. 1-5). On March 29, 2016, Timmons filed this action under §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. 1). See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) ("The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title."); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").
"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts."). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
However, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) ... As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).
In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").
Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).
"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).
If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).
Where, as here, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council denied review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. "[W]hen the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the applicant attacks only the ALJ's decision, the Court may not consider evidence that was presented to the Appeals Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324.
At Step One, the ALJ determined that Timmons had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date, May 6, 2012. (R. 20). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Timmons had the following severe impairments: obesity, lymphedema, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD), hypertension, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), personality disorder, and mood disorder. (R. 20). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Timmons did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of one of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of Impairments. (R. 21-22).
At Step Four,
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).
The ALJ determined that Timmons had the RFC "to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967[,]"
Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Timmons was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 27). At Step Five, the ALJ, after taking testimony from a vocational expert, found that there exist significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Timmons can perform given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 27-28). Thus, the ALJ found that Timmons was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 28).
Timmons's lone claim of error in favor of reversal is that "[s]ubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that [Timmons] can perform unskilled work on a consistent basis" because the ALJ "specifically failed to discuss medical records that discuss [Timmons]'s `inability to get along with people, having various mood swings and paranoia and also "blacking out" and not remembering what happened.'" (Doc. 13 at 1 - 2).
In analyzing Timmons's mental impairments, the ALJ considered treatment records from Altapointe covering a period from 2011 to January 2014. The ALJ discussed those records as follows:
(R. 25).
Timmons takes issue only with the last two sentences of the above-quoted passage, claiming that their "recitation of the evidence is grossly inaccurate." (Doc. 13 at 3). In support, Timmons cites excerpts from two Altapointe treatment notes respectively dated December 30, 2013, and January 2, 2014, which together comprise "Exhibit 12F" (R. 408-411). Having considered those notes, the undersigned is not persuaded that reversible error has been shown.
As Timmons highlights, the December 30, 2013 note, completed by a Dr. Freerksen, states: Timmons "[f]eels `pissed off.' Seeing people, objects, shadows. `I talk to my friends everyday.' These are hallucinations. Two days ago, she pushed someone down and broke her nose because she got mad. Her friends were telling her to do so." (R. 410). Timmons further points out that the December 30, 2013 note documented the following observations: "Appearance/Grooming: Inappropriate; Behavior: Uncooperative, Agitated; Mood: Angry; Affect: Irritable; Homicidal thoughts: Yes, Describe: thoughts of generalized malevolence, not homicide, and no intent or plan; Perceptions: Auditory hallucinations present, visual hallucinations present; Insight: Poor Judgement [sic]: Poor; Anxiety: Mild, Describe: fidgety." (R. 410 - 411). However, the undersigned agrees with the Commissioner that these appear to simply be Dr. Freerksen recording Timmons's subjective complaints and offering general observations. Timmons omits Dr. Freersken's additional observations that her thoughts were "logical/coherent/[within normal limits]" and that she had "no impairment" in her concentration. (R. 411). She also fails to mention Dr. Freerksen's observation that "[h]allucinations seem to by [sic] personality based and consumer indicated she assaulted the other person (no charges pressed) because she was angry and not because her `friends' told her to[,]" indicating Dr. Freerksen had some doubt as to Timmons's subjective reports of hallucinations. (R. 410). Finally, as the Commissioner correctly notes, the December 30, 2013 examination was the only time Dr. Freerksen ever saw Timmons, and her observations as to Timmons's appearance and demeanor are largely inconsistent with prior treatment notes. In particular, Dr. Cohen-Colson, who saw Timmons six times in 2013, repeatedly reported unremarkable observations. Timmons has not challenged the ALJ's characterization of her Altapointe records at any time prior to Dr. Freersken's report.
As for the January 2, 2014 treatment note, completed by therapist J. Smith, Timmons highlights the following observations:
(R. 408 (emphasis by Timmons)).
As the Commissioner correctly notes, a "therapist" who is neither a physician nor a psychologist is not an "acceptable medical source" who can provide evidence of a medically determinable impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a). Timmons has pointed to no other evidence that would support her claimed impairments of paranoia or "blacking out." Moreover, at the time Smith offered his "clinical opinion," Timmons had recently been transferred to him from another therapist, and Smith had only seen her twice (the other time being a month earlier, December 4, 2013) (see R. 347-348). Finally, despite the dire-sounding tone of his clinical opinion, Smith's observations of Timmons at the January 2, 2014 examination were unremarkable. (See R. 408-409 (noting "appropriate" appearance and grooming; "normal, cooperative" behavior; "normal" mood; affect "appropriate to situation;" no homicidal thoughts; etc.)).
The undersigned is not persuaded that these two treatment notes render the ALJ's overall longitudinal view of Timmons's Altapointe treatment records fatally flawed. Additionally, the undersigned agrees with the Commissioner that Timmons has not explained how the evidence the ALJ purportedly ignored is inconsistent with the mental RFC the ALJ ultimately arrived at or otherwise shows that Timmons is unable to work. Indeed, the ALJ explained that "[t]he preclusion from working with the public and limitations to occasional interaction with co-workers accommodates her mental impairments and symptoms such as anxiety and issues with interpersonal interactions[, and h]er concentration issues and mental impairments are accommodated by the limitations to simple instructions ... and avoiding tasks involving a variety of instructions or tasks." (R. 25-26).
Accordingly, the Court
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is
Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.