T. MICHAEL PUTNAM, Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, Cheryl Vanita Hobson, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). Ms. Hobson timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Hobson was forty-one years old at the time of the hearing, she has a ninth-grade education, and she is able to communicate in English. (Tr. at 31, 44). She has no past relevant work experience. (Id.) Ms. Hobson claims that she became disabled on June 1, 2009, due to COPD, seizures, glaucoma, depression, back pain, and slow blood flow to the brain. (Tr. at 155).
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is "doing substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I). If he or she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant's impairments are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairments fall within this category, he or she will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a determination of the claimant's residual functional capacity will be made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Residual functional capacity ("RFC") is an assessment, based on all relevant evidence, of a claimant's remaining ability to do work despite his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.945(a)(1).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant's impairments prevent her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant's RFC, as well as the claimant's age, education, and past work experience, in order to determine if he or she can do other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden is on the Commissioner to demonstrate that other jobs exist which the claimant can perform; and, once that burden is met, the claimant must prove his or her inability to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
Applying this sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Ms. Hobson has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 15, 2009, the application date. (Tr. at 24). According to the ALJ, Plaintiff's impairments include mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; seizure disorder; affective disorder with anxiety; bipolar disorder; COPD secondary to chronic tobacco abuse; and narcotic dependence, which were considered "severe" based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) He also determined that the Plaintiff has impairments that are non-severe, which are: a previous hysterectomy following evidence of early stage uterine cancer, GERD, migraine headaches, tremor, glaucoma, and obesity. (Id.) However, he found that the impairments, either individually or in combination, do not meet or medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 25).
The ALJ did not find Ms. Hobson's allegations to be totally credible, and he determined that she has the residual functional capacity to perform "sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a), except she must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat, cold and pulmonary irritants; no driving commercial vehicles; occasional stooping; no climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds; understand, remember and carry-out instructions sufficient to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks; can maintain concentration, persistence and pace for periods up to two hours sufficient to complete a regular workday with routine breaks; low stress environment, defined as infrequent, gradually introduced changes in the work setting; infrequent interaction with public; can be around employees throughout the workday, but only occasional, casual conversation and interpersonal interaction; only occasional, tactful, non-confrontational supervision; and deal with things rather than people. (Tr. at 27-28).
According to the ALJ, Ms. Hobson has no prior relevant work, she is a "younger individual," and she has a "limited education," as those terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 31). He determined that "[t]ransferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work." (Id.) The ALJ found that Ms. Hobson has the residual functional capacity to perform a significant range of sedentary work. (Tr. at 32). Even though Plaintiff cannot perform the full range of sedentary work, the ALJ relied upon the testimony of an impartial vocational expert ("VE") for finding that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that she is capable of performing, such as inspector of small parts, bonder in the semi-conductor industry, and document preparer. (Id.) The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff "has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since July 15, 2009, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)." (Id.)
This court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual findings of the Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. "The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and `the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'" Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966)). Indeed, even if this court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for "despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached." Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
The court must keep in mind that opinions such as whether a claimant is disabled, the nature and extent of a claimant's residual functional capacity, and the application of vocational factors "are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). Whether the plaintiff meets the listing and is qualified for Social Security disability benefits is a question reserved for the ALJ, and the court "may not decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, even if the court were to disagree with the ALJ about the significance of certain facts, the court has no power to reverse that finding as long as there is substantial evidence in the record supporting it.
Ms. Hobson alleges that the ALJ's decision should be reversed and remanded for two reasons. First, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination of her RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to include as a limitation upon her ability to do sedentary work that she be limited to working in a "well-spaced environment." Second, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination that she has the ability to perform unskilled sedentary work is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not take into account that the Plaintiff's impairments will result in more than one absence per month from her job, which according to the VE, would make her unemployable.
At the oral hearing, the ALJ discussed, in his hypothetical questions to the Vocational Expert (VE), Ms. Hobson's possible need for a well-spaced work environment for light work.
(Tr. at 75-77) (emphasis added).
The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have applied the well-spaced environment parameter set forth in his first hypothetical to Ms. Hobson's RFC determination. Had the ALJ done so, a finding that she is disabled arguably would have been required due to absence of any jobs that could meet that accommodation. The Plaintiff argues also that the ALJ should have analyzed her need for a well-spaced environment similarly to the court in Rosario v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2011 WL 6024027 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2011), in which the ALJ determined that the plaintiff's impairments created a situation in which "third parties walking in and out of her area" would cause distractions and that the plaintiff's "work environment would consist of a desk, cubicle or space, but not like a fast food environment." Id. at *3. Ms. Hobson argues that the ALJ in Rosario properly considered the plaintiff's need for limited distractions, and that the ALJ in the instant case similarly should have considered Ms. Hobson's need for limited distractions.
The ALJ addressed the Plaintiff's claim of an inability to concentrate in his decision. He wrote, for example:
(Tr. at 30-31). Along with claiming she has difficulty concentrating, the Plaintiff testified in the oral hearing that she had difficulty getting along with co-workers at her previous jobs. She did not, however, claim that co-workers or customers being in her workspace was particularly distracting. Her testimony did not indicate that a "cubicle" style working environment would improve her ability to concentrate.
Ultimately, the Plaintiff is responsible for proving disability. Although the burden is on the Commissioner to demonstrate that jobs exist which the claimant can perform, once that burden is met, the plaintiff must prove her inability to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). Beyond claiming that the ALJ "ignored" the possibility that Ms. Hobson would be unable to work with the distraction of third parties walking around in her workspace, the Plaintiff does not offer any evidence that Ms. Hobson cannot do the jobs listed in the ALJ's opinion or that the ALJ's RFC determination was not based on substantial evidence. The Plaintiff's medical records do not indicate that her treating physicians believed she was unable to work around people or that she needed to be in a "well-spaced" environment in order to work or function. The only evidence of the Plaintiff's need for a well-spaced environment is her own testimony, which the ALJ found only partially credible. As discussed, infra, the ALJ adequately explained his reasoning for not finding Ms. Hobson's testimony fully credible.
The Court must always be aware of the fact that opinions such as whether a claimant is disabled, the claimant's residual functional capacity, and the application of vocational factors "are . . . reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). The ALJ clearly explained his determination and supported it with substantial evidence from the medical and non-medical records in the instant case. Accordingly, the ALJ's determination is due to be upheld.
The Plaintiff argues that her "impairments in combination would certainly result in more than just one absence from work per month." (Doc. 12, p. 12). The VE testified that the employer of a person with Ms. Hobson's education and work history would not tolerate more than one absence from work per month. Based on the Plaintiff's impairments and the VE's testimony, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found Ms. Hobson disabled and his decision is "not supported by substantial evidence and is due to be reversed." (Id.)
(Tr. at 78-79). Again, the Plaintiff argues that the parameters of the hypothetical precluding gainful activity should have been used by the ALJ to determine the Plaintiff's vocational ability. The Plaintiff states that her "impairments in combination would certainly result in more than just one absence from work per month. She has bipolar disorder or affective disorder with mixed anxiety, a seizure disorder, history of migraine headaches, and degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine. . . . It is also undisputed that the claimant has kidney stones every three months which cause her to miss a day or two whenever they happen." (Doc. 12, p. 12).
The Plaintiff's argument that her impairments "certainly" would result in more than one absence from work per month is based solely on Ms. Hobson's own subjective allegations of the severity of her impairments. Part of the ALJ's responsibility was to assess whether such subjective allegations are credible and supported by objective medical evidence. In the instant case, the ALJ found that Ms. Hobson's testimony was not completely credible and was not supported by evidence in the medical and nonmedical record.
(Tr. at 27-31). The ALJ found that the Plaintiff's migraines "are controlled with medication," "have not increased in severity since June 2009," and that none of Ms. Hobson's treating physicians "have stated that the claimant has any limitations or disability due to [her migraines]." (Tr. at 24). Based on this evidence, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff's migraines "constitute, at most, only slight abnormalities that cannot reasonably be expected to produce more than minimal, if any, work-related limitations." (Id.)
The ALJ did not, however, address the Plaintiff's history of kidney stones in his determination. The Plaintiff did not list her kidney stones as an ailment in her Disability Report. (Tr. at 155, 190). Ms. Hobson's medical records reflect a history of kidney stones, and the ALJ acknowledged her kidney stones in the oral hearing.
(Tr. at 59-60).
Although the ALJ did not specifically address the Plaintiff's history of kidney stones in his opinion, the Eleventh Circuit has held, "[t]here is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision. . . . is not a broad rejection which is `not enough to enable [the court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.'" Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Foote v. Charter, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561(11th Cir. 1995)). It is clear to the court that the ALJ thoughtfully and thoroughly reviewed the record in the instant case and considered medical evidence along with non-medical evidence such as the Plaintiff's testimony. The ALJ's decision was not a broad-brush rejection and is due to be upheld.
However, even assuming that the ALJ erred in failing to specifically address the Plaintiff's history of kidney stones, such error was harmless. In Jordan v. Astrue, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida discusses the idea of "harmless error" in regard to ALJ determinations:
617 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
In the instant case, the Plaintiff has presented no evidence that she is disabled specifically due to her history with kidney stones. In the Plaintiff's brief she argues that it is "undisputed" that her condition will cause her to accrue more than an average of one absence from work per-month, making her unable to do any work the ALJ found her qualified for. However, the Plaintiff's bald assertion that she will have a kidney stone every three months and miss two-to-three days of work each time does not indicate that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The medical records simply do not support the Furthermore, the Plaintiff's medical records, though they do indicate a history of kidney stones, do not indicate that the plaintiff is fated to always suffer from kidney stones. Even if the ALJ did err in failing to specifically discuss the Plaintiff's history of kidney stones in his determination, remanding the case for further analysis on that point would not change the outcome of the case and would be an exercise in futility. Accordingly, the ALJ's determination is due to be affirmed.
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Hobson's arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered affirming the Commissioner's determination.
