MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Prince L. Williams, Jr. has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his application for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 16, 17).

Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 12, 13) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 11) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised,1 the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

I. Background

On August 13, 2012, Williams filed an application for SSI2 with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), alleging disability beginning December 1, 1999.3 After his application was initially denied, Williams requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") for the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, which was held on March 12, 2014. On May 30, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Williams's application, finding him "not disabled" under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 53-63).

The Commissioner's decision on Williams's application became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied his request for review of the ALJ's decision on January 5, 2016. (R. 1-5). On March 1, 2016, Williams filed this action under § 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. 1). See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) ("The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title."); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II. Standards of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts."). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must . . . tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (footnote and some citations and quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).4

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

Where, as here, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council denied review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. "[W]hen the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the applicant attacks only the ALJ's decision, the Court may not consider evidence that was presented to the Appeals Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324.

III. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Williams had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of his SSI application, August 13, 2012. (R. 58). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Williams had the following severe impairments: stuttering and epilepsy. (R. 58). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Williams did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of Impairments. (R. 58-59).

At Step Four,

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Williams had the RFC "to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c)[,]"6 with the following limitations: "[T]he claimant can occasionally lift or carry 50 pounds, frequently 25 pounds. He can sit/stand/walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. He can push/pull as much as he can lift or carry. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He can never climb ladders or scaffolds. He can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. He can perform jobs not involving complex or frequent verbal communication. He can never work around unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, or extreme heat. He can never operate a motor vehicle. He is limited to simple tasks and short simple instructions. He can occasionally respond appropriately to the public." (R. 59).

The ALJ determined that Williams had no past relevant work. (R. 62). At Step Five, the ALJ, after taking testimony from a vocational expert, found that there exist significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Williams can perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 62-63). Thus, the ALJ found that Williams was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 63).

A. Severe Impairments

Williams claims that the ALJ reversibly erred by failing to classify his depression and anxiety as "severe impairments" at Step Two.7 The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports this decision, but the Court need not decide whether this is so. Because the ALJ determined at Step Two that Williams had other "severe impairments," any failure to include these additional "severe impairments" is harmless.

"At step two the ALJ must determine if the claimant has any severe impairment. This step acts as a filter; if no severe impairment is shown the claim is denied, but the finding of any severe impairment, whether or not it qualifies as a disability and whether or not it results from a single severe impairment or a combination of impairments that together qualify as severe, is enough to satisfy the requirement of step two." Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App'x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("[W]e have recognized that step two requires only a finding of `at least one' severe impairment to continue on to the later steps. See Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588. Further, the regulations state that the only consequence of the analysis at step two is that, if the ALJ finds no severe impairment or impairments, he should reach a conclusion of no disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Here, the ALJ found multiple severe impairments and accordingly proceeded to step three of the evaluation. Based on our precedent and the regulations, therefore, it is apparent that there is no need for an ALJ to identify every severe impairment at step two. Accordingly, even assuming that Tuggerson-Brown is correct that her additional impairments were `severe,' the ALJ's recognition of that as a fact would not, in any way, have changed the step-two analysis, and she cannot demonstrate error below."). Moreover, the ALJ's decision adequately demonstrates that she considered depression and anxiety at both Step Three (see R. 58 (stating that the ALJ considered Williams's impairments individually and in combination)) and Step Four (see R. 60 (noting "diagnostic impressions of major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder" but giving them "little weight . . . given the claimant's lack of any mental health treatment and the lack of any significant signs of anxiety or depression during the October 2013 psychological consultative examination . . .").8

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Williams's claim of error in the ALJ's determination of "severe impairments" at Step Two.

B. Testimony of Williams's Mother

Williams next argues that the ALJ reversibly erred because her decision "is devoid of any mention of the testimony offered by [Williams']s mother regarding [his] seizure disorder" and that "[n]o explanation is provided for failing to consider the lay witness testimony." (Doc. 12 at 6). This claim is contradicted by the ALJ's decision, which expressly noted that Williams's "mother testified to more seizures" but found more credible Williams's own testimony that he had only experienced "one seizure in the last month and none for the previous 12 months[,] as it is consistent with the medical record." (R. 61-62).9 Williams does not argue that this finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("A clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.").

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Williams's claim of error as to the ALJ's consideration of Williams's mother's testimony.

C. PRTF Technique

Finally, Williams argues that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to evaluate his mental impairments using the technique required by the Social Security regulations. "Agency regulations require the ALJ to use the `special technique' dictated by the [Psychiatric Review Technique Form ("PRTF")] for evaluating mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a-(a) . . . The ALJ is required to incorporate the results of this technique into the findings and conclusions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a-(e)(2)." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213-14.

Mills v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-12818, 2016 WL 4361933, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 16, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished). "[W]here a claimant has presented a colorable claim of mental impairment, the social security regulations require the ALJ to complete a PRTF and append it to the decision, or incorporate its mode of analysis into his findings and conclusions. Failure to do so requires remand." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213-14.

The Commissioner does not deny that the ALJ failed to utilize the PRTF technique but argues that this claim is "unavailing, because the ALJ specifically explained why she found that Plaintiff had no medically determinable psychological impairments." (Doc. 13 at 7). However, only a "colorable claim of mental impairment" is needed to trigger the requirement to apply the technique. As the Commissioner points out in her brief, the ALJ discussed and analyzed evidence concerning Williams's mental impairments. Specifically, the ALJ noted "diagnostic impressions of major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder" from a November 5, 2012 psychological consultative examination but gave them "little weight" due to Williams's "lack of any mental health treatment and the lack of any signs of anxiety or depression during [an] October 2013 psychological consultative examination . . ." (R. 60). The ALJ also gave "great weight" to the report from the October 2013 psychological consultative examination, noting that it was "detailed" and "included psychological testing, a clinical interview, and observations." (R. 61). The ALJ expressly noted that Williams "was assigned a GAF of 67" at the October 2013 examination, "indicative of mild mental limitations." (R. 61). The ALJ's discussion of the psychological evidence of record indicates an implicit finding that Williams had made a "colorable claim of mental impairment."10 Thus, the ALJ was required "to complete a PRTF and append it to the decision, or incorporate its mode of analysis into h[er] findings and conclusions." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1214.

It is undisputed that the ALJ did not complete a PRFT and append it to her decision; the decision also does not specifically reference the PRTF technique. The Commissioner has made no effort to show that the ALJ's decision otherwise adequately accounts for the technique, and the Court's own review finds that it does not. Cf. Mills, 2016 WL 4361933, at *2 ("The ALJ's decision does not specifically reference the PRTF technique. The ALJ discusses some of the functional areas in analyzing Mills' claim, however, so we must determine whether the ALJ's reasoning was enough to comply with the PRTF requirement." (citing Moore, 403 F.3d at 1214) (ALJ must "complete a PRTF and append it to the decision, or incorporate its mode of analysis into his findings and conclusions" (emphasis added))).

The ALJ's decision notes that at the October 2013 evaluation Williams "reported the ability to feed, bathe, groom and dress himself without assistance[,]" as well as the ability to "use a phone, count money, prepare meals, shop for groceries, and meet basic transportation needs." (R. 61). The ALJ also gave "great weight" to the 2013 consultative evaluator's opinion that Williams had "adequate ability to . . . work independently . . ." (R. 61). These findings are arguably relevant to "activities of daily living."11 The ALJ also gave "great weight" to the 2013 consultative evaluator's opinions that Williams's "stuttering would likely create at least mild problems with communicating and interpersonal relations" and that Williams had "adequate ability . . . to work with others, although his stuttering might prove troublesome." (R. 61). These findings are arguably relevant to "social functioning."12 The ALJ also gave "great weight" to the 2013 consultative evaluator's opinions that Williams had "good ability . . . to understand, remember and carry out simple/concrete instructions" and "adequate ability to deal with work pressures[,]" findings which are arguably relevant to "concentration, persistence, or pace."13

Assuming, without deciding, that the foregoing constitutes sufficiently specific findings as to the degrees of limitation for the first three areas of the PRTF technique, the ALJ's decision omits any discussion of the fourth area, "episodes of decompensation."14 Failure to include specific findings on any of the PRTF technique's four areas mandates reversal. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(e)(4) ("The decision must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional areas described . . ." (emphasis added)); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213-14 (finding reversible error where the "ALJ failed to even analyze or document [the claimant's] condition in two of the PRTF's functional areas: social functioning and prior episodes of decompensation"); Mills, 2016 WL 4361933, at *3 (finding reversible error where "the ALJ's opinion incorporated analysis of three of the four functional limitations[ but] does not reference social functioning").

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Williams's claim of error that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his mental impairments using the PRTF technique required by the Social Security regulations. Thus, the Court will remand to the Commissioner with the instruction to perform "an evaluation of [Williams]'s mental impairments that complies with the applicable regulations." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1214; Mills, 2016 WL 4361933, at *3.15

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner's final decision issued January 5, 2016, denying Williams's application for SSI is REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), applicable to SSI applications under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), for further proceedings consistent with this decision. This remand under sentence four of § 405(g) makes Williams a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993), and terminates this Court's jurisdiction over this matter.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), should Williams be awarded Social Security benefits on the subject application following this remand, the Court hereby grants Williams's counsel an extension of time in which to file a motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) until thirty days after the date of receipt of a notice of award of benefits from the SSA.16 Consistent with 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c), "the date of receipt of notice . . . shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of such notice, unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary." If multiple award notices are issued, the time for filing a § 406(b) fee motion shall run from the date of receipt of the latest-dated notice.

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE AND ORDERED.