SUSAN RUSS WALKER, Magistrate Judge.
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by Robert Dunklin, a state inmate, in which he alleges that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his health during a prior term of incarceration at the Butler County Correctional Facility.
Defendant Harden filed a special report, supplemental report and relevant evidentiary materials in support of his reports, including affidavits and certified copies of medical records, addressing the claims presented by Dunklin. In these filings, the defendant denies that he acted with deliberate indifference to Dunklin's health or medical needs.
The court entered orders allowing Dunklin the opportunity to file responses to the reports and evidentiary materials submitted by the defendant. Doc. No. 29; Doc. No. 38. The latter order advised the parties that unless "sufficient legal cause" is shown within fifteen days of entry of this order "why such action should not be undertaken, the court may at any time [after expiration of the time allowed for filing responses] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report[s] and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law." Doc. No. 38 at 2-3 (emphasis removed). Dunklin filed responses to these orders supported by documentary evidence and an affidavit. Doc. No. 32; Doc. No. 39.
Pursuant to the aforementioned orders, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendant's reports cumulatively as a motion for summary. Upon consideration of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the supporting evidentiary materials, the sworn complaint and the plaintiff's responses to the reports, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendant.
"Summary judgment is appropriate `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); F.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
The defendant has met his evidentiary burden. The burden therefore shifts to Dunklin to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) ("If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it."); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under penalty of perjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts "must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage." Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal citation omitted).
To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250. "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff's "conclusory assertions . . ., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment."); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond "his own conclusory allegations" challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Mere verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment."); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value."). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding summary judgment appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must "consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. — and can only grant summary judgment if [the evidence] in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists." Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).
For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine [dispute] for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.
The court has undertaken a thorough review of all the evidence contained in the record and, after such review, finds that Dunklin has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
On March 10, 2013, law enforcement officials placed Dunklin in the Butler County Correctional Facility due to his violation of probation on a prior state conviction.
Officials responsible for prison inmates may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's health or welfare when the official knows the inmate faces "a substantial risk of serious harm" and with such knowledge disregards the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). A constitutional violation occurs only "when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the official does not `respond[] reasonably to the risk.' Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1982-83, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). A plaintiff must also show that the constitutional violation caused his injuries." Marsh v. Butler County, Al., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001).
To prevail on a claim concerning allegedly improper medical treatment, an inmate must, at a minimum, show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986). Specifically, jail personnel may not subject an inmate to "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (As directed by Estelle, a plaintiff must establish "not merely the knowledge of a condition, but the knowledge of necessary treatment coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in [the acknowledged necessary] treatment."
Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).
In order to set forth a cognizable claim of "deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need . . ., Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant's deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury." Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-1307 (11th Cir. 2009). In seeking relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish "an objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (holding that for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety). Regarding the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must first show "an objectively `serious medical need[]'. . . and second, that the response made by [the defendant] to that need was poor enough to constitute `an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' and not merely accidental inadequacy, `negligen[ce] in diagnos[is] or treat[ment],' or even `[m]edical malpractice' actionable under state law." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal citations omitted). Thus, on a claim challenging the constitutionality of medical care, "[t]he facts alleged must do more than contend medical malpractice, misdiagnosis, accidents, [or] poor exercise of medical judgment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-97, 97 S.Ct. 285." Simpson v. Holder, 200 F.App'x 836, 839 (11th Cir. 2006); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, __ U.S. __, __, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999)) (emphasis added) (It is well-settled "[t]hat . . . `liability for
Furthermore, "to show the required subjective intent . . ., a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public official acted with an attitude of `deliberate indifference' . . . which is in turn defined as requiring two separate things `awareness of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists [] and . . . draw[ing] of the inference[.]'" Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal citations omitted). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Additionally, "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Id. at 838.
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (To show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's response to the need was more than "merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law.").
Moreover, "as Estelle teaches, whether government actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment `is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment' and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment." Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545; Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) ("A difference of opinion as to how a condition should be treated does not give rise to a constitutional violation."); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (mere fact inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference which violates the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because their opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient). Self-serving statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records. See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1990); Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
Dunklin argues that Sheriff Harden is responsible for the treatment decisions of the jail's nurses and his failure to intervene in these decisions constituted deliberate indifference. Harden avers that he was not in any way involved in the medical treatment provided to Dunklin and he relies exclusively on the facility's contract medical personnel to provide such treatment. Doc. No. 28-1 at 2-5. Dunklin concedes that Harden had no involvement with his medical treatment. Doc. No. 39 at 1. In his affidavit, Sheriff Harden states, in relevant part, that:
Doc. No. 30 at 4-5 (paragraph numbering omitted) (footnote added).
Stacey Sexton, a licensed practical nurse employed by QCHC to provide medical treatment to inmates at the Butler County Correctional Facility, addresses the plaintiff's allegations as follows:
Doc. No. 36-1 at 2-3. The affidavit of Nurse Sexton is corroborated by the objective medical records compiled contemporaneously with the treatment provided to Dunklin relative to his claim of deliberate indifference.
The medical records further indicate that, during the April 5, 2013 evaluation, Nurse Sexton showed Dunklin his prescribed medication. Dunklin identified the medication as that provided to him and, although initially advising that "the Mobic 15mg was the wrong pill[,]" Doc. No. 28-3 at 19, subsequently indicated that "he received [the] correct medication." Doc. No. 28-3 at 16. At this time, Nurse Sexton observed no swelling and noted "no acute distress." Doc. No. 28-3 at 19.
On April 8, 2013, Dunklin reported to the health care unit with "a pill in his pocket [stating it constituted evidence that he received the wrong medication]. [Nurse Sexton] ask[ed] to see the pill. . . . [Dunklin] put the pill to his mouth, said I'll take it." Doc. No. 28-3 at 19. Nurse Sexton retrieved the pill from Dunklin and identified it as Mobic, one of the medications prescribed for Dunklin. Id.
Dunklin has failed to demonstrate deliberate indifference or reckless disregard on the part of Sheriff Harden. Specifically, the record contains no evidence that the defendant was aware of information from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of defendant Harden on Dunklin's claim alleging deliberate indifference arising from the actions of medical personnel in treating his pain.
Insofar as Dunklin seeks to hold defendant Harden liable for the treatment provided by medical professionals, Dunkin is likewise entitled to no relief, as
Cameron v. Allen, et al., 525 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
Even assuming arguendo that defendant Harden exerted some authority over the manner in which those persons responsible for medical treatment rendered such treatment, the law is well settled "that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or vicarious liability]. . . . Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 S.Ct. 203 (1888) (`A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties'). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[S]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability."); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001) (A supervisory official "can have no respondeat superior liability for a section 1983 claim."); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), citing Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.). "Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1949. Thus, liability for medical treatment provided to Dunklin could attach to Sheriff Harden only if he "personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal connection between [their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.
Dunklin, however, concedes that Sheriff Harden did not personally participate or have any involvement, direct or otherwise, in the medical treatment provided by health care personnel. Doc. No. 39 at 1. The evidentiary materials before the court demonstrate that medical personnel made all decisions relative to the treatment provided to Dunklin and provided treatment to him in accordance with their professional judgment upon assessment of his physical condition.
In light of the foregoing, defendant Harden can be held liable for decisions of medical personnel only if his actions bear a causal relationship to the purported violation of Dunklin's constitutional rights. To establish the requisite causal connection and therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Harden, Dunklin must present sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of either "a history of widespread abuse [that] put[] [the defendant] on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [he] fail[ed] to do so" or "a . . . custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate indifference to [his medical needs], or . . . facts [that] support an inference that [the correctional defendants] directed the [facility's health care staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the staff] would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). After extensive review of the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted in this case, it is clear that Dunklin has failed to meet this burden.
The record before the court contains no probative evidence to support an inference that defendant Harden directed medical personnel to act unlawfully or knew that they would act unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, Dunklin has presented no evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration in the face of which this defendant failed to take corrective action; instead, the undisputed medical records indicate that Dunklin had continuous access to medical personnel and received treatment for his back and joint pain. The undisputed records also demonstrate that the challenged course of medical treatment did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by the defendant. Thus, the requisite causal connection does not exist in this case and liability under the custom or policy standard is not justified. Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is likewise due to be granted in favor of defendant Harden with respect to liability based on the theory of respondeat superior. Furthermore, even had Dunklin presented a proper basis for the claims lodged against defendant Harden, the medical records before the court demonstrate that health care personnel did not act with deliberate indifference to Dunklin's medical needs.
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
It is further
ORDERED that on or before August 24, 2017 the parties may file objections to this Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall "waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions" except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
