ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate (doc. 17). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.1

I. Background.

A. The Arbitration Proceedings and the Award.

This is an action to vacate an arbitrator's award, ostensibly brought pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10 and Alabama law.2 The underlying dispute involves claims brought by plaintiffs, Wayne and Robert Thames ("the Thameses"), against defendant, Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society ("Woodmen"). In particular, the Thameses sought to recover from Woodmen for the undisputed misappropriation of certain insurance premium funds they paid to non-party Scott Dees, who was Woodmen's local field representative, during the period of 2005 to 2008.3 Plaintiffs asserted claims against Woodmen for vicarious liability (on the theory that Dees was Woodmen's agent or employee), negligence, fraud/fraudulent concealment, breach of contract, and conversion.

As prescribed by the applicable arbitration agreement, the parties submitted their dispute to the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), which appointed a Birmingham attorney named Ben F. Beckham (the "Arbitrator") as arbitrator.4 After a number of conferences, discovery proceedings, and motion practice, the proceedings culminated in an arbitration hearing conducted on September 25 and 27, 2012.5 During this hearing, the Arbitrator received testimony from five witnesses, as well as dozens of exhibits for both claimants and respondent. The hearing was not closed until October 31, 2012, to allow for submission of post-hearing briefs. Both sides were represented by counsel throughout the arbitration process. Of relevance to the instant proceeding, Woodmen's attorneys were Walter T. Gilmer, Jr., and Archibald Reeves, IV, both of the McDowell Knight firm in Mobile, Alabama.

On November 30, 2012, the Arbitrator issued a 13-page written Award in which he found for Woodmen and against the Thameses on all claims. (Doc. 18, Exh. A.) In summary, the Award included the following determinations: (i) Dees was an independent contractor whose misappropriation of funds was for wholly personal reasons, such that Woodmen could not be vicariously liable; (ii) the Thameses' negligence claim failed because of contributory negligence (they admitted to exercising poor business judgment in their dealings with Dees and to receiving annual reports that enabled them to determine that Dees was misappropriating their premium funds) and timeliness (claim was governed by two-year statute of limitations yet the Thameses filed an arbitration demand more than three years after incurring the complained-of losses); (iii) the Thameses' fraud claims failed for lack of reasonable reliance, inasmuch as they admitted to using poor judgment (i.e., they knew better than to make premium payment checks payable to Dees and acknowledged not adequately protecting their own interests) and they received annual reports that showed their premium payments to Dees were not reaching Woodmen; (iv) the Thameses failed to present sufficient evidence that Woodmen breached any contract with them, inasmuch as Local Lodge 1057 is independent and autonomous, Woodmen did not control Lodge 1057's checking account, Woodmen received no complaints that Dees was misappropriating premium funds until 2011, Woodmen would not have known from Lodge 1057's reports and audits that Dees was misappropriating policyholder funds, the primary responsibility rested with the Thameses to verify that Woodmen was receiving their premium payments, and there was not sufficient and creditable evidence that Woodmen knew or should have known prior to 2011 that Dees was misappropriating their premium payments and Lodge 1057's checking account funds; and (v) Woodmen could not have converted premium funds that it never received, and such conversion claim was untimely, in any event. (Doc. 18, Exh. A at 3-11.)

In light of these and other written findings, the Arbitrator concluded the Award as follows: "The evidence presented was insufficient as a matter of law for Claimants to be entitled to any recovery in this matter. Based on the evidence submitted and the applicable law, Claimants are not entitled to any recovery in this matter, and Respondent has no liability to Claimants in this matter." (Id. at 12.)

B. Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate the Award.

On December 28, 2012, less than 30 days after entry of the Award, the Thameses (by and through counsel) filed a Notice of Appeal in the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Alabama. On February 8, 2013, Woodmen removed this action to this District Court.6 Upon transfer to the undersigned's docket in April, this Court entered an Order (doc. 13) directing the Thameses to file an Amended Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate the Arbitration Award, with appropriate record citations and legal analysis. Plaintiffs' ensuing request for discovery was denied based on well-settled authority and their failure to identify either law or facts showing that discovery was warranted in these post-arbitration proceedings. (See doc. 15.)7

On May 16, 2013, plaintiffs filed their amended Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate (doc. 17). That Motion identifies three grounds for setting aside the Award. First, plaintiffs assert that the Arbitrator violated 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) by "refus[ing] to order the production of an audit conducted by Woodmen of the World showing the extent of Mr. Dees' theft after being provided with proof of said audit" and by "refusing to allow material evidence and testimony showing that Woodmen of the World has an extensive history of negligent hiring and supervision of its agents in Alabama." (Doc. 17, at 2, 4.) Second, plaintiffs maintain that the Arbitrator violated 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) by "fail[ing] to disclose a relationship with defendant's counsel." (Id. at 5.) Third, plaintiffs contend that the Arbitrator violated 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) by "refus[ing] to give credence to the evidence presented against Woodmen" showing breach of contract by non-compliance with company procedures and guidelines, "thus further demonstrating his level of partiality." (Id. at 7.)8 Defendant has filed a response (doc. 18) denying that plaintiffs are entitled to relief on any of these grounds.

II. Analysis.

A. Legal Standard for Vacatur of Arbitration Award.

"After arbitration is complete, judicial review of the arbitration process and of the amount of the award is narrowly limited." Booth v. Hume Pub., Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 932 (11th Cir. 1990). Indeed, "[b]ecause arbitration is an alternative to litigation, judicial review of arbitration decisions is among the narrowest known to the law." AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. ("FAA"), "imposes a heavy presumption in favor of confirming arbitration awards; therefore, a court's confirmation of an arbitration award is usually routine or summary." Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 842 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also AIG Baker, 508 F.3d at 999 (FAA "presumes that arbitration awards will be confirmed") (citations omitted).9

By its terms, the FAA provides that a federal court "may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators ...; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct ... in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Although vacatur may be had under these four statutory scenarios, such review "is circumscribed, as arbitrators do not act as junior varsity trial courts where subsequent appellate review is readily available to the losing party." Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 842-43 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

"The burden is on the party requesting vacatur of the award to prove one of these four bases." Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2002). And the law is now "clear that the statutory grounds justifying vacatur found in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) are exclusive." Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 842 n.10. "The FAA does not permit courts to roam unbridled in their oversight of arbitration awards." Scott v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1014 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Southern Communications Services, Inc. v. Thomas, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 3481467, *4 (11th Cir. July 12, 2013) (award cannot be vacated merely because "an arbitrator behaves in manifest disregard of the law" or reaches an "incorrect legal conclusion," but is subject to vacatur only on "exceedingly narrow" statutory grounds).

B. Section 10(a)(3) Review.

Plaintiffs' first asserted basis for requesting vacatur of the Award is that the Arbitrator committed misconduct by "refus[ing] to order the production of an audit conducted by Woodmen of the World showing the extent of Mr. Dees' theft." (Doc. 17, at 2.) Plaintiffs explain that this evidence was relevant because it "would show the total amount of loss by Wayne and Robert Thames and the date of these losses," and because the audit "could definitively show the true amount of loss of the plaintiffs." (Id.) Plaintiffs also ascribe misconduct to the Arbitrator "in refusing to allow material evidence and testimony showing that Woodmen of the World has an extensive history of negligent hiring and supervision of its agents in Alabama." (Id. at 3.) According to plaintiffs, this evidence "show[s] a pattern of negligent hiring and supervision" and would have bolstered their negligence claims. (Id. at 5.)

1. Section 10(a)(3) Standard.

The FAA authorizes vacatur of arbitration awards "where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct ... in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Judicial review under § 10(a)(3) is narrow, inasmuch as "[a]rbitrators enjoy wide latitude in conducting an arbitration hearing, and they are not constrained by formal rules of procedure or evidence." Rosensweig v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 494 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, courts have emphasized that this subsection does not warrant vacatur where an arbitrator merely made an erroneous discovery or evidentiary ruling; rather, a plaintiff must show that the arbitrator's handling of these matters was in bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative misconduct, effectively depriving the plaintiff of a fundamentally fair proceeding. See, e.g., Scott, 141 F.3d at 1016 ("a mere difference of opinion between the arbitrators and the moving party as to the correct resolution of a procedural problem will not support vacatur under section 10(a)(3)").10

Furthermore, even a showing of misconduct (without more) does not suffice, because § 10(a)(3) also includes a prejudice element that the party petitioning for vacatur must satisfy. See Rosensweig, 494 F.3d at 1333 ("[A] federal court may vacate an arbitrator's award only if the arbitrator's refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence prejudices the rights of the parties to the arbitration proceedings.") (citation omitted); Aviles v. Charles Schwab & Co., 2011 WL 2938020, *3 (11th Cir. July 20, 2011) (similar).

2. Arbitrator's Discovery Ruling Concerning Production of "Audit."

The Thameses maintain that the Arbitrator violated § 10(a)(3) by refusing to order Woodmen to produce an "audit" showing "the total amount of loss by Wayne and Robert Thames and the date of those losses." (Doc. 17, at 2.) The threshold problem with this § 10(a)(3) argument is that the Thameses have offered no evidence that such an audit exists. From day one, Woodmen consistently, steadfastly denied that it had conducted such an audit. Both sides agree that the Arbitrator heard from the parties at length on this issue on multiple occasions, both before and during the hearing, including the Thameses' explanation for why they believed there must be such an audit and Woodmen's denial of the existence of same. (Hearing Transcript (doc. 1, Exh. A), at 356-59.) The Arbitrator ultimately accepted Woodmen's representation that no such audit exists. (Doc. 18, Exh. E, ¶ 5 ("The Respondent represents there are/were no pre-arbitration audits on the Claimants[`] insurance accounts."). Plaintiffs have come forward with no evidence that the Arbitrator's finding that the subject audit did not exist was erroneous, much less that said determination was made in bad faith or was so gross that it amounted to affirmative misconduct. All the Thameses have shown is that they disagree with the Arbitrator's decision. Under applicable law, such a contention falls well short of the high threshold necessary to support § 10(a)(3) relief on an arbitrator misconduct theory.

Even if the Court could conclude on this record that the Arbitrator erred in crediting Woodmen's representation that the requested audit is nonexistent, and even if the Court could conclude on this record that such an error was so egregious as to constitute affirmative misconduct, the Thameses still would not prevail under § 10(a)(3). As noted supra, that subsection allows for vacatur on misconduct grounds "only if the arbitrator's refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence prejudices the rights of the parties to the arbitration proceedings." Rosensweig, 494 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs state that the evidentiary value of the supposed audit was that it "could show the true amount of Mr. Dees' theft and Wayne and Robert Thames [sic] loss as well as the mechanics of Mr. Dees' scheme to defraud." (Doc. 17, at 3.) However, plaintiffs fail to show how this information might have made any material difference in the arbitration proceedings. To the extent plaintiffs would have used the audit to show the amount of loss, that kind of damages evidence would only come into play if the Arbitrator found for the Thameses on liability. He did not, so the "true amount" of the Thameses' loss (and, hence, the damages to which they would have been entitled had they prevailed on liability) was of no consequence. Nor does plaintiffs' cryptic reference to "the mechanics of Mr. Dees' scheme to defraud" suggest that production of the audit would have mattered one whit in the Arbitrator's liability findings. At issue in the case was not the mechanics of Dees' scheme, but whether Woodmen should be liable for it.11 Plaintiffs identify nothing about the supposed audit that would reasonably have improved their position on liability.

In short, the Court readily concludes that plaintiffs' § 10(a)(3) claim for vacatur of the Award because the Arbitrator failed to require Woodmen to produce "an audit ... showing the extent of Mr. Dees' theft" (doc. 17, at 2) is meritless. Plaintiffs have not shown that the Arbitrator's determination that no such audit existed was erroneous, much less that such a determination could possibly amount to affirmative misconduct by the Arbitrator, or that the Thameses were prejudiced in their rights to the arbitration proceedings as a result. All we have here is a simple disagreement by a litigant with an arbitrator's reasonable (albeit not unassailable) discovery ruling. That is not the stuff of a § 10(a)(3) violation.

3. Arbitrator's Purported Exclusion of Evidence of "Systematic Negligence, Negligent Supervision and Fraud."

Alternatively, the Thameses seek vacatur of the Award under § 10(a)(3) on the ground that the Arbitrator "demonstrated misconduct in refusing to allow material evidence and testimony showing that Woodmen of the World has an extensive history of negligent hiring and supervision of its agents in Alabama." (Doc. 17, at 4.) Plaintiffs' Motion does not specify what evidence was excluded, but merely cites to four pages of the hearing transcript (pages 13, 45, 414, 415), with no amplification. These pages reveal the following: (i) the Arbitrator overruled a defense objection to plaintiffs' questioning about a Woodmen agent named Glenn Morris and events dating back a quarter century (Hearing Transcript, at 13-14); (ii) when the defense objected to a question concerning Scott Dees' duties when Woodmen hired him, plaintiffs' counsel withdrew the question before the Arbitrator ruled on it (id. at 45-46); and (iii) the Arbitrator overruled a defense objection to plaintiffs' questioning Woodman's national field manager about whether "this same activity isn't going on all over the country" and allowed follow-up questions about Morris over defense objections (id. at 414-16). The point is this: Nowhere in the cited pages did the Arbitrator exclude evidence or testimony showing Woodmen's purported history of negligent hiring and supervision of agents. Without identification by plaintiffs of exactly what evidence was purportedly excluded by the Arbitrator, this challenge to the Award fails on its face.

Nor do plaintiffs improve their § 10(a)(3) argument by describing testimony that was allowed by the Arbitrator, then faulting the Arbitrator for "refus[ing] to give credence to said testimony and erroneously referr[ing] to the testimony as contradictory." (Doc. 17, at 4.) By its plain language, § 10(a)(3) applies to misconduct by an arbitrator "in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy," not in refusing to give such credence or weight to the evidence that the losing party believes it deserved. Plaintiffs have cited no authority — and the Court is aware of none — for the proposition that § 10(a)(3) may be used as a full-scale assault on an arbitrator's credibility determinations whenever the losing party disagrees with same.

Besides, even if plaintiffs had shown error by the Arbitrator in excluding evidence that Woodmen had a history of negligent hiring and supervision of its agents, vacatur of the Award under § 10(a)(3) would remain inappropriate because the Thameses still have not shown prejudice. According to plaintiffs, the purportedly wrongfully excluded evidence related to their claims of negligence, negligent supervision and fraud. The Award reflects that plaintiffs' negligence claims were denied on grounds of contributory negligence and untimeliness, and that plaintiffs' fraud claims were denied for want of reasonable reliance. Those fatal defects would have remained — and the resulting Award would have been unchanged — even if the evidence cited by the Thameses had been allowed.

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that plaintiffs' 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) challenge to the Award is both factually and legally unfounded.

C. Section 10(a)(2) Review: Failure to Disclose Relationship with Counsel.

The other two grounds for relief presented in plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate allege that the Arbitrator was biased or corrupt in some way. In that regard, the Thameses maintain that the Arbitrator's evident partiality was manifested in his failure to disclose a relationship with Woodmen's attorneys, and in "disregarding and falsely labeling the evidence" at the hearing. (Doc. 17, at 7.) As set forth in the Motion to Vacate, plaintiffs' latter point turns on the Arbitrator's purported refusal to lend credence to evidence that Woodmen had breached a contractual duty owed to the Thameses.

1. Section 10(a)(2) Legal Standard.

Under § 10(a)(2) of the FAA, vacatur of an arbitration award is permissible "where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). "[T]he `evident partiality' exception is to be strictly construed, as it must be if the federal policy favoring arbitration ... is to be given full effect." Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Services, Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). "Partiality as used in the FAA is synonymous with bias in favor of or against a party." Aviles, 2011 WL 2938020, at *3. "The alleged partiality must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain and speculative." Gianelli, 146 F.3d at 1312. Thus, under the law of this Circuit, "an arbitration award may be vacated due to the `evident partiality' of an arbitrator only when either (1) an actual conflict exists, or (2) the arbitrator knows of, but fails to disclose, information which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a potential conflict exists." Id. (citation omitted); see also Scott, 141 F.3d at 1015 ("To vacate an arbitration award for evident partiality, the moving party must present evidence that would support a `reasonable impression of partiality' on the arbitrator's behalf," that is "direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain and speculative.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 73 (2nd Cir. 2012) ("where an undisclosed matter is not suggestive of bias, vacatur based upon that nondisclosure cannot be warranted under an evident-partiality theory").

2. Arbitrator's Failure to Disclose Relationship with Counsel.

The centerpiece of the Thameses' § 10(a)(2) objection is that "[t]he arbitrator failed to disclose a relationship with defendant's counsel." (Doc. 17, at 5.)12 This allegation is devoid of factual support. Both of Woodmen's attorneys of record have filed declarations in which they unequivocally deny having ever met, spoken to, worked with, or dealt with the Arbitrator at any time before, or in any context other than, this matter.13 Against defense counsel's unambiguous, comprehensive averments that they have had no interaction with the Arbitrator outside the boundaries of the Thames v. Woodmen of the World arbitration proceeding, plaintiffs present an unvarnished accusation (unsupported by record evidence) that as some point prior to the arbitration hearing, the Arbitrator stated, "I know that these attorneys, Archie Reeves and Walt Gilmer, are good, honest attorneys and if they claim there is no audit then there is no audit." (Doc. 17, at 5.) Even if plaintiffs' counsel's bare representation in a brief were sufficient to establish this fact, that quotation does not reveal any prior relationship between the Arbitrator and Woodmen's lawyers. On its face, the Arbitrator's purported comment is equally consistent with the notion that his impressions of Woodmen's attorneys were drawn from their actions in this case as it is with the theory that such impressions were culled from previous interactions outside the context of this matter. By all appearances, plaintiffs never followed up with the Arbitrator to request clarification of the basis for and meaning of that statement, although they were clearly on notice of it well in advance of the arbitration hearing. Such a "remote, uncertain, and speculative" charge of bias does not come close to meeting the legal standard for "evident partiality" under § 10(a)(2), and therefore cannot support vacatur of the Award.

Furthermore, even if the Court were blindly to accept plaintiffs' position that the Arbitrator had a prior relationship with Woodmen's lawyers (despite the lack of evidence to support that position, plaintiffs' failure to take reasonably available steps to develop an appropriate record during arbitration proceedings, and defendant's attorneys' declarations flatly denying such a relationship), plaintiffs would still not be entitled to relief. At most, plaintiffs have shown that the Arbitrator was sufficiently acquainted with Woodmen's lawyers that he believed them to be "good, honest attorneys." That does not come close to satisfying the "evident partiality or corruption" standard for vacatur under § 10(a)(2). Indeed, "standing alone, the fact that an arbitrator ... had previous contacts with counsel for one of the parties does not suggest evident partiality." University Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2002).14 In a best-case scenario for plaintiffs, they have shown nothing more than "previous contacts." Absent facts or circumstances suggesting such previous contacts give rise to bias, financial linkages, ongoing business relations, or a significant compromising connection between the Arbitrator and Woodmen or its lawyers (none of which the Thameses have even hinted to be the case), there is no § 10(a)(2) violation.

3. Arbitrator's Disregard or False Labeling of Evidence.

Finally, the Thameses seek vacatur of the Award under § 10(a)(2) on the ground that the Arbitrator displayed evident partiality and corruption in "disregarding and falsely labeling the evidence." (Doc. 17, at 7.) As explanation for this allegation, plaintiffs submit a cursory paragraph citing an eight-page excerpt from the hearing transcript, disagreeing with the Arbitrator's treatment of their breach of contract claims, and stating that the Arbitrator "refused to give credence to the evidence presented against Woodmen on these findings." (Id.)

Upon review of the cited pages, the Court cannot discern how the testimony therein establishes that Woodmen breached a contractual duty owed to the Thameses.15 Even if such testimony did demonstrate a breach, the Arbitrator's purported "refus[al] to give credence" to such evidence does not constitute "evident partiality" under applicable law. Otherwise, a § 10(a)(2) vacatur could be had whenever the losing party disagreed with the arbitrator, or whenever a reviewing court believed the arbitrator "got it wrong." That is simply not the legal standard. See, e.g., Taylor v. University of Phoenix/Apollo Group, 2012 WL 3892837, *5 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 2012) (arbitrator's purported mistake of fact or law does not constitute "evident partiality" under § 10(a)(2)); Scandinavian Reinsurance, 668 F.3d at 75 ("[w]e have repeatedly said that adverse rulings alone rarely evidence partiality"); Thian Lok Tio v. Washington Hosp. Center, 753 F.Supp.2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2010) ("Although a series of unfavorable rulings by the arbitrator may produce an appearance of bias in the eyes of the unsuccessful party, it does not justify vacating the arbitration award.").

Careful review of the cited pages of the hearing transcript, alongside the Award's treatment of the breach of contract claims, does not reveal any reason to believe that such award was infected by "evident partiality or corruption." The Arbitrator's ruling on the breach of contract claim evinces neither the existence of an actual conflict nor information which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a potential conflict exists, as required to constitute "evident partiality" under the Gianelli line of cases. Therefore, no § 10(a)(2) vacatur is warranted on this claim.

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs' Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate (doc. 17) is denied in its entirety because plaintiffs have not made an adequate showing that any of the four statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitrator's award under the Federal Arbitration Act are satisfied here. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 9, the undersigned will enter a separate Judgment confirming the Award. Because this Order and the accompanying Judgment resolve all claims for relief joined herein, the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case for administrative and statistical purposes.