Filed: Sep. 14, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 11-10843 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SEPTEMBER 14, 2011 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cv-61618-WJZ KENNETH ARUGU, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant, versus CITY OF PLANTATION, KIMBERLY STALKER, LAURETTA DECKER, a.k.a. Lauretta Arugu, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees, WILLIAM SMITH, llllll
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 11-10843 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SEPTEMBER 14, 2011 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cv-61618-WJZ KENNETH ARUGU, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant, versus CITY OF PLANTATION, KIMBERLY STALKER, LAURETTA DECKER, a.k.a. Lauretta Arugu, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees, WILLIAM SMITH, lllllll..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-10843 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cv-61618-WJZ
KENNETH ARUGU,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant,
versus
CITY OF PLANTATION,
KIMBERLY STALKER,
LAURETTA DECKER,
a.k.a. Lauretta Arugu,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees,
WILLIAM SMITH,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Counter Claimant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(September 14, 2011)
Before CARNES, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Arugu appeals the district court’s judgment awarding sanctions
against him in the form of $1,953 in attorney’s fees. Those sanctions arose from
Arugu’s filing a pro se “Motion in Opposition” to the district court’s order
dismissing his lawsuit for failure to comply with a court order. Arugu filed the
motion pro se even though his brother, Odiator Arugu, has served as his attorney
throughout the proceedings in the case.1
I.
Arugu’s pro se motion contained unsupported accusations of misconduct by
the district court and defense counsel and stated that Arugu had “notified the
ACLU, NAACP, the Urban League, Rainbow Coalition, National Action Network,
Channel 7 news, Channel 4 news, CNN, Sun-Sentinel news, and the Miami Herald
news” about the dismissal of his lawsuit. Arugu asserted that the district court
judge was “bias[ed] against [him],” had “abused his authority as a judge,” and had
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Arugu, through his brother as counsel, originally filed a complaint in Florida state court
alleging various state law tort claims against these defendants: the City of Plantation, Florida;
Officer Kimberly Stalker; Officer William Smith; and Lauretta Decker, who is Arugu’s ex-wife.
The allegations arose from a domestic dispute at Decker’s home, which resulted in Arugu’s
arrest. Arugu later amended his complaint to assert violations of his Fourth Amendment rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the defendants removed the case to federal court. Officer Stalker
asserted a counterclaim against Arugu for assault and battery, alleging that he “unlawfully struck
and battered” her and injured her in the course of his arrest.
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“failed to uphold and keep to the oath of office.” In response the defendants filed
a motion for sanctions.
The motion for sanctions was referred to a magistrate judge, who found that
because Arugu was represented by counsel, he was on notice that he was not
authorized to file anything pro se. That notice was given in the form of a local
rule, which provides: “Whenever a party has appeared by attorney, the party
cannot thereafter appear or act on the party’s own behalf in the action or
proceeding, or take any step therein . . . .” S.D. Fla. R. 11.1(d)(4). In addition to
that, Arugu had notice in the form of an earlier order issued by the district court
directing him to refrain from filing any more pro se motions because those
motions violated Local Rule 11.1(d)(4).
Arugu asserted that he believed that he was no longer represented by
counsel at the time he filed the pro se “Motion in Opposition,” but the magistrate
judge rejected that assertion, finding that Arugu provided “no comprehensible
explanation for why, after his attorney filed five post-dismissal documents on
[Arugu’s] behalf, [Arugu] suddenly considered himself not to be represented
anymore,” particularly given that his attorney was also his brother. According to
the magistrate judge’s report, Arugu’s arguments were “inconsistent because he
simultaneously asserts that he thought that he was not represented by counsel
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following the dismissal of the matter and that counsel for Defendants should have
made efforts to resolve the Motion for Sanctions with his counsel (whom he
thought did not represent him) prior to filing the motion.”
The magistrate judge also found fault with the content of the pro se filing,
which accused the district court judge of being biased, abusing his authority, and
failing to uphold his oath of office—all without any substantiating evidence.
According the magistrate judge’s report, the “Motion in Opposition” apparently
was filed for the sole purpose of disparaging the district court judge and
attempting to demean the court. The filing did nothing to advance the litigation
and actually disrupted it and multiplied the proceedings. The magistrate judge
specifically made a finding of bad faith, stating: “In view of these circumstances
and [Arugu’s] suspect explanation for his pro se [Motion in] Opposition despite
the Court’s prior Order instructing [Arugu] to make all filings through his
attorney, I find that [Arugu] filed his Opposition in bad faith.” The magistrate
judge recommended that the district court exercise its inherent authority to impose
sanctions. The sanction recommended was an award of the fees and costs that
were associated with the defendants’ filing of their motion for sanctions and
defense counsel’s attendance at the hearing on that motion.
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Arugu filed objections to the report and recommendation. The district court
conducted a de novo review of the record, overruled Arugu’s objections, and
approved and adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and as a
result exercised its inherent authority to award sanctions against Arugu. The court
ordered the defendants to file affidavits and supporting documentation to establish
the costs and fees they had incurred related to their motion for sanctions.
The defense counsel filed a “Verified Notice of Compliance,” asserting that
they were entitled to $1,953 based on 12.6 hours of attorney time at a $155 per
hour billing rate, which was the rate the City had agreed to pay them for all legal
work on the case. They included a detailed list of tasks performed, the date of
their performance, and the amount of time each task took in ten-minute
increments. They expressly waived any claim to reimbursable costs such as
postage and copying, stating that those were nominal.
The district court issued an order construing the defendants’ notice of
compliance as a motion for attorney’s fees. Applying the lodestar method of
calculating an award of attorney’s fees, the court found that $155 was a reasonable
hourly rate, and 12.6 hours was a reasonable amount of time to spend on tasks
related to the motion for sanctions. For those reasons, the court ordered Arugu to
pay the defendants $1,953. After the district court issued that order, Arugu filed
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an “Objection” to the award of fees, which the district court considered,
concluding that Arugu’s objections to the calculation of fee award were “without
merit.” Arugu appealed to this Court.
II.
We review only for abuse of discretion a court’s imposition of sanctions
under its inherent powers. Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc.,
561 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009). “In determining whether the court abused
its discretion we ask whether it applied the wrong legal standard or made findings
of fact that are clearly erroneous.”
Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
We have explained:
A court may impose sanctions for litigation misconduct under its
inherent power. The court’s inherent power derives from the court’s
need to manage its own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases. This power, however, must be
exercised with restraint and discretion.
Id. at 1306 (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). “‘The key to
unlocking a court’s inherent power is a finding of bad faith.’”
Id. (quoting Barnes
v. Dalton,
158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir.1998)). A party engages in bad faith by,
among other things, “delaying or disrupting the litigation or hampering
enforcement of a court order.”
Id.
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Arugu contends that he did not act in bad faith by filing the pro se motion in
opposition, even though he was represented by counsel and the district court had
already ordered him not to file any more pro se motions. That contention is
untenable. The magistrate judge’s finding of bad faith was not erroneous, much
less clearly erroneous. It was based on a finding that Arugu’s pro se motion
disrupted the litigation and multiplied the proceedings. The magistrate judge
noted that the defendants had to respond to that motion, and the court had to hold
a hearing on the defendants’ response. There was also a finding that Arugu’s
explanation for his actions was “suspect.” In spite of that finding, Arugu
continues to assert in his brief to this Court that defense counsel violated the
district court’s local rule by failing to confer with his counsel before filing a
motion for sanctions, while asserting that he filed his pro se motion because he
thought his case was closed and he was no longer represented by counsel. Those
assertions are plainly contradictory. Based on those facts as well as the content of
Arugu’s pro se motion itself, the magistrate judge properly concluded that
sanctions were appropriate. In its adoption of that conclusion and its
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determination of the amount to be awarded, the district court acted well within the
range of its discretion.2
AFFIRMED.
2
Arugu also argues that he had no opportunity to respond to the defendants’ motion
seeking fees. That is incorrect. As we have already discussed, Arugu filed an “Objection” after
the district court issued its order awarding the fees. The district court considered and then
rejected on the merits Arugu’s objections to the award, including his assertion that certain items
on the list of tasks performed were not related to the defendants’ motion for sanctions.
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