Filed: Jul. 08, 2019
Latest Update: Jul. 08, 2019
Summary: OPINION AND ORDER MYRON H. THOMPSON , District Judge . Plaintiff William Gipson, an African-American, brought this lawsuit against his employer, defendant Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc., pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. 1981a and 2000e through 2000e-17) ("Title VII"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended (42 U.S.C. 1981) (" 1981"). This court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII) and 28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3
Summary: OPINION AND ORDER MYRON H. THOMPSON , District Judge . Plaintiff William Gipson, an African-American, brought this lawsuit against his employer, defendant Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc., pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. 1981a and 2000e through 2000e-17) ("Title VII"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended (42 U.S.C. 1981) (" 1981"). This court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII) and 28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3)..
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OPINION AND ORDER
MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.
Plaintiff William Gipson, an African-American, brought this lawsuit against his employer, defendant Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc., pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a and 2000e through 2000e-17) ("Title VII"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 1981) ("§ 1981"). This court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights). Gipson asserted five claims for racial discrimination and retaliation: (1) discriminatory wages, (2) discriminatory failure-to-promote, (3) discriminatory demotion, (4) retaliatory demotion, and (5) harassment. (Gipson also asserted several state claims but he voluntarily dismissed those earlier.)
Hyundai has responded to these five federal claims with a motion for summary judgment in its favor on all claims. The magistrate judge has recommended summary judgement against Hyundai on the first two claims for discriminatory wages and failure-to-promote, although with the failure-to-promote claim proceeding on § 1981 only. The magistrate judge has recommended summary judgment in favor of Hyundai on the two claims of discriminatory and retaliatory demotion. And Gipson has abandoned his fifth claim for harassment. The parties have filed objections to various parts of the recommendation.
The court agrees with the magistrate judge that summary judgment should not be entered in favor of Hyundai on the discriminatory wage and failure-to-promote claims and that these claims should proceed to trial (albeit with the failure-to-promote claim based only on § 1981). The court, however, disagrees with the magistrate judge's recommendation that summary judgment should be entered in favor of Hyundai on Gipson's retaliatory and discriminatory demotion claims. These claims rely on Gibson's overall performance. As the magistrate judge noted in his recommendation in the context of the failure-to-promote claim, Gipson presented evidence casting doubt on Hyundai's assertion that, over time, co-employee Clayton Payne performed better than Gipson. Furthermore, the court notes that the performance evaluation process raises a specter of race discrimination. And there are substantial allegations of a racially hostile work environment. For the same reasons the magistrate judge concluded that there are disputes of material fact, analyzed under the various burden-shifting frameworks, as to Payne's and Gipson's performance evaluations in the context of the failure-to-promote claim, the court concludes the same as to the retaliatory and discriminatory demotion claims.
Finally, the court will dismiss Gipson's harassment claim as abandoned.
* * *
Accordingly, for the above reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
(1) The parties' objections (doc. nos. 114 and 115) to the magistrate judge's recommendation are sustained in part and overruled in part.
(2) The recommendation of the magistrate judge (doc. no. 110) is adopted as to plaintiff William Gipson's wage discrimination claim and discriminatory failure-to-promote claim, and is rejected as to plaintiff Gipson's retaliatory demotion claim and discriminatory demotion claim.
(3) Defendant Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 71) is denied as to all claims, except as to plaintiff Gipson's failure-to-promote claim to the extent it is based on Title VII. Summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc. on Gipson's failure-to-promote claim to the extent it is based on Title VII.
(4) Plaintiff Gipson's following four federal claims will go to trial: his claims of (a) discriminatory wages, (b) discriminatory failure-to-promote, (c) discriminatory demotion, and (d) retaliatory demotion, with all four claims, except the failure-to-promote claim, resting on both Title VII and § 1981 and the failure-to-promote claim resting on only § 1981.
(5) Plaintiff Gipson's federal harassment claim is dismissed in its entirety.
This case is not closed.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 S.Ct. 911 (1945)). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Perez-Priego v. Alachua County Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment entered by a magistrate judge, but only if the parties consented to the magistrate's jurisdiction. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Under this section, appeals are permitted from the following types of orders:
i. Orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions; However, interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1986);
ii. Orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships; and
iii. Orders determining the rights and liabilities of parties in admiralty cases.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 S.Ct. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the order or judgment appealed from is entered. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time to file an appeal may be reopened if the district court finds, upon motion, that the following conditions are satisfied: the moving party did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order within 21 days after entry; the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice, whichever is earlier; and no party would be prejudiced by the reopening.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court lacks jurisdiction, i.e., authority, to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
