KEITH STARRETT, District Judge.
After holding a bench trial, receiving the parties' briefs, and carefully considering the parties' evidence and arguments, the Court finds as follows: 1) Plaintiffs presented no credible evidence of racial discrimination, 2) Plaintiffs' claims of familial discrimination fail because Defendants were responding to legitimate safety concerns, 3) Defendants did not retaliate against Plaintiffs, and 4) Defendants did not substantially interfere with Plaintiffs' use or enjoyment of the subject property. The Court will enter a separate judgment in favor of Defendants.
This case involves claims under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"),
The FHA makes it unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Likewise, the ALFHL makes it unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with it, because of race . . . ." ALA. CODE § 24-8-4(1). Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed a claim of racial discrimination under the ALFHL, it has held that the "same legal analysis" applies to claims under the FHA and the Florida Fair Housing Act because the two laws are "substantively identical." Phillipeaux v. Apt. Inv. & Mgmt. Co., 598 F. App'x 640, 643 (11th Cir. 2015). Therefore, as the relevant provisions of the FHA and ALFHL are substantively identical, the Court will apply the same legal analysis to Plaintiffs' claims under each law.
"To prove intentional discrimination, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that the defendants actually intended or were improperly motivated in their decision to discriminate against persons protected by the FHA." Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App'x 581, 584 (11th Cir. 2009). "[A] plaintiff may meet this burden by presenting evidence that the `decision-making body acted for the sole purpose of effectuating the desires of private citizens, that racial considerations were a motivating factor behind those desires, and that members of the decision-making body were aware of the motivations of the private citizens.'" Id. (quoting Hallmark Devs., Inc. v. Fulton County, Georgia, 466 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiffs presented no credible evidence of racial discrimination. They presented no credible evidence that Brittany Allen — an African-American woman — was motivated by a desire to discriminate against the African-American residents of the apartment complex. Likewise, they presented no credible evidence that Allen promulgated the rules to placate white residents who were motivated by racial considerations. The only evidence presented to support Plaintiffs' claim of racial discrimination was testimony from Plaintiffs and Khelsi Harvest. Harvest testified that Brittany Allen said white tenants were complaining about the African-American tenants, and Plaintiffs testified that rules were only enforced against the African-American children. As the Court will explain, neither Plaintiffs' nor Harvest's testimony is credible.
With respect to Harvest, Brittany Allen and Savannah Cox testified that Harvest rented units below market rates without authorization, and it is undisputed that leasing consultants received a $50.00 bonus for every unit they leased. Therefore, the evidence shows that Harvest inflated her own sales figures at her employer's expense, receiving a $50 bonus every time she leased a unit below market rate. Moreover, Harvest forged Allen's signature on a lease application, using the Grand Reserve's model apartment to help someone defraud the local school district. Finally, Harvest had a pecuniary motive to testify against the Grand Reserve: she had filed her own lawsuit against it for employment discrimination. All of this evidence is sufficient to cast considerable doubt on her credibility.
Additionally, Harvest has a prior conviction for a crime involving a dishonest act. Rule 609 provides that a witness's character for truthfulness may be impeached by evidence of a criminal conviction "for any crime regardless of the punishment, . . . if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving — or the witness's admitting — a dishonest act or false statement." FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). However, "if more than 10 years have passed since the witness's conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later," the evidence of conviction is only admissible if "(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use." FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
This rule "creates a strong presumption against the use for impeachment purposes" of prior convictions, such as this one, which are more than ten years old. United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 687 (11th Cir. 1998). Evidence of stale convictions "will be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. In evaluating whether exceptional circumstances exist, the trial judge must consider whether the witness has already been impeached, and if so, the probative value of the prior conviction decreases accordingly." United States v. Tisdale, 817 F.2d 1552, 1555 (11th Cir. 1987).
Harvest's prior conviction for bank theft involves a dishonest act: she pleaded guilty to embezzling $19,520.00 from a bank. In the Court's opinion, this is probative of her character for truthfulness here. Harvest's testimony is being used to extract an award of money damages from her former employer, against whom she filed her own lawsuit for alleged racial discrimination. The record contains substantial evidence that Harvest did not deal honestly with the Grand Reserve. She leased apartments below market rate so that she could collect more bonuses. She also forged her supervisor's signature on an application to assist someone in defrauding the local school district. In summary, her actions while employed by the Grand Reserve were characterized by dishonesty and self-dealing, and a judgment against the Grand Reserve in this case would bolster her claims of employment discrimination. These factors are similar in kind to her earlier conviction for embezzlement.
"The danger in admitting stale convictions is that while their remoteness limits their probative value, their prejudicial effect remains," and "the jury, despite limiting instructions, can hardly avoid drawing the inference that the past conviction suggests some probability that defendant committed [a] similar offense . . . ." United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 908 (11th Cir. 1992). This danger does not exist here because this is a bench trial. The Court can assign a fair amount of probative value to the prior conviction, in light of both the time that has passed and the substantial similarities to the present case. Even if the Court did not consider the prior conviction, it still would not find Harvest to be a credible witness because of the other substantial impeachment evidence in the record.
As for the Plaintiffs, the Court likewise does not find their testimony to be credible. On multiple occasions during trial, the Court had to instruct Mrs. Belcher to stop coaching her children while they testified. To be clear: the Court witnessed Mrs. Belcher coaching all three minor plaintiffs during their testimony. Additionally, the minor Plaintiffs' testimony was inconsistent with their deposition testimony on many issues.
Although Plaintiffs claimed that they were fined for violations of the disputed rules, Defendants demonstrated that Plaintiffs were never fined for breaking the new rules instituted by Brittany Allen. Plaintiffs' only documentary evidence of being fined was a money order they remitted just days before filing this lawsuit, and upon which they wrote "FINED FOR CHILDREN OUTSIDE." Mrs. Belcher testified that Plaintiffs were late on their rent no more than twice during their period of residence at the Grand Reserve, but Defendants' accounting records demonstrate that Plaintiffs were charged late fees 29 times. Of course, neither Mr. Belcher nor Mrs. Belcher could provide conclusive answers on these matters because each claimed that the other handled the family's finances.
Defendants offered testimony from Brittany Allen, Savannah Cox, Allen Tucker, and Cedric Leonard that the disputed rules were not enforced. Cedric Leonard testified that children of all races were causing the problems that the new rules were intended to address, and that residents of all races complained about the children. Brittany Allen, an African-American woman, testified that she promulgated the new rules in a sincere effort to address serious problems caused by children in the apartment complex, and that race was not a motivating factor in her decision. Sheena Allen denied having ever witnessed any discriminatory actions against residents at the Grand Reserve.
In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiffs presented no credible evidence that Defendants intended to discriminate against African-American residents, or that Defendants instituted the disputed rules in response to the racially discriminatory complaints of white residents.
The FHA makes it unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . familial status . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
But a plaintiff can also establish a prima facie violation of § 3604(b) by "establishing the existence of facially discriminatory rules which treat children, and thus, families with children, differently and less favorably than adults-only households." Iniestra v. Cliff Warren Invs., Inc., 886 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2012). "Facially discriminatory actions are just a type of intentional discrimination or disparate treatment." Fair Hous. Ctr. of the Greater Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Park Partners Residential, LLC, No. 16-80740, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35546, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2017). "When a facial challenge is made, the motive of the drafters of the ordinance is irrelevant." Id. at *10. To determine whether a rule is facially discriminatory, the Court first must determine whether "an ordinance singles out protected individuals with regard to housing and applies different rules to them." Id. at *9 (citing Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 231 (6th Cir. 2003) (policy prohibiting those with children from renting/owning second and third floor condos was facially discriminatory on the basis of familial status). Second, "the Court must determine whether the differential treatment is justified such that it is not a violation of the FHA." Park Partners, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35546 at *10 (citing Jeffrey O. v. City of Boca Raton, 511 F.Supp.2d 1339, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2007)).
"The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the standard a . . . defendant must meet to justify disparate treatment under the FHA." Jeffrey O., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 1350. The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits require a defendant to "show either: (1) that the restriction benefits the protected class, or (2) that it responds to legitimate safety concerns raised by the individuals affected, rather than being based on stereotypes." Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 468 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Social Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1996); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1503 (10th Cir. 1995)).
The Court finds that Brittany Allen promulgated the disputed rules in response to legitimate safety concerns raised by residents of the Grand Reserve apartment complex. Therefore, even if the new rules were facially discriminatory on the basis of familial status, they were justified. The evidence at trial revealed a host of problems caused by children running amok in the apartment complex. Residents found used condoms and marijuana on the playgrounds. Children were engaging in sexual activity on the premises, and residents found a little girl's underwear in the sauna. Children were destroying the gym equipment, vandalizing the property, and preventing other residents (including other children) from enjoying the amenities of the apartment complex. Brittany Allen — a mother herself — testified that she promulgated the new rules for the protection and safety of the complex's children, in response to legitimate complaints from residents. She did not do so for the purpose of discriminating against families or children. It is certainly arguable whether the rules were the wisest or most efficient means of addressing these issues, but there is no reason to question Allen's sincerity and good intentions. Regardless, the evidence shows that the new rules were not enforced. For these reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' claim of familial-status discrimination.
It is unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected by" the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
Plaintiffs have not directed the Court to any credible evidence that Defendants subjected them to adverse actions because of protected activity. Plaintiffs were never fined or penalized for violating any of the disputed rules. In fact, Plaintiffs' testimony on this issue was riddled with misrepresentations, as demonstrated by Defendants' accounting records. The only fines or penalties levied against Plaintiffs were for late payment of rent, and for a noise violation arising from a domestic dispute at their apartment. Although Defendant charged Plaintiff a $200 fine for the noise violation, Plaintiffs never actually paid a fine as the funds were applied to the back rent they owed. Additionally, the Court does not find the minor Plaintiffs' testimony to be credible on issues related to enforcement of the disputed rules, in light of the coaching they received throughout the trial and the inconsistencies with their previous deposition testimony. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proof on this claim.
"[T]here is implied in every leasing a covenant of quiet enjoyment." Johnson v. Northpointe Apts., 744 So.2d 899, 902 (Ala. 1999). "The landlord warrants that the tenant will not be disturbed in possession by any other person with a superior legal right to possession. Moreover, the landlord covenants not to evict the tenant himself, actually or constructively." Id. "A breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment occurs when the landlord substantially interferes with the tenant's beneficial use or enjoyment of the premises. Even if not substantial enough to rise to the level of a constructive eviction . . ., such interference may constitute a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment entitling the tenant to damages." Id. Among other things, "the covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached by threats or other forms of intimidation before the expiration of the tenancy." Horne v. TGM Assocs., LP, 56 So.3d 615, 627 (Ala. 2010) (citing Johnson, 744 So. 2d at 902). The question is whether Defendants' actions "materially affect[ed] the value and interfer[ed] with the present right to use and to the possession of a part of the premises . . . ." Wolff v. Woodruff, 61 So.2d 69, 73 (Ala. 1952). To constitute a constructive eviction, "it is necessary that the conduct of the landlord manifest an intention to deprive the tenant of possession of the rented premises. The intent need not be actual, but may be presumptive, or inferable from the character of the landlord's interference." S. Security Servs., Inc. v. Esneault, 435 So.2d 1309, 1312 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Defendants substantially interfered with their enjoyment of the premises. Multiple witnesses testified that the disputed rules were not enforced. For the same reasons provided above, the Court does not find Plaintiffs' testimony to be credible with regard to enforcement of the rules. Plaintiffs' testimony as to the purported effect that the rules had on them is inconsistent. Although Plaintiffs claim that enforcement of the rules made their lives miserable, they re-upped their lease in the summer of 2015, when they could have left the Grand Reserve without penalty. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof on this claim.
For these reasons, the Court finds as follows: 1) Plaintiffs presented no credible evidence of racial discrimination, 2) Plaintiffs' claims of familial discrimination fail because Defendants were responding to legitimate safety concerns, 3) Defendants did not retaliate against Plaintiffs, and 4) Defendants did not substantially interfere with Plaintiffs' use or enjoyment of the subject property. The Court will enter a separate final judgment in favor of Defendants.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
