G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendant GoDaddy.com LLC's ("GoDaddy") Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 21.) For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
GoDaddy is an internet-domain name registrar. (Compl. ¶ 14.) With the permission of Microsoft, GoDaddy began selling Office 365 through its website in early 2014 through subscription services. (Compl. ¶ 2.) When selling Office 365 directly, Microsoft offers various Office 365 plans including the "Office 365 Business Premium" plan. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Similarly, GoDaddy also sells several Office 365 plans including one entitled "Office 365 Business Premium" plan. (Compl. ¶ 4.)
On or about November 13, 2014, Plaintiff Venture Edge Legal PLLC, viewed and purchased, through GoDaddy's website, the Office 365 Business Premium plan for $89.88 for a one-year term with an automatic annual renewal rate of $179.88 per year. (Compl. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff alleges GoDaddy failed to disclose that its version of the Office 365 Business plan does not offer the same services and features as the Office 365 Business Premium plan sold by Microsoft.
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While "a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead `enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are `merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), "[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
Rule 9(b) requires that a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake; in other words, Plaintiff must allege the "who, what, when and where" of his ACFA claim. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has done so here. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant failed to disclose that its version of the Office 365 Business Premium plan did not provide users with the same set of functionality as the Office 365 Business Premium plan sold by Microsoft. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Further, Plaintiff's allegations detail the services provided by Microsoft's plan that are not provided by GoDaddy's version. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff also alleges that this failure to disclose took place on Defendant's website, prior to when Plaintiff purchased GoDaddy's version of the Office 365 Business Premium plan. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Thus, in construing these allegations "in light most favorable to" Plaintiff, the Complaint satisfies Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements. Smith, 84 F.3d at 1217; see also Falk v. GMC, 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (recognizing that "a plaintiff in a fraud by omission suit will not be able to specify the time, place, and specify content of an omission as precisely as would a plaintiff in a false representation claim.")
The applicable statute of limitations for claims under the ACFA is one year. Alaface v. Nat'l Inc. Co., 181 Ariz. 586, 591, 892 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). "The statute of limitations has been interpreted to begin running when the defrauded party discovers or with reasonable diligence could have discovered the fraud." Mister Donut of Am. v. Harris, 150 Ariz. 321, 323, 723 P.2d 670, 672 (Ariz. 1986). Defendant raises the possibility that Plaintiff discovered the fraud at some point before purchasing the product and thus, the Complaint was not filed within the ACFA's one year statute of limitations and could be time-barred. As an affirmative defense, statute of limitations "is properly raised in a motion to dismiss where it appears from the face of the Complaint that the claim is time barred," and should not be granted "unless it appears certain plaintiff will not be entitled to relief under any set of facts susceptible of proof under the claims stated." Anson v. Am. Motors Corp., 155 Ariz. 420, 421, 747 P.2d 581, 582 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). It is not clear from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff's claim is barred. Id. (explaining that when evaluating a statute of limitations-based motion to dismiss, the court must "determine whether the complaint, construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff," establishes a timely claim). Accordingly, the court declines to rule in the context of deciding this motion to dismiss that the Complaint was time-barred.
The ACFA stipulates:
A. R. S. § 44-1522(A) (2013) (emphasis added). Under Arizona law, however, an omission-based claim also requires that a "party is under a duty to disclose." Tavilla v. Cephalon, Inc., 870 F.Supp.2d 759, 774 (D. Ariz. 2012). Plaintiff asserts that the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 551(2)(b), (2)(e) and the ACFA itself impose a duty to disclose on GoDaddy.
Defendant has a duty to disclose under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(e), which requires one party to a business transaction to disclose "facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other [party] is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other [party], because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." § 551(2)(e) (1977). The available services and functions of GoDaddy's Office 365 Business Premium plan form a fact basic to Plaintiff's transaction. GoDaddy's product had the exact name as Microsoft's product, yet, Plaintiff plausibly pleads, GoDaddy's product did not share the same services and functions as the Microsoft product. Such allegations sufficiently allege the plausible existence of a duty to disclose.
GoDaddy counters that it does not have a duty to disclose because Plaintiff, in the course of the transaction, agreed to GoDaddy's Universal Terms of Service Agreement ("UTOS") and Microsoft Office Terms of Use Agreement ("MOTU").
An ACFA claim also requires that the plaintiff relied upon the seller's omission. Kuehn v. Stanley, 208 Ariz. 124, 129, 91 P.3d 346, 351 (Ariz. 2004). Here, GoDaddy alleges that Plaintiff failed to include any allegation of reliance. (Doc. 21 at 19.) Pleadings, however, only require "`enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Clemens, 534 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And here, Plaintiff's Complaint states that, "Plaintiff and the members of the Class relied on GoDaddy's omissions of material fact in deciding whether to purchase the Office 365 Business Premium plan from GoDaddy." (Compl. ¶ 44 (emphasis added).) Moreover, the Complaint sufficiently alleges facts that Plaintiff relied on GoDaddy's alleged omission in deciding whether to purchase GoDaddy's Office 365 Business Premium plan. (Compl. ¶ 33-35.)
GoDaddy argues that the UTOS and MOTU prevent Plaintiff from alleging that it relied on an omission since those agreements bound Plaintiff to buy GoDaddy's plan "as is," "as available," and "with all faults." See In re Am. Sw. Mortg. Litig., No. CIV 89-462, 1990 WL 304214 at *4-5 (D. Ariz. July 12, 1990). In the context of a motion to dismiss, such generalized statements do not sufficiently establish that Plaintiff had no right to rely on Defendant's omissions in these circumstances.
The ACFA also requires damages due to the omission. A. R. S. § 44-1522(A) (2013). GoDaddy claims that Plaintiff's recovery of damages is prohibited by the UTOS and MOTU. The specific language of both the UTOS and MOTU only bars liability from "any direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive, or consequential damages." (Doc. 22, Ex. A.) Courts generally will not consider evidence or documents beyond the complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, this is an issue better suited for resolution in further proceedings.
Further, GoDaddy alleges that Plaintiff's claim is also barred to the extent that if Plaintiff learned of the alleged fraud within 45 days of the purchase of GoDaddy's Office 365 Business Premium plan, Plaintiff had the contractual right to return the product for a full refund. The existence of a refund, however, does not simply preclude any future claims of fraud. F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1103 (9th Cir. 1994) ("the existence of a money-back guarantee is insufficient reason as a matter of law to preclude a monetary remedy"). Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the required element of damages under the ACFA.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.