CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Opinions By Defendant's Expert Dr. Pearce. (Doc. # 269.) For the reasons described below, the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion.
During his direct examination, Dr. Pearce, Defendant's rebuttal expert in labor economics, testified as follows:
The next day, on cross-examination, counsel for Plaintiff EEOC, Ms. Jaeckel, questioned Dr. Pearce as follows:
At this point, Ms. Jaeckel moved to strike Dr. Pearce's testimony regarding Plaintiff-Intervenors' part-time status at JetStream, as Dr. Pearce's expert report did not list AirServ payroll reports as documents or data that he reviewed in preparation of his report, as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court reserved ruling on the issue, and ordered the parties to submit briefing regarding whether the testimony should be struck. The Court has considered the Motion, as well as Defendant's Response thereto, and the issue is ripe for ruling.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure requires that expert witnesses must disclose, among other things, "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them" and "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them." Such disclosures are required in order "to eliminate surprise and provide the opposing party with enough information regarding the expert's opinions and methodology to prepare efficiently for deposition, any pretrial motions and trial." Cook v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 580 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1122 (D. Colo. 2006). Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in turn, provides that if a party fails to provide information as required by Rule 26(a), "the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence . . . at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." Rule 37(c)(1) also provides that, in addition to (or instead of) striking the expert's testimony, "the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard, . . . may inform the jury of the party's failure [to disclose]." Id.
"The determination of whether a Rule 26(a) violation is justified or harmless is entrusted to the broad discretion of the district court." Woodworker's Supply, Inc., v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., 100 F.3d 1353, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996)). Although "[a] district court need not make explicit findings concerning the existence of a substantial justification or the harmlessness of a failure to disclose," the Court is guided by the following factors in deciding whether it should exclude expert evidence: (1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the testimony is offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which introducing such testimony would disrupt the trial; and (4) the erring party's bad faith or willfulness. Id. "The burden of establishing substantial justification and harmlessness is upon the party who is claimed to have failed to make the required disclosures." Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC, No. 10-CV-02516-WJM-KLM, 2014 WL 4651643, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2014) (citing Contour PAK, Inc. v. Expedice, Inc., 2009 WL 2490138, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug.14, 2009)).
Under Rule 37(c)(1), the court must first consider whether Defendant has established "substantial justification" for its failure to disclose the basis of Dr. Pearce's new opinion about Plaintiff-Intervenors' part time status at AirServ. Defendant argues that Rule 26(a) does not even apply to Dr. Pearce's failure, or, in the alternative, that its failure to disclose Dr. Pearce's reliance on the AirServ payroll records was "substantially justified," because Dr. Pearce's testimony about the Air Serv payroll records was merely offered to "rebut Dr. LaJeunesse's trial testimony concerning the new basis for his opinion":
(Doc. # 270 at 3-4, 5.) Specifically, Defendant cites Dr. LaJeunesse's Expert Report, which stated, "
Defendant, however, cites no authority for its assertion that, despite Rule 26's strict disclosure requirements, it may effectively supplement the testimony of its own expert
Defendant's counsel asked no follow up questions about the source of Dr. LaJeunesse's assumptions (or about the fact that that source had purportedly changed), deciding instead to move on to questions about his assumptions regarding overtime. Defendant has thus failed to show that its failure to disclose Dr. Pearce's reliance on the payroll records is substantially justified.
The Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that this testimony is not harmless. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs were surprised by the testimony. They were also prejudiced; specifically, Plaintiffs already presented the testimony of Dr. LaJeunesse and rested their case before hearing about Dr. Pearce's new basis for his opinion as to Plaintiff-Intervenors' part-time status, and Dr. Pearce's testimony is probative of whether or not Plaintiff-Intervenors would have qualified for benefits, one significant aspect of their possible back pay damages. Likewise, Plaintiffs have no ability to cure this prejudice: trial has almost concluded, and interrupting it to depose Defendant's expert on this issue is simply not an option at this juncture, nor can they call a witness to explain the meaning of the "P" on AirServ's records. Although there is not conclusive evidence of bad faith or willfulness, the fact that Defendant did not disclose that Dr. Pearce had never seen the AirServ payroll records until two days before he testified — especially because, at least according to Defendant's Response to the instant Motion, Dr. Pearce was only testifying to this effect to impeach Dr. LaJeunesse's testimony — certainly smacks of the kinds of gamesmanship and surprise that Rule 26(a) is designed to prevent.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion and will strike Dr. Pearce's testimony under Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As this testimony has already occurred, the Court will instruct the jury as follows: