ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 20). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.1

I. Background.2

Plaintiff, Lecedrick Abrams, brought this action against his former employer, Tube City IMS, LLC, alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for taking medical leave, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. ("FMLA").

A. History of Abrams' Employment Relationship with Tube City.

Tube City is an imbedded contractor at the SSAB steel mill in Axis, Alabama, where it provides services including slag processing, metal recovery, material handling and logistics. (Kuehnlein Decl. (doc. 22, Exh. A), ¶ 2.) For example, when scrap metal is delivered to the mill by rail, barge or truck, Tube City is tasked with unloading, sorting, cutting and delivering the scrap to the mill as feedstock for new steel production. (Id.) Abrams began working for Tube City (or, more precisely, its predecessor) at the mill in March 2006. (Abrams Decl. (doc. 28, Exh. 1), ¶ 1.) He was originally hired as a "scarfer" in the slab department, where his job duties involved use of a blow torch to remove defects from slabs of metal. (Abrams Dep. (doc. 22, Exh. B), at 37, 39.) Abrams was employed for Tube City in this capacity for a period of four or five years. (Id. at 39.)

In November 2007, Abrams was injured in an automobile accident, following which he missed roughly six or seven weeks of work. (Abrams Dep., at 43-44.) In June 2010, Abrams requested and received six weeks off from work to recover from hip surgery. (Id. at 44-45.) He missed more time from work for medical reasons in late 2010 and returned to work with light duty restrictions, which Tube City initially accommodated. (Id. at 46-47.) However, Tube City terminated Abrams' employment in February 2011, prompting him to file an EEOC Charge of Discrimination alleging (among other things) that Tube City had fired him for taking medical leave that was protected by the FMLA. (Id. at 47-49; Abrams Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) Tube City and Abrams reached a settlement of these claims, pursuant to which Abrams was reinstated to work at Tube City with no loss of seniority or benefits. (Abrams Dep., at 49-50; Abrams Decl., ¶ 6.)

Abrams returned to work at Tube City on July 5, 2011. (Abrams Dep., at 50-51.) Upon reinstatement, Abrams was assigned to the Metal Recovery Department as a "burner" in the Burn Yard. (Kuehnlein Dep. (doc. 22, Exh. C), at 17-18.) In that capacity, Abrams' job duties involved cutting scrap metal into pieces for processing at the mill. (Kuehnlein Decl., ¶ 5.) After the burner cuts the scrap metal, a crane operator picks up the pieces of scrap and places them in piles or in a dump truck or pallet carrier for transportation to the scrap yard. (Id.) During the relevant time period, the head of Tube City's Metal Recovery Department was Tom Kuehnlein. (Id., ¶ 3.) The other two supervisors in that department were Terrell Williams (whose title was metal recovery coordinator) and Zyron Reed (metal recovery leadman). (Id.) Abrams never received written discipline or performance evaluations at any time during his employment at Tube City. (Abrams Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3, 14.)

B. Abrams' 2014 Medical Leave and Subsequent Termination.

On May 28, 2014, Abrams requested and received approval from Tube City to take medical leave for another hip surgery. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 6; Abrams Dep., at 54.) Throughout the period of this FMLA leave, Abrams maintained weekly contact with supervisor Zyron Reed in order to keep Tube City apprised of his medical status. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 8.) During these communications in the summer of 2014, Abrams and Reed discussed the possibility of Abrams transferring out of the Burn Yard and into a position in the Shear Department. Reed ultimately confirmed that transfer (with Kuehnlein's approval) on July 28, 2014. (Id., ¶¶ 9-10; doc. 28, Exh. 3.)3 Abrams returned to work at Tube City following his FMLA medical leave of absence on August 4, 2014. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 10; Abrams Dep., at 57-58.) At that time, Abrams believed he was in "better shape" than when his FMLA leave began; in particular, his physical therapy had been successful, and Abrams was experiencing no further issues with his hip. (Abrams Dep., at 69.)

On Abrams' first day back at work, supervisor Terrell Williams (who oversaw the Shear Department) welcomed him and congratulated him on his "promotion." (Abrams Decl., ¶ 24; Abrams Dep., at 69.)4 Williams informed Abrams that this transfer would be a good change of jobs, that Williams was proud to have him in the Shear Department, and that the transfer had been done in recognition of Abrams' hard work, good attitude, productivity and excellent job performance in the Burn Yard over the years. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 24; Abrams Dep., at 69.) As supervisor for the Burn Yard, Reed no longer directly supervised Abrams following the latter's transfer to the Shear Department, which was geographically some distance from the Burn Yard. (Abrams Decl., ¶¶ 25-26, 28.) Rather, Abrams reported directly to Williams (and not Reed) from August 4, 2014 onward. (Id.) Upon transferring to the Shear Department, Abrams was assigned a new locker, used different restroom facilities, clocked in and out at a different time clock, and worked a different schedule than he had done when he worked in the Burn Yard. (Id., ¶¶ 27-28.) Nonetheless, both the Burn Yard and the Shear Department were part of the Metal Recovery Department, headed by Kuehnlein. (Abrams Dep., at 75, 105.) As Kuehnlein explained, "[t]he shears are a different area but they are still burners .... I believe the burn yard was doing the same process. Yeah, I think we had burners running with each group and you had four different crews." (Kuehnlein Dep., at 19.)

Abrams' employment in the Shear Department was short-lived. On August 17, 2014, less than two weeks after Abrams came back to work from FMLA leave, Kuehnlein notified him that his employment at Tube City was being terminated pursuant to a reduction in force (the "RIF"). (Abrams Decl., ¶¶ 29-30.) In fact, Abrams was one of four Tube City employees in the Metal Recovery Department to be laid off in August 2014 because of a production slowdown in the steel industry and concomitant decrease in work for Tube City at the SSAB mill location. (Kuehnlein Decl., ¶ 6; Kuehnlein Dep., at 25-26.)5 The operational circumstances prompting the layoff decision were that, because of a downturn in business at the SSAB mill, Tube City no longer needed as many burners in the Metal Recovery Department as it employed. (Doc. 28, Exh. 6, at # 12.)

The other three employees selected for the RIF were Ronny Reed, Justin Reed, and Lee Davison, all of whom had been assigned to the Burn Yard. (Id., ¶ 8; Abrams Decl., ¶ 31.) None of those individuals had taken FMLA leave during their employment at Tube City. (Abrams Dep., at 74.) All four laid-off employees worked as burners in the Metal Recovery Department, although Abrams was the only one assigned to the Shear Department side, rather than the Burn Yard side. (Id. at 75-76.) Following Abrams' layoff, Tube City reassigned an employee named Ricky Preston from the Burn Yard to the Shear Department to assume Abrams' job duties. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 33.)

C. The Reduction-in-Force Selection Process.

Plaintiff has challenged neither the legitimacy nor the business necessity of Tube City's decision to eliminate four burner positions via RIF in August 2014. For summary judgment purposes, then, the Court will accept as true that Tube City had a legitimate business reason to implement a RIF in the Metal Recovery Department. The critical factual question animating the Complaint is why Abrams was one of the four burners selected for layoff, particularly so swiftly on the heels of his return to work from FMLA leave less than two weeks earlier. Plaintiff's theory is that Tube City selected him for inclusion in the August 2014 RIF in retaliation for his exercise of FMLA rights. For that reason, the record facts concerning Tube City's RIF selection process, and its specific grounds for selecting Abrams as one of the four employees to be laid off, are of central importance.

At the time of the RIF, Tube City employed 17 burners (including Abrams) in the Metal Recovery Department at the SSAB mill. (Kuehnlein Decl., ¶ 7.) To select four of those 17 for layoff, Tube City considered the following factors: "seniority, productivity, performance, and ability and experience in performing other jobs at the site." (Doc. 28, Exh. 6, at #12.) According to Tube City, "[b]ased on these criteria and the application of these criteria to the burners at issue, Plaintiff was chosen to be included in the temporary layoff." (Id.)6 The decision of which four burners to terminate was made by Kuehnlein, with the input and recommendations of Zyron Reed (who supervised the Burn Yard) and Terrell Williams (who supervised the Shear Department). (Kuehnlein Decl., ¶ 9.) In that regard, Kuehnlein instructed Reed and Williams to assess the staff, then met with them in his office a couple of weeks before the layoff to discuss the list of RIF candidates. (Kuehnlein Dep., at 27-28, 84-85.) Although he made the layoff decision, Kuehnlein "relied on input and recommendations" from Reed and Williams. (Kuehnlein Decl., ¶ 9.) Kuehnlein states that he accepted the recommendation of Reed and Williams that Abrams be selected for layoff. (Id., ¶ 17.)

D. Application of RIF Selection Criteria to Abrams.7

With respect to seniority, a spreadsheet prepared by Tube City and identifying the hire dates for all burners under consideration in the RIF confirms that Abrams was senior to the other 16 candidates. (Doc. 28, Exh. 5; Abrams Dep., at 63.) According to the chart, as of August 2014 (when the layoff was performed), Abrams had nearly eight and a half years of seniority at Tube City. (Doc. 28, Exh. 5.) By contrast, seven of the other 16 burners in the Metal Recovery Department had three or fewer years of seniority, and 10 of those 16 had four or fewer years of seniority (i.e., less than half of Abrams'). (Id.) The other three burners selected for layoff had seniority of 38 months (Justin Reed), 23 months (Lee Davison), and 6 months (Ronny Reed, Jr.), as compared to the 101 months of seniority held by Abrams. (Id.)

As for productivity, Kuehnlein avers that Reed informed him that Abrams was among the bottom four burners in terms of productivity. (Id., ¶ 13.) Reed avers that he evaluated productivity by monitoring the amount of scrap that each burner processed on a tons per hour basis, and that by this metric Abrams' productivity placed him in the bottom four. (Reed Decl. (doc. 22, Exh. E), ¶ 9.) However, plaintiff's evidence (which must be accepted as true for summary judgment purposes) is that Reed informed Abrams that Abrams had earned his transfer to the Shear Department as "one of the most productive burners in the Burn Yard." (Abrams Decl., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff's evidence is also that he processed more scrap on a daily basis than any other worker did. (Id., ¶ 22.) Accepting Tube City's construct that productivity equates to amount of scrap processed,8 it would have been helpful to examine business records documenting each burner's quantity of scrap processed on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. However, Tube City maintains no such records and prepares no such reports on an employee-specific basis; rather, Reed simply relied on his own observations. (Reed Dep., at 23, 25, 39.)9 As it stands, there is conflicting record evidence as to both Abrams' actual productivity and Reed's perception of Abrams' productivity.

The performance criterion must be considered in light of plaintiff's substantial showing that he had performed at a high level in the Burn Yard. Indeed, plaintiff's evidence is that he had occupied a position of trust and leadership for Tube City. To that effect, Reed repeatedly referred to Abrams as his "right hand man," and entrusted him with carrying the radio and operating the crane. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 11.) Abrams was a "shift leader" and the "go-to guy" to whom other burners reported when they needed help. (Id., ¶ 36.) Plaintiff's evidence is that Reed notified at least one other employee in the Burn Yard that Abrams was a shift leader. (Finley Dep. (doc. 28, Exh. 19), at 45.) Abrams carried a radio on his collar during the night shift (the only employee to do so) and carried Reed's radio when the latter was not present, such that "it was known that he was the guy to go to." (Id. at 45-46.)10 Reed's esteem for Abrams was shared by Williams, who informed Abrams on August 4, 2014 that he was glad to see Abrams back, and that Abrams "was doing a good job." (Abrams Dep., at 69.) Moreover, Williams informed Abrams that his transfer to the Shear Department was the product of Abrams' excellent job performance and productivity in the Burn Yard. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 24.)

Once again, the supervisors' purported oral characterizations of Abrams' responsibilities and overall job performance cannot be confirmed or refuted by written records for the simple reason that such materials do not exist. For example, Tube City did not complete periodic written performance evaluations for Abrams or any other burners. (Kuehnlein Dep., at 28; Reed Dep. at 30.) Abrams never received a written evaluation during his eight-plus years of employment at Tube City. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 3.) Tube City does maintain written disciplinary records; however, plaintiff's evidence is that Abrams was one of the only RIF candidates in the Metal Recovery Department who had never been the subject of formal discipline. (Id., ¶ 14.)11 The summary judgment record includes documentation of written disciplinary action (including suspensions and "last chance agreements") taken by Tube City against various other burners who were eligible, but not selected, for the August 2014 RIF. (See doc. 28, Exhs. 7-17.)12

Embedded in the concept of performance is Abrams' willingness (or lack thereof) to perform overtime work. Plaintiff's evidence is that Abrams worked overtime every time Reed asked him to do so. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 15.) Yet during the RIF meeting, Reed informed Kuehnlein that Abrams had "refused overtime." (Reed Decl., ¶ 7; Reed Dep., at 34.) Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Abrams, no such refusals ever happened.

Finally, with respect to the criterion of "experience in performing other jobs at the site," plaintiff's evidence is that Abrams had worked in four departments (Shear Department, Burn Yard, Maintenance Department and Slab Yard), in multiple capacities (scraper, scarfer, slitter, crane operator, excavator crane operator), and operating a wide variety of equipment (track torch, three hole torch, dump truck, Liebherr crane, Sennebogan crane) at Tube City's facilities at the SSAB mill. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 36; Abrams Dep., at 109-10.) Plaintiff's evidence is that Abrams was the only crane operator on the night shift in the Burn Yard, and that he operated the crane on nearly every shift he worked. (Abrams Dep., at 110; Abrams Decl., ¶ 12.)13 A witness who worked in the Burn Yard indicates that he personally saw Abrams operate the crane on at least 200 occasions, and that Abrams taught other Tube City employees how to operate the crane. (Finley Decl. (doc. 28, Exh. 18), ¶¶ 6, 7.) According to plaintiff's evidence, Reed specifically stated that Abrams was "a good crane operator" who unloaded rail carts, scrap bins and flatbed trucks better than any of the other operators. (Abrams Decl., ¶ 20.) While plaintiff was not certified to operate the crane, there was no requirement that burners be certified to operate heavy equipment in order to survive the RIF; indeed, Tube City's evidence is that burners were retained who were not so certified. (Kuehnlein Decl., ¶ 15.)

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "If the nonmoving party fails to make `a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "Summary judgment is justified only for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations." Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases because they involve issues of motivation and intent. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004). Rather, "the summary judgment rule applies in job discrimination cases just as in other cases. No thumb is to be placed on either side of the scale." Id. at 1086 (citation omitted); see also Williamson v. Clarke County Dep't of Human Resources, 834 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1318 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (recognizing and applying rule that summary judgment standard is applied equally in employment discrimination cases as in other kinds of federal actions).

III. Analysis.

A. Relevant Analytical Framework.

Plaintiff's sole cause of action is a claim for retaliation under the FMLA. The law is clear that an employer may not retaliate against an employee for exercising rights provided by the FMLA. See, e.g., Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp., 776 F.3d 822, 832 (11th Cir. 2015) ("The FMLA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee for exercising a right under the FMLA."); Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 n.5 (11th Cir. 2000) ("the substance of the FMLA provisions as they concern this case is that an employer may not do bad things to an employee who has exercised or attempted to exercise any rights under the statute"). To prevail on his FMLA retaliation claim, Abrams "[e]ssentially ... must show that []he suffered an adverse employment action that was motivated by an impermissible retaliatory or discriminatory animus." Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Where, as here, a plaintiff offers no direct evidence of retaliatory intent, courts analyze FMLA retaliation claims through the familiar lens of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.14 "To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, an employee must show that, (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) the decision was causally related to the protected activity." Jarvela, 776 F.3d at 832 (citation and internal marks omitted). Once the employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer "to articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse action." Martin v. Brevard County Public Schools, 543 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). If the employer does so, then the burden shifts back to the employee to "show that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual by presenting evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In its Motion papers, Tube City asserts that it "assumes for purposes of summary judgment" that Abrams can make out a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation. (Doc. 21, at 14.) Such an "assumption" is well grounded in record facts. It appears beyond reasonable dispute that Abrams' leave of absence from May 28, 2014 until August 4, 2014 for hip surgery was within the ambit of the FMLA's protections. Tube City's termination of Abrams' employment plainly qualifies as an adverse employment decision. And the timing of that termination decision, which was implemented just 13 days after Abrams' return from FMLA leave, unquestionably satisfies the "causal connection" prong of the prima facie inquiry. See, e.g., Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care System, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Close temporal proximity between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is generally sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact of a causal connection.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001) (as a general proposition, short time lapse between FMLA leave and termination decision "constitutes circumstantial evidence that the [employer] was retaliating against [employee] for seeking FMLA protection and thus satisfies the third element of a prima facie case").

The burden thus shifts to Tube City to articulate a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for Abrams' selection in the August 2014 reduction in force.15 Tube City satisfies this modest burden here. In particular, defendant alleges that plaintiff was included in the RIF pursuant to an "evaluation of his attitude, disposition, work ethic, qualifications and ability to operate multiple pieces of heavy machinery, and cross-training potential." (Doc. 21, at 15-16.) Defendant further states that Abrams' supervisors "found his job performance to be inferior as compared to the other burners" with respect to (i) "poor attitude, disposition and work ethic," such as refusal to work overtime and taking extended breaks; (ii) inferior productivity in terms of amount of scrap processed; (iii) not being certified to operate the crane or other heavy equipment; and (iv) lack of skills to operate heavy machinery. (Id. at 16-17.) Such an articulation, supported by record evidence, suffices to discharge defendant's burden of production.

B. Pretext.

The summary judgment analysis in this case, as in so many other employment discrimination cases, thus turns on pretext. For purposes of a pretext analysis, courts decide "whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence." Ezell v. Wynn, 802 F.3d 1217, 1227 (11th Cir. 2015). To satisfy his burden of showing pretext, "[a] plaintiff is not allowed to recast an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute [his] business judgment for that of the employer." Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). "The inquiry into pretext centers on the employer's beliefs, not the employee's beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker's head." Id. at 1266. The issue is not whether the employer's decision was wise or accurate, prudent or fair; rather, "our sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the decision." Id. (citation and internal marks omitted). In order to satisfy his burden at the pretext stage, "[t]he employee may rely on evidence that he already produced to establish his prima facie case." Martin, 543 F.3d at 1268.

Here, Abrams has made a strong showing of pretext by using a collage of record facts that, if believed by the finder of fact, undermine Tube City's stated reasons for selecting him in the RIF and suggest that the real reason was FMLA retaliation. For starters, the inordinately brief interval (just 13 days) between Abrams' return from FMLA leave and his discharge is evidence of pretext. See, e.g., Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1298 (close temporal proximity between FMLA-protected activity and the adverse employment action "is evidence of pretext, though probably insufficient to establish pretext by itself"). Moreover, defendant's inconsistencies and recasting of its RIF selection criteria during this litigation is also evidence of pretext. See id. ("[A]n employer's failure to articulate clearly and consistently the reason for an employee's discharge may serve as evidence of pretext."). In written discovery responses, Tube City documented the selection criteria as being "seniority, productivity, performance, and ability and experience in performing other jobs at the site." (Doc. 28, Exh. 6, at #12.) Yet on summary judgment, defendant says the relevant factors were "attitude, disposition, work ethic, qualifications and ability to operate multiple pieces of heavy machinery, and cross-training potential." (Kuehnlein Decl., ¶ 10.) Most notably, defendant's principal brief on summary judgment fails to acknowledge the role of seniority in the RIF selection process. Perhaps this was an innocent oversight, or perhaps the omission was because Abrams had more seniority than any of the other 16 candidates for the August 2014 RIF. Either way, Tube City has not addressed why its list of RIF criteria presented on summary judgment appears to diverge in material respects from that identified in discovery. Whatever the reason, defendant's shifting explanation of what criteria it used in carrying out the RIF is evidence of pretext.16

More broadly, defendant's stated productivity- and performance-related reasons for selecting Abrams in the RIF rest on factual characterizations that are hotly contested in the record. On summary judgment, it is Abrams' version of the facts, not Tube City's, that controls. Plaintiff's evidence is that Abrams processed more scrap on a daily basis than any other worker in the Burn Yard, that Reed lauded him as one of the most productive burners, that Abrams was a "shift leader" and the "go-to guy" to whom other burners reported when they needed help, that Reed referred to Abrams as his "right hand man" and let him carry the radio when Reed was not there, that Williams notified Abrams shortly before the August 2014 RIF that Abrams was being transferred to the Shear Department because of his excellent job performance and productivity, that Abrams (in contrast to many other RIF candidates, several of whom had received significant formal discipline, including suspensions and last-chance agreements) had never received written discipline, and that Abrams had never refused to work overtime when Reed requested that he do so. Taken in the aggregate, such evidence raises a reasonable inference that Tube City's stated reasons for selecting Abrams in the RIF (i.e., that he had a poor attitude, took extended breaks, refused to work overtime, ranked near the bottom in terms of scrap processed, and was a relatively poor performer) are false.17

With respect to the criteria of "ability to operate multiple pieces of heavy machinery, and cross-training potential," Tube City's position is that Abrams lacked aptitude on the crane and therefore lacked skills for cross-training on heavy equipment. But plaintiff's evidence is that Abrams operated the crane literally hundreds of times, on nearly every shift he worked; that he was the only employee to do so on his shift; that he taught other employees how to operate the crane; and that Reed specifically acknowledged that Abrams was a good crane operator. Such evidence, if accepted as true, belies Tube City's explanation that it selected Abrams for the RIF because he "was not proficient in operating the crane" and had failed to "demonstrate[] the skills necessary to be trained to operate heavy equipment." (Kuehnlein Decl., ¶¶ 14-15.)18

Put it all together, and here's what the evidence looks like from plaintiff's perspective. Abrams was a star performer, a leader in the Burn Yard, the most senior burner in the Metal Recovery Department, the only crane operator on his shift, praised by his supervisors as reliable and productive, experienced in performing many other jobs in other departments at Tube City's facilities, and with a pristine disciplinary record. He took more than two months of FMLA leave from late May 2014 until early August 2014. Thirteen days after he returned to work, Abrams was laid off under a RIF whose ostensible criteria were seniority, productivity, performance, and ability and experience in performing other jobs at the site. What's more, the termination decision was made a couple of weeks before the RIF (i.e., just as plaintiff was coming back to work from FMLA leave). Plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision, and that the real reason was retaliation for his exercise of FMLA leave.19

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 20) is denied. This case remains set for Final Pretrial Conference on April 12, 2016, at 2:00 p.m., with jury trial to follow during the May 2016 civil term.

DONE and ORDERED.