BARBARA B. CRABB, District Judge.
Paul Reina, who has multiple disabilities, worked as a cart pusher for defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, from 1998 to 2015. Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has filed this lawsuit under Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) et seq., contending that defendants failed to provide Reina with a reasonable accommodation and terminated his employment because of his disabilities. Now before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. Dkt. # 21. For the reasons explained below, I am denying the motion because I conclude that disputed issues of material fact remain that must be resolved by a jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
From the parties' proposed findings of fact, I find the following facts to be material and undisputed.
Paul Reina is 40 years old and deaf with developmental, visual and intellectual impairments. He spent the first six years of his life in an institution, after which Rose Slaght and her husband became his foster parents. Slaght is Reina's legal guardian. Reina is nonverbal, but his family and job coaches communicate with him using different forms of sign language. His receptive skills are better than his expressive skills.
Reina's first job during high school was working in a laundromat, and he later worked in a delicatessen. In October 1998, Reina's high school program helped him become a cart pusher (also sometimes referred to as a "cart attendant" or "courtesy associate") at the Wal-Mart store in Beloit, Wisconsin, where he worked until June 12, 2015.
While Reina was working at the Beloit store, defendants had policies in place to
Defendants' policies provide that reasonable accommodation requests should be acted upon and communicated to the employee as soon as possible and that managers should determine whether the employee can continue to perform his job while the request is pending. Although managers generally make accommodations at the store level, defendants have an Accommodations Services Center, which is a corporate division devoted to requests for accommodation. Defendants' policies instruct managers to inform the center if they decide to deny an accommodation request for any reason.
Employees and managers had access to defendants' policies through the company's intranet, which is referred to as "the Wire." In 2015, employees could access the Wire only from computers located inside Wal-Mart facilities.
In February 1999, the store agreed to provide Reina the following accommodations: (1) he could work with his job aide; (2) he would not have to handle fragile merchandise; and (3) he would not be assigned to do tasks that he was incapable of handling. While employed with defendants, Reina always worked with a job coach, including Slaght, Matt Coppernoll, Margie Polizzi and Mike Fallon. Coppernoll was Reina's primary job coach from 2005 to 2015, and the other individuals filled in for Coppernoll on a substitute basis. (Defendants point out that there is no evidence that any of these individuals were professionally trained as job coaches or that they provided job training or placement services, but for ease of reference, I will continue to refer to them as job coaches, as the parties do.) Reina's family arranged for the job coaches, who were paid through the Medicaid waiver program. One job coach, Polizzi, submitted to a background check and fingerprinting. (The parties do not say whether defendants requested these things.)
The primary purpose and function of a cart pusher or cart attendant has remained the same during Reina's employment with defendants. The job description for a cart attendant, as revised on July 31, 2007, identifies the following as essential functions:
Employees working in other positions at the store provide customer assistance, such as stockers who load and unload items for customers, and greeters who direct and assist customers. Defendants do not require cart attendants to use the cart
Although the parties dispute whether all of the functions of a cart attendant were considered essential for Reina's position and whether and to what extent his job coaches may have performed his job for him, they do not dispute the following:
Defendants never told Slaght that they did not want Reina's job coach to operate the cart caddy, steer carts or hold the lead cart.
Several different managers rated Reina's performance between 1998 and 2014, and their evaluations were generally positive and complimentary, noting that Reina was a "solid performer" and was meeting expectations. The following are examples of the comments that managers made about Reina on his evaluations:
On some evaluations, "N/A" was written next to a task for which Reina did not receive a rating or evaluation. For example, Reina's 2008 evaluation did not evaluate him on helping customers find what they needed. Some of Reina's evaluations listed or noted "areas of improvement," but none of them stated that Reina was not meeting expectations or was performing a function incorrectly. In 2001, the evaluation identified as a goal, that Reina "will continue to work to [the] best of ability and improve if possible."
(The parties dispute whether Reina successfully performed the essential functions of his job on his own. Two of Reina's former Wal-Mart managers, Amanda Fellows and Sheila Rae Martin, aver that their evaluations of Reina's performance in 2013 and 2014 were based on what he and his job coach "collectively were able to achieve" and that they did not believe that Reina could perform the essential functions of his position on his own. The 2013 and 2014 evaluations do not state anything about "collective" performance or mention Reina's job coach. In addition, because defendants did not identify Fellows and Martin as witnesses until just before they filed their motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not have the opportunity to depose them.)
On December 26, 2012, a shift manager, Leah Wampole (who later changed her last name to Stroh), reported an incident between Coppernoll and Reina in an email to James Ford, the market human resources manager:
Wampole called the police who investigated and classified the report as "unfounded" because even though an altercation occurred, there were no injuries to either party.
In late May or early June 2015, Jeff Scheuerell became the manager (the highest level of management) of the Beloit store. During a meeting on June 10, 2015, Stroh (formerly Wampole and now the co-manager of the Beloit store) told Scheuerell and Human Resources Manager Julie Repka about the 2012 incident between Coppernoll and Reina and the outcome of the police investigation. She also forwarded them the emails she had sent about the incident in 2012. (The parties dispute whether on or about June 9, 2015, a customer made a report to the store about observing Coppernoll sitting on Reina's chest and punching Reina in the face. Scheuerell avers that he learned about the report on June 9, but he fails to say how he learned about it or what he was told. Stroh also generally avers that she had become aware of a second incident in June 2015, but she fails to provide any details. For its part, plaintiff points out that: (1) the Beloit Police Department does not have a police report associated with such an incident and defendants have not produced or identified any witness statements, videos or internal interview reports concerning it; (2) Slaght and Coppernoll both testified that they were not told about an incident occurring in 2015; (3) Stroh had forwarded her email about the 2012 incident around this time, suggesting that this is the incident that Scheuerell was concerned about; and (4) Stroh testified that her only recollection of a 2015 incident was a general discussion in the June 10, 2015 meeting that "this has happened before" and that she did not "specifically remember" the 2015 incident, dkt. # 45 at 55.)
Scheuerell and Repka decided to "delve deeper" into the work relationship between Reina and Coppernoll. Scheuerell learned from Stroh that Reina was "deaf, blind and mute" and that Stroh thought Reina's job coach was performing the majority of the functions of Reina's job. (Plaintiff disputes the truth of Stroh's statement on the ground that Stroh testified at her deposition that her only personal observation of a job coach performing work was running the cart caddy for Reina.)
On June 11, 2015, Scheuerell called defendants' global ethics hotline to express concerns about the potential wage and hour issues related to work performed by Reina's job coach, whom defendants did not pay or employ. He reported that Coppernoll "is doing all of Paul Reina's work" and had "assaulted Paul." Dkt. # 27, exh. 3 at 2-3. (It is not clear from the record of the call whether Scheuerell identified the assault as taking place in 2015 or in the past. In addition, Scheuerell and Repka testified that they had observed from a parked car in the parking lot that Coppernoll was performing work for Reina, who
Scheuerell and Repka decided that Reina should provide current, medically-supported information about his physical condition and what, if any, reasonable accommodations existed that could allow him to perform the essential duties of his job. On the afternoon of June 11, 2015, Scheuerell contacted Slaght to request a meeting, which Scheuerell, Slaght, Coppernoll and Reina attended on June 12, 2015. At the meeting, Scheuerell expressed his concern that Reina's job coach was performing the majority of Reina's work. He gave Slaght a new hire packet that included an "Accommodation Medical Questionnaire" and the cart attendant job description. Scheuerell told Slaght that a physician had to complete the form. (The parties dispute exactly what was said during this meeting, including whether Scheuerell said that he believed that Coppernoll had assaulted Reina or whether Scheuerell told Reina not to return to work until he had been "deemed fit to work" by his doctor.) Also on June 12, 2015, but after the meeting occurred, the global ethics hotline responded to Scheuerell in writing, suggesting that he contact Repka, the human resource manager for the area.
Slaght asked a physician at Reina's health care clinic to complete the accommodation form. Dr. Susan Lewinski listed Reina's diagnoses as "deaf mutism, developmental delay, visual loss and anxiety state." Dkt. # 27, exh. 2. She recommended "job coach-to do seeing & hearing" as an accommodation and noted that he was limited in the areas of hearing, seeing, speaking, lifting more than 50 pounds, learning, reading, thinking and sleeping.
In early August 2015, Slaght sought help for Reina from defendants by emailing a complaint using a link on an online portal for employees. When Slaght attempted to access the portal again in early August, she found that defendants had terminated Reina's access.
Reina was not placed on the Beloit store's schedule and did not return to work after the June 12, 2015 meeting. (The parties dispute the status of Reina's employment. Plaintiff says Reina was constructively discharged because 1) he was sent home on June 12 and denied access to the company's online portal; 2) no one asked Slaght about the July 2015 request for accommodation and Scheuerell told her not to call about it; and 3) Scheuerell stated that Reina could not return to work until he had been deemed fit to work. Defendants deny terminating Reina and say that he was placed on leave and inactive status because he failed to provide updated and more specific medical information; Reina posed a danger to himself and customers while working in parking lot (which defendants
Reina filed a charge of discrimination in September 2015, alleging that defendants failed to accommodate his disabilities and effectively discharged him from his employment. Reina and defendants participated in a mediation sponsored by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 18, 2016, but it was not successful. (Plaintiff seeks to introduce a statement concerning the status of Reina's employment that defendants' representative allegedly made during this mediation. However, Fed. R. Evid. 408 provides that statements made in settlement negotiations are inadmissible to prove liability on the underlying claim or to impeach a prior inconsistent statement. Although plaintiff says that defendants waived their objection under this rule by their own reliance on Slaght's understanding of statements Scheuerell made during the mediation, I am not persuaded that such a waiver occurred. In any event, because neither defendants' alleged statement nor Slaght's understanding of Scheuerell's statements is dispositive of the issues in this case, I have not considered this evidence for purposes of resolving defendants' motion for summary judgment.)
In a letter to Reina dated March 25, 2016, Wal-Mart's Accommodation Service Center stated:
The Accommodation Service Center did not receive a response to the letter. Although Slaght received the letter on April 4, 2016, she waited a few months before opening it and did not take any action in response. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a determination on Reina's charge of discrimination on or around March 15, 2017.
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against "a qualified individual on the basis of disability," including by failing to make reasonable accommodations and denying employment opportunities, which includes termination of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) and (b)(5)(A), (B).
To prove discriminatory termination based on disability, plaintiff must show that: (1) Reina is disabled; (2) he is able to perform the essential functions of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.
For purposes of summary judgment, defendants do not contest that Reina was disabled. However, they assert several grounds on which they say plaintiff's claims must fail, including that: (1) the provision of a permanent job coach is not a reasonable accommodation, even when the employer does not have to arrange or pay for the coach; (2) Reina is not a "qualified individual" because his job coach performs the essential functions of a cart pusher for him; (3) using a non-employee to perform work for defendants poses an undue hardship on defendants because it exposes the store to legal and safety risks; (4) Reina, and not defendants, destroyed the interactive process; (4) there is no evidence that Reina was terminated because of his disabilities; and (5) there is no evidence that defendants acted with the malice or reckless indifference necessary to support an award of punitive damages. I discuss each of these arguments below and conclude that disputed issues of fact preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants.
To succeed on any of its claims, plaintiff must show that Reina is a "qualified" individual with a disability, meaning that he is "an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Interpretive Guidance states that "an employer, under certain circumstances, may be required to provide ... a temporary `job coach' to assist in the training of a qualified individual with a disability as a reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at § 1630.9 (entitled "not making reasonable accommodation"). The regulation is silent on the subject whether a job coach, particularly one that is not paid by or provided by the employer, may be a permanent accommodation and still be considered reasonable. However, the Commission's "Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities" states that "[a]n employer also may be required to allow a job coach paid by a public or private social service agency to accompany the employee at the job site as a reasonable accommodation." EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 25, 1997) (available at https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html).
Limited published case law exists on the subject, but as defendants point out, a few federal district courts in other jurisdictions have held that the permanent or indefinite use of a job coach is not a reasonable accommodation, even if the employer does not have to pay for the job coach.
Although the court in
Therefore, to the extent that defendants are advocating for a per se rule that a permanent job coach is never a reasonable accommodation, I am not persuaded by their argument. The holdings in
The court of appeals has held that "[a]n ADA plaintiff can establish discrimination by showing the employer failed to accommodate the employee, but [he] first must establish that [he] is a qualified individual with a disability."
In considering whether a job coach was a reasonable accommodation, the court of appeals focused on the type and amount of assistance provided by the job coach, concluding that reliance on "another person to perform an essential function of the job... is, as a matter of law, not reasonable," and does not require the employer "to show the accommodation would create an undue hardship."
Acknowledging these holdings of the court of appeals, defendants argue that even if a permanent job coach can be considered a reasonable accommodation in certain cases, plaintiff cannot show that Reina was a "qualified individual" because
In determining whether a job function is essential, courts look to the "employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the function, and the experience of those who previously or currently hold the position."
Defendants rely on the cart attendant job description and the testimony of Scheuerell, Repka and a few other employees to show that the essential functions of Reina's position included retrieving and managing carts and flatbeds (both manually and using the cart caddy), assisting customers (acknowledging them, assisting them with merchandise, resolving disputed issues and concerns and promoting products and services) and maintaining a clean and safe work environment (picking up trash and breaking down boxes). However, plaintiff has presented evidence suggesting that not all of these functions were considered essential for Reina's position, particularly those related to using a cart caddy and customer assistance:
Defendants have several arguments about why plaintiff's evidence is not credible or persuasive, but those issues are best left for the jury to resolve at trial.
According to plaintiff's version of events, Reina is able to perform the essential functions of the job that he performed for 17 years with only physical and verbal prompts from his job coach, such as helping steer a long line of carts that Reina was pushing, identifying carts to collect or pointing out items that needed to be loaded into customers' cars. Plaintiff argues that the job coach serves as Reina's "eyes and ears" in the parking lot. Defendants argue that Reina's impairments prevented him from performing even the most insignificant of tasks and some of their employees observed Reina's job coaches performing most of the duties of his job for him. After reviewing the evidence presented by the parties, I find that there are genuine issues of fact about the extent Reina's job coaches may have provided assistance to Reina and whether they were required to perform certain essential job duties for Reina beyond merely demonstrating proper technique. These factual questions do not support the grant of summary judgment to defendants on the question whether Reina was qualified for the cart attendant position.
Defendants argue that even if the provision of a permanent job coach for Reina is a reasonable accommodation in this case, it poses an undue burden because it exposes the store to legal and safety risks. Generally, undue hardship means "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" when considered in light of
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
In any event, defendants have not shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to whether Reina's requested accommodation would pose an undue burden on them. Defendants contend that they could "arguably be party to negligence and other tort claims should Mr. Reina's helper, while performing tasks for Walmart, damage customer property or hurt someone." Dkt. # 22 at 28. Although defendants argue that the potential risks are "significant," they present no evidence in support of their contention and fail to describe with any particularity what risks they face.
Defendants cite the alleged reports of Coppernoll's "beating" of Reina as a safety risk. However, the police investigated the report of abuse, including reviewing video footage of the incident in 2012 and determined that it was "unfounded." There is little evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that another incident occurred in 2015, but even if the event did occur, it is not clear that allowing Reina to have a job coach poses a significant safety risk to Reina or defendants' customers. A reasonable jury could conclude that the incidents were limited to the relationship between Reina and Coppernoll and are unlikely to recur, particularly if Coppernoll did not continue to serve as Reina's job coach. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied on this ground.
Once an employee requests a reasonable accommodation, the employer must meet the employee half way and engage in a "flexible, interactive process" to identify the necessary accommodations.
Although defendants blame the failure of the interactive process on Slaght,
Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot prove its discriminatory termination claim because Reina was not able to perform the essential functions of his position with a reasonable accommodation and there is no evidence that he was actually terminated. However, as discussed above, questions of fact remain with respect to what tasks made up the essential functions of Reina's position, how Reina performed those tasks and what assistance he required from his job coach. Also in dispute is whether Reina was terminated in July 2015.
Although defendants contend that Reina "went on leave/inactive status while Walmart waited for information it requested," dkt. # 23 at 39, they have not explained or submitted any evidence showing who made the decision to place Reina on leave, when the decision was made or how the decision was made or communicated to Reina. Scheuerell testified that he was waiting for information from Slaght about Reina's requested accommodation, but he also stated he did not recall making the decision to place Reina on leave. For its part, plaintiff argues that defendants terminated Reina because they did not want to continue accommodating his disability by allowing him to have a job coach.
Under plaintiff's version of the events, Scheuerell sent Reina home on June 12, told him he could not return to work until he had been deemed fit to work by his physician, did not ask about the July 2015 request for accommodation that Slaght submitted for Reina and told Slaght not to call him about the accommodation. There also is evidence that defendants did not attempt to contact Reina or Slaght again until almost a year later, after Reina filed a charge of discrimination and the parties made an unsuccessful attempt to mediate his claim. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants constructively terminated Reina because they did not want to accommodate his disability, and that instead of allowing Reina to return to work, they strung him along while purportedly waiting for what they considered acceptable paperwork. Accordingly, I conclude that plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to withstand summary judgment with respect to the discrimination claim.
"Punitive damages are available for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act if the defendant discriminated `with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.'"
Defendants contend that a reasonable jury could not conclude that they acted with malice or reckless indifference to Reina's federally protected rights because they 1) accommodated Reina's disabilities for years; 2) they had good reasons to ask Reina for new accommodation paperwork, including allegations that Reina's job coach physically assaulted Reina and was performing all of Reina's work; and 3) they had anti-discrimination and reasonable accommodation policies in place and an entire department devoted to handling requests for reasonable accommodations. However, factual disputes remain concerning defendants' reasons for requesting new paperwork from Reina, how defendants approached Reina and how Reina responded that could raise questions about defendants' intent. In addition, some question remains about whether defendants followed their policies in this case, particularly to the extent that the policies required accommodation requests to be acted upon and communicated to the employee as soon as possible and that managers should determine whether the employee can continue to perform his job while the request is pending. Under plaintiff's version of the events, neither of these things occurred, and defendants' accommodations center did not become involved until March 2016.
In sum, until the facts are further developed at trial, it is not possible to determine as a matter of law whether punitive damages would be appropriate in this case in the event that defendants are found liable.
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, dkt. # 21, is DENIED.
