MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DAVID A. BAKER, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) filed in response to the court's order of December 8, 2017 (Doc. 20). In that order, the court directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint that properly alleges diversity jurisdiction. See (Doc. 20 at 2). Because this is Plaintiff's third failed attempt to properly plead the parties' citizenship in order to invoke this court's diversity jurisdiction, this action is due to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, Riverboat Group, LLC, d/b/a Vanguard Labs, LLC, initiated this lawsuit on June 23, 2017, against Ivy Creek Healthcare, LLC, d/b/a Lake Martin Community Hospital. (Doc. 1). On September 6, 2017, the court ordered Plaintiff to amend its complaint because Plaintiff's complaint was insufficient to clearly establish the court's jurisdiction based upon diversity because it did not indicate the full citizenship of the parties who are limited liability companies. (Doc. 11). On September 28, 2017, Plaintiff, Riverboat Group, LLC d/b/a Vanguard Labs, LLC, filed an amended complaint against Ivy Creek of Tallapoosa, LLC, d/b/a Lake Martin Community Hospital. (Doc. 12). The court again counseled Plaintiff that its allegations regarding limited liability companies were deficient, noting that in order to allege the citizenship of a limited liability company, a plaintiff must allege the citizenship of the LLC's members. See (Doc. 20) (emphasis added). In its December 8, 2017 order, the court cautioned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint that properly alleges diversity jurisdiction may result in dismissal. Plaintiff filed its Second Amended Complaint against Ivy Creek of Tallapoosa, LLC on December 14, 2017. (Doc. 23).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff seeks to invoke this court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Section 1332 provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(1).
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "a federal court has an independent obligation to review its authority to hear a case before it proceeds to the merits."1 Mirage Resorts, Inc. v. Quiet Nacelle Corp., 206 F.3d 1398, 1400-1401 (11th Cir. 2000). That obligation should be undertaken "at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings[.]" Univ. of S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Even when no party challenges it, courts are obligated to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). The burden of persuasion for establishing diversity jurisdiction remains on the party asserting it. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). "Consistent with the limited nature of federal jurisdiction, the party seeking a federal venue must establish the venue's jurisdictional requirements." Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1207(11th Cir. 2007) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Plaintiff bears that burden here, and the court concludes Plaintiff has failed to carry this burden despite being given multiple opportunities to correct its deficient pleadings.
In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Riverboat Group, LLC is a Delaware series limited liability company whose sole member is Atrium RB Group, LLC. (Doc. 23, ¶¶ 1, 2). Plaintiff further alleges that Atrium RB Group, LLC is a Delaware series limited liability company and its members are Logan Trotter, a New Orleans, Louisiana resident; Aaron Motwani, a New Orleans, Louisiana resident; and Clayton White, a Theodore, Alabama resident. Id., ¶¶ 3, 4. Regarding the Defendant, Plaintiff alleges Ivy Creek of Tallapoosa, LLC is a domestic limited liability company whose sole member is Ivy Creek Healthcare, LLC. Id., ¶¶ 5, 6. Ivy Creek Healthcare, LLC is a foreign limited liability company with a principal address in Miami, Florida. Id., ¶ 7. Michael D. Bruce is the sole member of Ivy Creek Healthcare, LLC. Id., ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges "Michael D. Bruce's address is 16020 SW 80th Avenue; Miami, FL 33157." Id., ¶ 9.
For purposes of diversity of citizenship, "a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen." Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). It has long been recognized that "[c]itizenship, not residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to establish diversity for a natural person." Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994); Crist v. Carnival Corp., 410 F. App'x 197, 200 (11th Cir. 2010) ("residency is not the equivalent of citizenship"); Cong. of Racial Equal. v. Clemmons, 323 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1963) (since residence is not the equivalent of citizenship, an allegation that a party is a resident of a certain state or foreign country is not a sufficient allegation of his citizenship).
Here, Plaintiff alleges the residence of the members of its LLC and identifies an address for the sole member of the Defendant's LLC. The Second Amended Complaint still fails to allege the LLC members' citizenship despite two orders from this court advising it to do so.
III. Conclusion and Order
Because Plaintiff has been unable to properly plead the citizenship of the parties in order to invoke this court's diversity jurisdiction, it is hereby ORDERED the case is DISMISSED without prejudice due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. No costs. The Clerk is directed to close the file.
DONE and ORDERED.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on December 1, 2013, the fee to file an appeal is $505.00
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 S.Ct. 911 (1945)). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Perez-Priego v. Alachua County Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment entered by a magistrate judge, but only if the parties consented to the magistrate's jurisdiction. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Under this section, appeals are permitted from the following types of orders:
i. Orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions; However, interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1986);
ii. Orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships; and
iii. Orders determining the rights and liabilities of parties in admiralty cases.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 S.Ct. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the order or judgment appealed from is entered. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time to file an appeal may be reopened if the district court finds, upon motion, that the following conditions are satisfied: the moving party did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order within 21 days after entry; the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice, whichever is earlier; and no party would be prejudiced by the reopening.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Rev.: 3/2011
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court lacks jurisdiction, i.e., authority, to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
