MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Peggy Strickland ("Strickland"), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendant falsely arrested her without probable cause in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Strickland names as the sole defendant Lowndes County deputy sheriff Lashun Hutson ("Hutson"). The court has jurisdiction of the plaintiff's claim pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. ALA. LR 73.1, the parties have consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case and ordering the entry of final judgment.

This case is now pending before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. See Doc. #25. The plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the motion. See Doc. #31. After careful consideration of the motion, evidence and arguments in support of and in opposition to the motion, the court concludes that the defendant's motion (doc. #25) is due to be granted.

II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

"Summary judgment is appropriate `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute]1 as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c) (Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for [his] motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence which would be admissible at trial indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of her case on which she bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

Once the defendant meets his evidentiary burden and demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to her case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)(2) ("When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a genuine [dispute] for trial."). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in her favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.

To survive the defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" establishing a violation of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-250. "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990) quoting Anderson, supra. Hence, when the plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by appropriate evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to her case and on which she will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.").

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine [dispute] for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. FACTS2

Peggy Strickland ("Strickland") is a rural mail carrier assigned to the United States Post Office in Fort Deposit, Alabama. (Doc. #27, Ex. B1 at 17). Part of her route requires her to travel on Highway 21 in Lowndes County, Alabama. On January 6, 2014, Strickland encountered horses in the middle of Highway 21. (Id. at 26-37). Strickland had previously complained to the postmaster about the horses being in the road because she was afraid she was going to hit one.3 (Id. at 33, 35).

On another day in January,4 Strickland was delivering mail on Highway 21 when she came upon a man leading horses down the middle of the road. When she stopped to deliver mail at a local store, she asked the store owner about the horses who told her that Antonio Hicks owned the horses.5 (Id. at 26, 39, 41). Strickland returned to the post office and reported that the horses were in the road again. (Id. at 42).

On January 15, 2014, Strickland was approaching a row of mailboxes to deliver mail when she saw Hicks sitting on his motorcycle in front of the boxes. (Doc. #27, Ex. B1 at 59; Doc. #27, Ex. 7). Strickland continued on her route, bypassing the mailboxes, but Hicks rode his motorcycle in front of her "weaving and weaving and weaving . . . [s]lowing down, going fast, slowing down, going fast." (Doc. #27, Ex. B1 at 59). Although Strickland complained to her co-workers, she did not report Hicks' behavior to the postal inspectors or local police. (Id. at 64).

On January 16, 2014, Strickland was on her mail route when she saw a parked car with two men in it.

(Id. at 66-67).

Strickland recognized Hicks as the driver of the car and Clinton Jones as the passenger. (Id. at 74). Strickland called 9-1-1 from Eva Scott's ("Scott") driveway.

(Doc. 28, Ex. J, audio file 1).

The Lowndes County Sheriff's department called back and asked Strickland if she knew the direction the subject was headed. (Doc. 28, Ex. J, audio file 2). At that time, Strickland identified Hicks as the driver of the car. (Id.).

Another member of the Lowndes County Sheriff's department called back. While Strickland was on the phone, Hicks pulled into Scott's driveway. (Doc. 28, Ex. J, audio file 3). Strickland was advised to stay on the phone, but Hicks left. (Id.) Strickland was able to identify the make of the car and the direction that it went. (Id.) At no time during the call, did Strickland report that Hicks pointed a gun at her while he was in the driveway.

While Strickland was waiting for deputies to arrive, the operator asked Strickland if she could talk to Eva Scott.

(Id.).

Sergeant Ed Jones of the Lowndes County Sheriff's Department was the first officer on the scene. (Doc. #27, Ex. E at 1). Jones spoke with Strickland and prepared an Alabama Uniform Incident/Offense Report.

(Doc. #27, Ex. A; Ex. E at ¶¶ 6-11).

While Jones was speaking to Strickland, Hicks arrived. (Doc. #27, Ex. E at ¶13). Jones took Hicks into custody. (Id.). A search of Hicks and his vehicle uncovered no weapon.6 (Id. at ¶ 14).

Hutson was also on the scene.7 (Id. at ¶ 5). Jones relayed Strickland's statements to Hutson. (Id. at ¶ 15).

On January 16, 2014, Strickland provided a written statement to United States Postal Inspectors.

(Doc. #27, Ex. B2, Ex. 7 at 2-3).

On January 17, 2014, Strickland gave a written statement to Anita Till, an employee of the Fort Deposit Post Office. (Doc. #27, Ex. B1 at 127).

(Doc. #27, Ex. B2, Ex. 8).

In her deposition, Strickland is much more equivocal about what she said to law enforcement. However, it is undisputed that she reported to law enforcement officers on more than one occasion that Hicks had pointed a gun at her.

Hicks and Jones were taken to the Lowndes County jail and questioned. (Doc. #27, Ex. C at 43, 66-67). They also gave written statements. According to Hicks,

This started all over some horses, it happen about a week or two ago when her (the mail lady) and my dad had a missunderstanding (sic) about my horses I ready (sic) don't know what was said or what happen but I know it had my dad mad. But on yesterday (1-15-14) was the 1st time I seen her for real, because I was waiting on the investergater (sic) at the store and she pull up at the mailbox and that's when I drove off. But on today 1-16-14 we met up again on Knight pl road I pull in on the road 1st and she was behinde (sic) me. So I pull over to get me something to drink out of the trunk, at that time she was driving by as I was about to get back in the car she drove by and I pointed at her and told lil mike that "there go that bitch right there that call them people on me." then we drove off, and went on to Knight pl. when we got to Knight pl dog man wanted us to take him home so we did, as we pull up the maillady was in the yard and all of the people was telling us that she had call the police on me and I wanted to know why so I left and came back to see what was going on when I pull back up the police was already there so I walk up to him and ask him what was going and he told me to set (sic) in the car.

(Doc. #27, Ex. B2, Ex. 9).

In the course of his investigation, Hutson spoke with Jones, the postal inspectors, and Eva Scott ("Scott").8 (Doc. #27, Ex. C at 57-61). Scott reported to Hutson that she did not see a gun.9 (Id. at 61). During his investigation, Hutson also listened to recordings of Strickland's 9-1-1 emergency calls and reviewed her written statements to the postal inspectors and Till. (Doc. #27, Ex. D at ¶ 18).

(Id.).

As a result of his investigation, Hutson secured an arrest warrant for Strickland, charging her with false reporting to law enforcement authorities.10 (Doc. #27, Ex. C at 75). He arrested her on January 30, 2014.

On the day of Strickland's court hearing, Hutson was suffering from pneumonia and did not appear. Consequently, the charge against Strickland was dismissed. (Doc. #27, Ex. D at ¶ 19).

Strickland filed this action against Hutson on August 8, 2014.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Parties' Positions

In his motion for summary judgment, the defendant asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Strickland cannot demonstrate that he violated her Fourth Amendment rights. In the alternative, he argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he had probable cause or at least arguable probable cause to arrest her for making a false report to law enforcement officers.

In response, the plaintiff argues that Hutson did not have probable cause to arrest her because he procured the arrest warrant "with false, or withheld, information to the magistrate." (Doc. #31 at 5). Consequently, she argues that Hutson is not entitled to qualified immunity because he violated clearly established law by presenting false and withheld material facts to the magistrate to obtain an arrest warrant.

B. Claims against Deputy Sheriff Hutson in his Official Capacity

To the extent that Strickland sues Hutson in his official capacity, Hutson is a state officer and entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.11 Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). See also, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (holding that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity).

Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).

Under all facets of Alabama law, a county sheriff and his deputies are state officers. Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998); see ALA. CONST. ART. V, § 112 (designates county sheriff as member of State's executive department). "A sheriff is an executive officer of the State of Alabama, who is immune from suit under Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, in the execution of the duties of his office."12 Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 442-43 (Ala. 1987). See also Drain v. Odom, 631 So.2d 971, 972 (Ala. 1994). As a deputy sheriff for Lowndes County, Hutson is immune from a lawsuit for damages in his official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994); Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1990). It is undisputed that Hutson was acting within his official capacity when he arrested Strickland. Therefore, the court concludes that Hutson's motion for summary judgment on any claims for monetary relief against him in his official capacity is due to be granted because he is absolutely immune from damages in his official capacity. Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989).

C. Claims against Deputy Sheriff Hutson in his Individual Capacity.

Defendant Hutson argues that qualified immunity shields him from personal liability for his actions in arresting Strickland on January 30, 2014. Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (officials "shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known'" (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). Qualified immunity is not merely a defense against liability but rather immunity from suit. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (citation omitted); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 372 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014) ("[Q]ualified immunity is `an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.")

Taylor v. Barkes, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).

"Public officials are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they have "violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct."" City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) quoting Plumhoff, 372 U.S. at ___, 134 S.Ct. at 2023. To receive qualified immunity, the defendant must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful act occurred. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). There is no dispute that Hutson was acting within the course and scope of his discretionary authority when he arrested Strickland for giving a false report to law enforcement officers.

The burden now shifts to the plaintiff to allege facts that demonstrate that Hutson is not entitled to qualified immunity. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003). To satisfy her burden, Strickland must show two things: (1) that the defendant committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that the constitutional right the defendant violated was "clearly established." Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). "If the law is not clearly established, then the court should dismiss the case against the government official." Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 559 (11th Cir. 2015). The court has the discretion to determine which prong of the qualified immunity analysis to address first in light of the particular circumstances of the case before it. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) ("courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified immunity analysis to tackle first."). The plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a false arrest in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.13 The law in this circuit is clear that a claim of false arrest is a constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983. Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002-3 (11th Cir. 1998). However, Hutson argues he is entitled to qualified immunity because he had, at a minimum, "arguable probable cause" to arrest Strickland. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 762-63 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that in the context of a claim for false arrest, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity where that officer had "arguable probable cause" to effectuate the arrest); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (same); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (law enforcement officials entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably, but mistakenly, determine that probable cause exists); Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137-38 (11th Cir. 2007) (same).

Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1113 (11th Cir. 2015) (footnote omitted). See also Windham v. City of Fairhope, 597 Fed. App'x. 1068, 1071 (11th Cir. 2015).

Arguable probable cause exists where an objectively reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer effectuating the arrest could have believed that probable cause existed. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1283; Windham, 597 Fed. App'x. at 1071-72; Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1399 (11th Cir. 1998).

The reasonable-officer standard is an objective one; we do not consider the officer's subjective intent. "Whether an officer possesses probable cause or arguable probable cause depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern."

Kopperud v. Mabry, 573 Fed. App'x. 828, 830-31 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

The court concludes that because Hutson had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Strickland for false reporting to law enforcement officers, he is entitled to qualified immunity.14 "Whether a particular set of facts gives rise to probable cause or arguable probable cause for arrest depends . . . on the elements of the crime." Crosby, 394 F.3d at 1333. "A person commits the crime of false reporting to law enforcement authorities if [s]he knowingly makes a false report or causes the transmission of a false report to law enforcement authorities of a crime or relating to a crime." ALA CODE § 13A-10-9(a) (1975). Prior to arresting Strickland for making a false report to law enforcement authorities, Hutson possessed the following information:

Based on the information acquired during the investigation, a reasonable officer, knowing what Hutson knew at the time he arrested Strickland, objectively could have believed that Strickland lied to law enforcement about whether Hicks pointed a gun at her, and thus, made a false report to law enforcement authorites. Strickland reported to the 9-1-1 operator, Sergeant Jones, the postal inspectors and Anita Till that Antonio Hicks had pulled a gun from his trunk and pointed it at her on Knight's Place Road. She also reported that Hicks pointed the gun at her while she was in Eva Scott's driveway. However, even though Strickland was on the phone with the 9-1-1 operator, she did not tell the operator that Hicks was pointing the gun at her in Scott's driveway. No weapon was found on Hicks or in either car he was in that day. Finally, Eva Scott did not see a gun during the incident in her driveway. Based on Strickland's inconsistent statements, the lack of corroboration, and the failure of the officers to find a weapon on Hicks or in his vehicles, a reasonable officer "in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendant[`s] knowledge could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest" Strickland for making a false report to law enforcement authorities. See Rushing v. Parker, 599 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010).

In opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiff focuses exclusively on misstatements Hutson made in the narrative section of his Alabama Uniform Incident/Offense Report.

(Doc. #27, Ex. 2 at 2).

Strickland argues that the statement demonstrates that Hutson omitted material facts and provided untrue information to the Magistrate Judge. However, her reliance on Hutson's narrative in the uniform incident/offense report is misplaced. Regardless of what Hutson wrote in the narrative section of the offense report, the report is not the criminal complaint or the affidavit charging Strickland. Strickland makes no other argument in opposition to Hutson's entitlement to qualified immunity.

"Qualified immunity . . . protects officers who `reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present.'" Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1167 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "Thus, the qualified immunity standard is broad enough to cover some mistaken judgment, and it shields from liability all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violated the law." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Even if Hutson's investigation was not perfect, his investigation "was not `plainly incompetent.'" Rushing, 599 F.3d at 1268.

Under the circumstances, the court concludes that Hutson had, at the very least, arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for making a false statement to law enforcement authorities in violation of ALA. CODE § 13A-10-09 (1975), and thus, he is entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's claim of false arrest.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. The defendant's motion for summary judgment (doc. #25) be and is hereby GRANTED.

2. This case be and is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice, with costs taxed against the plaintiff.

3. All pending deadlines are terminated and the pretrial conference and trial of this case be and are hereby CANCELED.

A separate judgment will issue.