NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES, See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

KELLY, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Petitioner Marco Glaser seeks review of the trial court's dismissal of his successive notice of post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). We find no such abuse here.

¶2 Following a jury trial, Glaser was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. The trial court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of natural life in prison and three terms of 7.5 years' imprisonment to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the natural-life terms. We affirmed Glaser's convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Glaser, No. 2 CA-CR 2011-0125 (memorandum decision filed Aug. 31, 2012).

¶3 Glaser initiated his first Rule 32 proceeding in February 2013, and after appointed counsel notified the trial court she had "found [no] error meriting post-conviction review,"1 the court permitted Glaser to file a supplemental, pro se petition by April 15, 2014. Pursuant to Glaser's subsequent request for an extension, the court gave him until May 30, 2014 to file his pro se petition. On June 4, 2014, the court denied Glaser's second request to extend and dismissed his first Rule 32 proceeding.

¶4 Glaser filed a second notice of post-conviction relief in July 2014, in which he indicated his claim was based on newly discovered evidence and that his failure to file a timely notice was without fault on his part. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e), (f). To the extent he attempted to provide a reason for his late filing, Glaser asserted previous Rule 32 counsel had not raised any issues on his behalf in his first post-conviction proceeding and the "Court of Appeals" had denied his request for an extension to file a pro se petition in that proceeding. The court summarily dismissed Glaser's second notice, finding he had "fail[ed] to identify a specific exception or meritorious reason substantiating his claim" for relief in a successive or untimely Rule 32 petition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) ("If [in a successive or untimely notice of post-conviction relief] the specific exception [to preclusion] and meritorious reasons do not appear substantiating the claim and indicating why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or in a timely manner, the notice shall be summarily dismissed.").

¶5 On review, Glaser again asserts his failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part, see Rule 32.1(f), and also attempts to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Glaser's apparent reliance on Rule 32.1(f) is misplaced. That rule, which provides a ground for relief when "[t]he defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief of right . . . within the prescribed time was without fault on the defendant's part," does not apply here. Rule 32.1(f) only applies to "of-right" proceedings, and does not provide relief from the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) for a non-pleading defendant like Glaser, who has already been afforded a direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (defining "of-right" proceedings). Moreover, Rule 32.1(f) would not apply in any event—Glaser's first notice of post-conviction relief was timely filed. His proceeding was dismissed because he did not timely file his petition. Because we agree with the trial court that Glaser failed to show why his claims were not precluded under Rule 32.2(b), we find the court correctly dismissed his notice.2

¶6 Accordingly, although we grant review, we deny relief.