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United States v. $389,820.00 in United States Currency, 2:16-cv-985-ECM. (2019)

Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama Number: infdco20191009a45 Visitors: 5
Filed: Oct. 04, 2019
Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2019
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER EMILY C. MARKS , Chief District Judge . This is an action for civil forfeiture of the Defendant property brought by the United States of America pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6). 1 Now pending before the Court are the Government's motion for summary judgment filed on June 12, 2019, (doc. 90), and Claimant Ruby Barton's motion for summary judgment filed June 13, 2019 (doc. 95). The Government filed a response in opposition to the Claimant's motion for summary j
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MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

This is an action for civil forfeiture of the Defendant property brought by the United States of America pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).1 Now pending before the Court are the Government's motion for summary judgment filed on June 12, 2019, (doc. 90), and Claimant Ruby Barton's motion for summary judgment filed June 13, 2019 (doc. 95). The Government filed a response in opposition to the Claimant's motion for summary judgment on July 8, 2019. (Doc. 97). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Government's motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED and the Claimant's motion for summary judgment is due to be DENIED.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and § 1355. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1395 and 21 U.S.C. § 881(j).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact by identifying those portions of "`the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The movant may carry this burden "by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the case." Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

"[A] court generally must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Fla. Int'l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Fla. Nat'l Univ., Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). However, "conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value." Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924-25 (11th Cir. 2018). If the record, taken as a whole, "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," then there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the court must grant summary judgment. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 475 U.S. at 587).

B. Summary Judgment in Civil Forfeiture Cases

This forfeiture proceeding is governed by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA").

1. The Government's Burden

Under CAFRA, the United States must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture," that is, that there is a "substantial connection between" the property and illegal drug activity. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) and (3). Whether the government has shown probable cause for forfeiture is a question of law. See United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1439 n.22 (11th Cir. 1991). Probable cause in this context is a reasonable ground for belief: something more than mere suspicion but less than prima facie proof. United States v. Cleckler, 270 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. $121,100.00 in United States Currency, 999 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1993)).

Courts have been cautioned in civil forfeiture proceedings "not to dissect strands of evidence as discrete and disconnected occurrences." United States v. $22,991.00, More or Less, in United States Currency, 227 F.Supp.2d 1220, 1235-36 (S.D. Ala. 2002). The Court must instead evaluate the evidence, applying a common-sense view of the realities of normal life in the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Carrell, 252 F.3d 1193, 1201 (11th Cir. 2001).

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), the government is not required to demonstrate that the seized currency was connected with any particular drug transaction; instead, the government need only show that the money was "related to some illegal drug transaction." United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The Government may use evidence gathered after the filing of a complaint for forfeiture to meet its burden. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(2).

2. The Claimant's Burden

Once the Government has met its burden, the burden shifts to the Claimant to prove by a preponderance of evidence either a defense to the forfeiture or to prove that the property is not otherwise subject to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1); United States v. $52,000.00, More or Less, in United States Currency, 508 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1040 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (citing United States v. $21,000.00 in United States Postal Money Orders, 298 F.Supp.2d 597, 601 (E.D. Mich. 2003)). "The claimant may meet this burden either by rebutting the government's evidence or by showing that the claimant is an innocent owner."2 Cleckler, 270 F.3d at 1334. If the Government carries its burden, and the Claimant fails to meet her burden, the property will be forfeited. See Id.

III. BACKGROUND

A. The May 13 and 14, 2016 Shooting Investigation

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. On May 13, 2016, at 10:48 p.m., Millbrook Police were dispatched to the Sonic Drive-In at 77 Dudley Drive in Millbrook, Alabama. Officers approached a Mercedes vehicle and observed two gunshot holes in the driver's side window. Inside the vehicle, officers found Rodriguez Lakeith Garth, who was shot twice in the torso, but was still conscious. Garth told police that he was shot while he was sitting in his vehicle near the Liberty Mart Convenience Center at 154 Deatsville Highway in Millbrook. While attending to Garth, officers found a large sum of U.S. currency in his pocket and inside the Mercedes. Law enforcement seized the money (Defendant $4,550), as well as the jewelry on Garth's person (Defendant Miscellaneous Jewelry). Garth was then transported to Baptist Hospital South in Montgomery, Alabama for treatment, where he later died as a result of his injuries.

A subsequent investigation determined that Garth resided at 94 Breckinridge Court in Deatsville, Alabama. Investigators from Elmore County Sherriff's Office arrived at 94 Breckinridge Court and spoke with a neighbor who reported hearing two gunshots at Garth's residence. The investigators found one spent shell casing in the driveway outside the garage at 94 Breckinridge Court and discovered tire tracks, which originated in the Garth's driveway and crossed the neighbor's lawn, leaving ruts through the grass. Based on the condition of the neighbor's yard, it appeared the vehicle that left the tracks was moving quickly. Investigators believed this evidence indicated that Garth had been shot at 94 Breckenridge Court and then traveled to the Sonic Drive-In before calling 911.

The next morning, on May 14, 2016, an investigator with Elmore County Sherriff's Office obtained a search warrant, signed by an Elmore County District Judge, to search 94 Breckenridge Court for firearms, ammunition, spent ammunition casings, and any other evidence related to the discharge of a firearm or a physical altercation in connection with the shooting of Rodriguez Garth. During an initial sweep of the residence, officers observed several large bundles of what appeared to be marijuana inside a guest bedroom closet. The officers then sought and obtained a second, more extensive search warrant authorizing them to search 94 Breckenridge Court, and any vehicles on the property, for firearms, ammunition, illegal narcotics, drug packaging materials, currency, ledgers, notes, computers, cellular telephones, mediums used for storing electronic data, measuring scales, and any stolen property.

B. The Search of 94 Breckinridge Court

Pursuant to the second search warrant, members of the DEA Montgomery Residence Office, along with agents from the Central Alabama Drug Task Force, searched the residence at 94 Breckinridge Court. Officers found and seized eight bundles of marijuana in the closet of the guest bedroom, four totes containing eleven bundles of marijuana weighing 441 pounds, four gallon-sized plastic bags weighing 1.62 kilograms containing what appeared to be cocaine, another bag of suspected cocaine weighing 42.7 grams, a digital scale, two firearms, ammunition, six cellular telephones, assorted jewelry, a large quantity of U.S. currency inside the residence (Defendant $15,780.00) and a large quantity of U.S. currency (Defendant $389,820.00) in the trunk of a 1972 Chevrolet Chevelle located in the garage of the residence, much of which was banded with rubber bands and packaged in vacuum sealed bags. Agents also seized the Mercedes Garth was driving when he was shot, the Chevrolet Chevelle located in the garage of Garth's residence, and a Cadillac DTS, also discovered at the residence3. There was no one present at 94 Breckinridge Court during the search and Garth was the only known resident at this address.

C. The Forfeiture Action

The United States filed a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem (doc. 1) of Defendants $389,820.00 in United States Currency, $15,780.00 in United States Currency, $4,550.00 in United States Currency, Defendant 1972 Chevrolet Chevelle, SS 396, and Defendant Miscellaneous Jewelry pursuant to 21 U.S.C., § 881(a)(6), alleging the Defendant properties constituted assets obtained either directly or indirectly from drug trafficking or represents the proceeds of drug trafficking.

Ms. Ruby Barton, the personal representative and executor of the estate of Rodriguez Garth, filed a verified claim on behalf of Garth's estate on February 15, 2017, (doc. 12), alleging that Garth's estate is the lawful owner of all Defendant properties and that the properties were seized as the result of an unlawful search and were therefore not subject to forfeiture.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Government's Motion for Summary Judgment

To determine whether summary judgment is proper in this matter, this Court must first decide whether the Government has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant property is subject to forfeiture as a matter of law. The Government makes several arguments, which the Court will address in turn.

1. Large Amounts of Cash in Close Proximity to Controlled Substances

The Government first argues that the large amounts of cash found on Garth's person, in Garth's residence, and in the trunk of the Chevrolet Chevelle parked in the garage attached to Garth's home are probative of illegal drug activity because the currency was found in close proximity to controlled substances. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that while a large quantity of cash alone is insufficient to "demonstrate a connection to illegal drugs, the quantity of cash seized [may be] highly probative of a connection to some illegal activity." $121,100.00 in U.S. Currency, 999 F.2d at 1507. The probative value of the currency is even stronger when it is found in close proximity to drugs and drug paraphernalia. See United States v. $74,000.000 in United States Currency, 2008 WL 1805432, at *4 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (citing United States v. $29, 959.00 in United States Currency, 931 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Further, in a civil forfeiture action, the physical location of the seized currency in relation to illegal narcotics is "strong circumstantial evidence" that the currency is connected to illegal drug trafficking. $22,991.00 in United States Currency, 227 F. Supp. at 1233. More specifically, the precise location of a large quantity of currency can create a link between the currency and illegal activity. In United States v. $22,991.00 in United States Currency, the court found that $22,991.00 was an "unusually large amount of cash to be transported in the trunk of an automobile" and found that storing the seized currency in the trunk of a car was "highly probative . . . circumstantial evidence of a link between this exorbitant amount of cash and illegal drug activity." Id. at 1232.

In this case, each of the Defendant currencies, Defendant Miscellaneous Jewelry, and Defendant Chevrolet Chevelle was found in close proximity to drugs or drug paraphernalia. Investigating officers found Defendant $4,550.00 and Defendant Miscellaneous Jewelry on Garth's person when they responded to his 911 call reporting that he had been shot. During the investigation of the shooting, officers concluded that Garth had been shot while in the driveway of his residence and then sped away from the house, as evidenced by tire tracks tearing from Garth's driveway through the neighbor's lawn, before calling police from the parking lot of the Sonic Drive-In in Millbrook, Alabama. Thus, Defendant $4,550.00 and Defendant Miscellaneous Jewelry were found on Garth's person shortly after he fled from his home, where illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia were later discovered.

During the subsequent search of Garth's home,4 Defendant $15,780.00 was found inside Garth's residence alongside 441 pounds of marijuana, 1.6 kilograms of cocaine, digital scales, firearms, and multiple cellular telephones. Defendant $389,820.00, much of which was banded with rubber bands and packaged in vacuum sealed bags, was found inside the trunk of Defendant Chevrolet Chevelle, which was parked in the garage attached to Garth's residence where illegal narcotics were discovered.

As previous courts have found, storing large quantities of currency inside one's home or in the trunk of a car rather than using more secure methods, such as a bank account, is very unusual. The large amount of cash, stored in an unusual manner, and found in proximity to the illegal narcotics discovered in Garth's home is highly probative circumstantial evidence of a link between Defendants $4,550.00, $15,780.00, $389,820.00, Miscellaneous Jewelry, Chevrolet Chevelle and illegal narcotics activity.

2. No Evidence of Innocent Ownership

The Government next argues that Garth's estate has failed to provide any evidence of legitimate income sufficient to explain why he had such large amounts of cash, several vehicles, and expensive gold and diamond jewelry. In order to prove innocent ownership, the claimant must do "more than show the existence of possible legitimate sources of cash." United States v. $41,305.00 in United States Currency & Traveler's Checks, 802 F.3d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 1991). Garth's estate must instead establish his financial transactions and prove that the Defendant properties were the result of an innocent source of ownership unrelated to any drug trafficking. United States v. $130,052.00 in United States Currency, 909 F.Supp. 1506, 1517-18 (M.D. Ala. 1995).

In this case, the Claimant does not even attempt to assert a legitimate source of the Defendant currencies and property. Instead, as discussed infra, the Claimant merely states that Garth is dead and cannot divulge the source or origin of the money. The Government and Claimant have engaged in discovery in this matter and, despite requests from the Government, the Claimant has not revealed any legitimate source to explain Garth's wealth of over $400,000.00 in cash, gold and diamond jewelry, and multiple automobiles. As a result, Garth's lack of evidence of innocent ownership is another factor weighing in favor of forfeiture.

3. Garth's Criminal History

A claimant's prior narcotics history is probative evidence to be considered in forfeiture actions. A claimant's lack of legitimate income combined with a "narcotics related criminal history" weighs in favor of satisfaction of the Government's burden. United States v. $52,000.00, More or Less, In United States Currency, 508 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1041-43 (S.D. Ala. 2007). Prior convictions of offenses involving controlled substances are relevant to the question of whether the currency was substantially connected to illegal drug activity. United States v. Currency, $21,175.00, in United States, 521 F. App'x 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2013); see also $121,100.00 in United States Currency, 999 F.2d at 1507 (finding that a claimant's history of narcotics arrests and convictions was a critical factor weighing in favor of forfeiture).

Here, it is undisputed that Garth had been convicted of trafficking cocaine in Montgomery County, Alabama in 2006. Garth was also charged in two drug-related felony cases in Chambers County, Alabama just a few weeks prior to his death in 2016. These offenses, combined with Garth's failure to prove a source of legitimate income, are yet another factor in favor of finding that forfeiture is proper in this matter.

In determining whether the Government has carried its burden, this Court cannot weigh each of these factors individually as disconnected strands of evidence. Instead, the Court must evaluate the evidence by applying a "common-sense view of the realities of normal life in the totality of the circumstances." Carrell, 252 F.3d at 1201. Given that the Defendant currencies, vehicle, and jewelry were found in close proximity to illegal narcotics, the unusually large quantities of currency were stored in Garth's home and the trunk of a vehicle rather than in a bank account, and Garth's known criminal history involving drugs and drug trafficking, the Court finds that there is a substantial connection between the Defendant properties and illegal drug activity. As such, the Court finds that the Government has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the seized property is subject to forfeiture.

The burden now shifts to the Claimant to prove either a defense to the forfeiture or to prove that the property is not otherwise subject to forfeiture.

B. The Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment

The Claimant argues that the Government has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant currencies and property are subject to forfeiture because the facts do not prove the use of the funds and property in violation of the controlled substances laws of the United States.5 To support her claims, Claimant recites various sections of 21 U.S.C. § 881 and makes arguments alleging a failure to connect the seized property to a particular drug transaction.

The Claimant does not offer any evidence supporting her allegations. She cites only to the Complaint in her motion; however, the Complaint is not evidence. Instead, the Claimant relies on conclusory statements without reference to supporting facts.6 As the Eleventh Circuit has held, "conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value." Jefferson, 891 F.3d at 924-25. As a result, the Court must rely on the evidence before it, which was proffered by the Government, relating to the proximity of Garth's cash in relation to illegal narcotics, Garth's prior criminal history, and Garth's failure to provide a legitimate income source. The Government's evidence is sufficient to find a substantial connection between the property seized and illegal drug activity.

Further, the Claimant appears to misapprehend the law with regard to the Government's burden. The Government is not required, as Claimant alleges, to prove that the seized currency was connected to any particular drug transaction. Rather the Government need only show that the money was "related to some illegal drug activity." $242,484.00 in U.S. Currency, 389 F.3d at 1160. The Court is satisfied that the Government has done so.

Finally, the Claimant argues that Garth's inability to reveal the source of his large quantities of cash does not establish that the Defendant currencies are the proceeds of illegal drug activity. The Claimant relies on precedent outside of this circuit to argue that the Government may not seize property in an effort to force citizens to provide explanations for their wealth. U.S. v. $506, 231.00 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 454 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The government may not require explanations for the existence of large quantities of money absent its ability to establish a valid narcotics-nexus."); United States v. One Residence and Attached Garage of Anthony J. Accardo, 603 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Property of private citizens simply cannot be seized and held in an effort to compel the possessor to `prove lawful possession.'").

The Claimant alleges that because Garth is dead, he is incapable of revealing the origin of his wealth; information which she argues should remain private absent cause to show otherwise. The Claimant provides no evidence supporting this claim and instead attempts to dispute her burden of proving a legitimate source for Garth's money and property. The Claimant fails recognize that once the Government has carried its burden, the Claimant must provide proof of innocent ownership, or otherwise rebut the Government's evidence, to successfully avoid forfeiture. The Government submitted evidence proving the Claimant was given the opportunity to provide documentation on behalf of Garth's estate which could explain how he accumulated such vast quantities of cash. The Claimant has provided no such documentation, has proffered no rebuttal to the Government's evidence, and has therefore not carried her burden.

This Court concludes that the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the Defendant currencies and other property, including the presence of drugs, combined with Garth's criminal history and the Claimant's failure to prove innocent ownership, provides the critical nexus to drug trafficking required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant properties in this matter are subject to forfeiture as a matter of law.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. The Government's motion for summary judgment (doc. 90) is GRANTED; 2. The Claimant's motion for summary judgment (doc. 95) is DENIED; 3. Judgment is entered in favor of the Government. As such, the Defendants $4,550.00, $15,780.00, $389,820.00, 1972 Chevrolet Chevelle, and Miscellaneous Jewelry are FORFEITED to the United States; and 4. The Government's motion for interlocutory sale of Defendant Miscellaneous Jewelry, filed April 15, 2019, (doc. 76), and motion for interlocutory sale of Defendant 1972 Chevrolet Chevelle, filed April 17, 2019, (doc. 78), are DENIED as moot.

A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on December 1, 2013, the fee to file an appeal is $505.00

CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST

1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:

(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 S.Ct. 911 (1945)). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Perez-Priego v. Alachua County Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment entered by a magistrate judge, but only if the parties consented to the magistrate's jurisdiction. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001). (b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Under this section, appeals are permitted from the following types of orders: i. Orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions; However, interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1986); ii. Orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships; and iii. Orders determining the rights and liabilities of parties in admiralty cases. (d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 S.Ct. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).

2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:

(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the order or judgment appealed from is entered. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time to file an appeal may be reopened if the district court finds, upon motion, that the following conditions are satisfied: the moving party did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order within 21 days after entry; the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice, whichever is earlier; and no party would be prejudiced by the reopening. (e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.

3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.

4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court lacks jurisdiction, i.e., authority, to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).

FootNotes


1. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of "[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter."
2. "With respect to a property interest in existence at the time the illegal conduct giving rise to forfeiture took place, the term "innocent owner" means an owner who (i) did not know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate such use of the property." 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(A)(i-ii).
3. Although agents seized all three vehicles, Defendant Chevrolet Chevelle is the only vehicle listed in the Government's Verified Complaint. (Doc. 1).
4. On April 12, 2019, the Claimant filed a motion to suppress (doc. 75), alleging that the initial search warrant was not supported by probable cause and, as a result, the drugs and U.S. currency found in Garth's home were fruit of the poisonous tree. The Court found the initial search warrant was supported by substantial evidence and that suppression of the seized items was not warranted. (Doc. 85).
5. In her motion for summary judgment, the Claimant again challenges this Court's jurisdiction, in rem, as to the subject Defendant properties. The Claimant has previously litigated this issue in this very case. The Court found federal jurisdiction was proper in this matter (doc. 37) and will not revisit this issue.
6. The Claimant has also failed to comply with this Court's Uniform Scheduling Order requiring the parties to file briefs and supporting evidence separately from their motions and to support claims with "specific references, by page and line, to where evidence can be found" in supporting documents. (Doc. 70 at 2.). The Claimant's motion uses improper citations, does not include pinpoint cites, and offers no evidence for this Court to consider in evaluating her arguments against forfeiture.
Source:  Leagle

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