DUSTIN PEAD, Magistrate Judge.
District Judge Robert J. Shelby referred this case to Magistrate Judge Dustin Pead pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (doc. 33). On January 21, 2014, Judge Shelby ordered that any discovery dispute between the parties be filed and addressed consistent with the Short Form Discovery Motion Procedure (doc. 28).
In general, the terms of the current dispute are as follows. On September 16, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a "Motion To Extend Fact Discovery Deadline" seeking an order of the court "extending fact discovery for the limited purpose of exploring Polaris' training program" (doc. 84).
In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff was previously alerted to issues involving Mr. Damron on both April 4, 2014, via its "Notice of Non-Party At Fault" (doc. 89-5), and in conjunction with Mr. Damron's own March 20, 2014, deposition (doc. 89-1).
On October 3, 2014, the Court requested supplemental briefing on the issue of establishing "good cause" to support Plaintiffs' requested modification of the scheduling order specifically in light of Defendant's April 4, 2014, "Notice of Non-Party At Fault" (doc. 93). On October 10, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief (doc. 102) and on October 17, 2014, Defendant filed its response thereto (doc. 103). Plaintiffs' supplemental brief seeks to expand the initial deposition request (doc. 84-1) to include a follow-up deposition of Mr. Damron which Plaintiffs contend has been recently "necessitated by the focus of Polaris' Motion for Summary Judgment" (doc. 102, pg. 4).
District courts are given "wide latitude" when determining whether to amend a scheduling order, and the Tenth Circuit reverses "only for abuse of discretion." Summers v. Mo. Pac R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599, 604 (10
Pursuant to rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a scheduling order "may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). "Demonstrating good cause under the rule requires the moving party to show that it has been diligent in attempting to meet the deadlines, which means it must provide an adequate explanation for any delay." Strope v. Collins, 315 Fed. Appx. 57, 61 (10
As Plaintiffs note, it is common for the direction of the litigation to change throughout the discovery processes. Changes to the complexion of the litigation, however, do not absolve the parties of their duties of reasonableness and diligence. Here, Plaintiffs waited over three months after expiration of the current fact discovery deadline, June 6, 2014, (doc.44), to seek an extension of the discovery deadlines from the court (doc. 84).
Ultimately, while the parties knowledge of all relevant facts and issues in a case is beneficial to the litigation process, it is not the duty of the court to ensure mutual enlightenment. Here, Defendant's April 6, 2014, "Notice of Non-Party At Fault" specifically identified Mr. Damron as someone with potential liability for Plaintiffs' alleged damages—the title of the notice alone imparts that information. Additionally, the contents of the notice itself provide Plaintiffs with timely legal notice of Defendant's identification of Mr. Damron as a non-party who they consider to be "at fault and liable to Plaintiffs due to his negligent and improper repairs, modifications and alterations to the subject RZR, specifically the rollover protection structure ("ROPS")" (doc. 89-5).
In response to the court's request for additional briefing on the issue of "good cause," Plaintiffs assert that the "Notice of Non-Party Fault" provided them with information about the "repairs Mr. Damron had performed" but did not indicate "how those repairs had been accomplished." (doc. 102, p.2). Ultimately, the court finds this argument unpersuasive as it elevates semantics over the establishment of a reasonable basis for not conducting discovery related to Polaris' training, certification and maintenance programs.
Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiffs fail to establish good cause for a second extension of the fact discovery deadline, and Plaintiff's motion to re-open and extend fact discovery is hereby DENIED (doc. 84).