MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Donna Marie Wilson brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying her application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 10, 13) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 9) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner under sentence four of § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings.1

I. Background

On February 10, 2015, Wilson filed an application for a period of disability and DIB with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), alleging disability beginning February 1, 2015.2 After her application was initially denied, Wilson requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") with the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. The hearing was held on October 24, 2016. On January 13, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Wilson's application, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 21-31).

The Commissioner's decision on Wilson's application became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied her request for review of the ALJ's decision on October 3, 2017. (R. 1-6). Wilson subsequently filed this action under § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such (Doc. 20). That motion has been denied by separate order (Doc. 26). decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II. Standards of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts.").3 "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must . . . tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) . . . As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).4

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But "when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous." Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. Nevertheless, "when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998).

III. Summary of the ALJ's Decision

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Wilson met the applicable insured status requirements through December 31, 2020, and that she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date, February 1, 2015. (R. 26). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Wilson had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, osteopenia, and obesity. (R. 26-27). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Wilson did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of one of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments. (R. 27-28).

At Step Four,

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Wilson had the RFC "to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a)[6] except that she can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds[, and] can occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. "(R. 28-30). Based on this RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Wilson was capable of performing past relevant work as an administrative assistant. (R. 30-31). Thus, the ALJ did not proceed to Step Five and found that Wilson was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 31).

IV. Analysis

Evidence considered by the Commissioner in making a disability determination may include medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). "`Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). "There are three tiers of medical opinion sources: (1) treating physicians; (2) nontreating, examining physicians; and (3) nontreating, nonexamining physicians." Himes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App'x 758, 762 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2)). "In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician's opinion; (4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the physician's specialization. These factors apply to both examining and non-examining physicians." Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citation omitted). While "the ALJ is not required to explicitly address each of those factors[,]" Lawton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 431 F. App'x 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished), "the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.

"Absent `good cause,' an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians `substantial or considerable weight.'" Id. (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). "Good cause exists `when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.' With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he `must clearly articulate [the] reasons' for doing so." Id. (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41) (internal citation omitted). See also, e.g., Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 ("[T]he opinion of a treating physician may be rejected when it is so brief and conclusory that it lacks persuasive weight or where it is unsubstantiated by any clinical or laboratory findings . . . Further, the [Commissioner] may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.").7

The ALJ addressed the medical opinion of Wilson's treating physician, Dr. James Crumb, as follows:

(R. 30).

The undersigned agrees with Wilson that the ALJ's stated reasons for rejecting the more limiting portions of Dr. Crumb's opinion are not supported by substantial evidence. In rejecting Dr. Crumb's sitting-and-standing opinion, the ALJ selectively cited to certain exam notes in administrative exhibit 12F purporting to show "routinely . . . normal" examinations. (R. 527, 532, 545-547). However, Exhibit 12F is replete with Wilson's subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms caused by standing and walking, and nothing in the notes to which the ALJ cites, or indeed in any of the 26 pages of notes found in Exhibit 12F, is inconsistent with or obviously detracts from either Wilson's subjective complaints or Dr. Crumb's opinion. On the whole, Exhibit 12F, the only specific evidence to which the ALJ cites to discredit Dr. Crumb's sitting-and-standing opinion, does not substantially justify that decision.9

In rejecting Dr. Crumb's pain opinion, the ALJ cites a single page of Dr. Crumb's treatment note from an August 11, 2016 examination (R. 601) purportedly stating that Wilson "did not exhibit pain behavior." Wilson claims that the ALJ misquotes Dr. Crumb's note and that it should read that Wilson "does not demonstrate aberrant pain behavior." (Doc. 10 at 12 (emphasis)).10 While the majority of Dr. Crumb's handwritten notes on this particular page are difficult to decipher, it is reasonably apparent that Dr. Crumb stated that Wilson "does not demonstrate ab— pain behavior" (R. 601), with some modifier that does not rule out the possibility of any pain behavior, contrary to what the ALJ determined. Moreover, on the back page of the same exam note, Dr. Crumb indicated that Wilson had "objective evidence for moderate to severe pain[,]" that she reported "reduced pain and improved physical function while on narcotic medications[,]" and that it was "[m]edically necessary to treat patient's pain with prescribed narcotic medications." (R. 602). This, too, contradicts the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Crumb found no pain behavior in Wilson.

In sum, then, the relatively few pages of the record to which the ALJ specifically cited to discredit portions of Dr. Crumb's opinion do not substantially support that decision, and the ALJ's otherwise conclusory statements that the rejected portions of Dr. Crumb's opinions "are not supported by objective evidence" are insufficient, on their own, to satisfy an ALJ's burden to "clearly articulate" "good cause" to reject a treating physician's opinion.11 Accordingly, the undersigned cannot conclude that the ALJ's decision to reject Dr. Crumb's sitting-and-standing and pain opinions is rational and supported by substantial evidence. Those opinions, if given "substantial" or "considerable" weight, would also have significantly bolstered Wilson's subjective testimony regarding the limitations caused by her pain and other impairments, which the ALJ found to be not entirely supported by the record.12

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision denying Wilson a period of disability and DIB is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner under sentence four of § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this decision.

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner's final decision denying Wilson's February 10, 2015 application for a period of disability and DIB is REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), for further proceedings consistent with this decision. This remand under sentence four of § 405(g) makes Wilson a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993), and terminates this Court's jurisdiction over this matter.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), should Wilson be awarded Social Security benefits on the subject application following this remand, the Court hereby grants Wilson's counsel an extension of time in which to file a motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) until thirty days after the date of receipt of a notice of award of benefits from the SSA.13 Consistent with 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c), "the date of receipt of notice . . . shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of such notice, unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary." If multiple award notices are issued, the time for filing a § 406(b) fee motion shall run from the date of receipt of the latest-dated notice.

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED.