SUSAN RUSS WALKER, Magistrate Judge.
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by Jerome Greer-El, a state inmate, against the Alabama Department of Corrections, Leon Forniss, Anthony Jones, Hunter Futral, Christopher Arrington and Chauncey Caldwell. In this cause of action, Greer-El alleges that defendants Arrington and Caldwell used excessive force against him on June 2, 2014 at the Staton Correctional Facility. Doc. 1 at 5. He further complains that defendants Forniss, Jones and Futral failed to protect him from the force used by Arrington and Caldwell. Doc. 1 at 6-7, 9. Finally, Greer-El asserts that the actions of these officers resulted from the failure of defendant Forniss to train and supervise his staff adequately. Doc. 1 at 7. Greer-El seeks issuance of a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 8.
The defendants filed a special report, supplemental special report and relevant evidentiary materials addressing the claims for relief raised by Greer-El. In these filings, the defendants deny they violated Greer-El's constitutional rights. The defendants further assert they are entitled to summary judgment as res judicata bars Greer-El from litigating his claims before this court because of a prior judgment entered on these same claims by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama in favor of all the defendants named in this case and other additional defendants in Greer v. Corrections Dept. State of Alabama, et al., Case No. CV-2015-259-GOG, Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama (Mar. 8, 2016). Doc. 45 at 1-5.
After reviewing the defendants' initial special report, Doc. 17, the court issued an order on July 30, 2015 directing Greer-El to file a response, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials, to each of the arguments set forth by the defendants in their report. Doc. 18 at 1-2. The order specifically cautioned that "
In this response, Greer-El argues that the order entered on June 30, 2015 denying the defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss based on abatement forecloses their res judicata defense. Doc. 50 at 2. Greer-El further alleges that in the aforementioned order this court determined that he had dismissed his state case prior to any ruling by the state court on his claims. Doc. 50 at 2. These arguments are without factual basis and refuted by the record. Denying the defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss based on abatement during the early stages of this case in no way precluded their ability to raise the bar of res judicata later on. In addition, contrary to Greer-El's allegation, the order at issue did not find that Greer-El had dismissed his state case. Instead, the order merely noted that Greer-El stated "he would `elect to have the state claim dismissed' so that he may proceed before this court on his claims." Doc. 15 at 1 (citation to record omitted). The order therefore advised Greer-El "that if he seeks to dismiss his state civil action he should file an appropriate motion with [the] Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama." Doc. 15 at 2.
A review of the record of the state court proceedings demonstrates that Greer-El did not file a motion to dismiss his state case.
Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court now treats the defendants' reports collectively as a motion for summary judgment and concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
When the defendants meet their evidentiary burden, as they have in this case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 (holding that, once a moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under penalty of perjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact). In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts "must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage." Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). "[M]ere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor such that summary judgment is not warranted. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question." Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citation omitted). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Greer-El's pro se status alone does not compel this court to disregard elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.
The court has undertaken a thorough review of all the evidence contained in the record. After this review, the court finds that Greer-El has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on res judicata.
The defendants assert that the doctrine of res judicata bars review of Greer-El's claims for relief because the instant complaint contains claims presented to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama in a prior civil action against the same defendants wherein the state court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Doc. 45 at 2. The state court record in Greer v. Corrections Dept. State of Alabama, et al., Case No. CV-2015-259-GOG demonstrates that Greer-El alleges violations of state law and his federal constitutional rights based on the same claims and factual allegations as those presented in the instant civil action. Doc. 45-1 at 1-5. In addition, the defendants named in this case are also named as defendants in the state case.
"Res judicata . . . refers to the preclusive effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of matters that were litigated or could have been litigated in an earlier suit." I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson National Bank, 739 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986).
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (footnote omitted). The law is well settled that "if a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action, . . . the two cases are really the same `claim' or cause of action for purposes of res judicata." Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 f.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, when the substance and facts of each action are the same, res judicata bars the second suit. Id.
Kizzire v. Baptist Health System, Inc., 441 F.3d 1306, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2006). Under Alabama law, two causes of action are the same for res judicata purposes when "the same evidence substantially supports both actions." Id. at 1309 (citation omitted). "Res judicata applies not only to the
When applying Alabama law to this case, the court finds that res judicata bars review of the claims presented in the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The court will address each of the elements necessary for application of res judicata.
"A judgment is on the merits when it amounts to a decision as to the respective rights and liabilities of the parties, based on the ultimate fact or state of the parties disclosed by the pleadings or evidence, or both, and on which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of the formal, technical, or dilatory objections or contentions." Mars Hill, 761 So.2d at 978 (internal citation omitted); Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Am. Res. Ins. Co., Inc., 5 So.3d 521, 533 (Ala. 2008) (same). This is true even when the court does not conduct a hearing on the facts of the case. Id. It is therefore clear that the state court's order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment and its entry of judgment in favor of the defendants is a final judgment on the merits.
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
1. The defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.
3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.
4. Costs be taxed against the plaintiff.
On or before
Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections to the Recommendation will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
