P. BRADLEY MURRAY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for supplemental security income benefits. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Docs. 17 & 18 ("In accordance with provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a United States magistrate judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, . . . order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.")). Upon consideration of the administrative record, Plaintiff's brief, the Commissioner's brief, and the arguments of counsel at the January 10, 2019 hearing before the Court, it is determined that the Commissioner's decision denying benefits should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.
Plaintiff, through his mother, filed an application for supplemental security income benefits on April 28, 2015, alleging disability beginning on June 1, 2013. (See Tr. 152-55.) His claim was initially denied on August 26, 2015 (see Tr. 94-100) and, following Plaintiff's written request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") (see Tr. 103-04), a hearing was conducted before an ALJ on November 28, 2016 (Tr. 35-82). On March 20, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding that the claimant was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to supplemental security income benefits. (Tr. 10-24.) More specifically, the ALJ went to the fifth step of the five-step sequential evaluation process and determined that Hunter has the residual functional capacity to perform those unskilled jobs identified by the vocational expert ("VE") during the administrative hearing (compare Tr. 22-23 with Tr. 78-79). On April 24, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a written request for review of the ALJ's unfavorable decision (Tr. 151) and, on December 20, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Hunter's request for review (Tr. 1-3). Thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
Plaintiff alleges disability due to Asperger's Syndrome. The ALJ made the following relevant findings:
(Tr. 12, 15, 22 & 23).
A claimant is entitled to an award of supplemental security income benefits when he is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (2016). In determining whether a claimant has met his burden of proving disability, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At step one, if a claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). At the second step, if a claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities (that is, a severe impairment), he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). At step three, if a claimant proves that his impairments meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404, the claimant will be considered disabled without consideration of age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). At the fourth step, if the claimant is unable to prove the existence of a listed impairment, he must prove that his physical and/or mental impairments prevent him from performing any past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). And at the fifth step, the Commissioner must consider the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant can perform other work besides past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process, see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), and while the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step of the process to establish other jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform,
The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
On appeal to this Court, Hunter asserts but one reason why the Commissioner's decision to deny him benefits is in error (i.e., not supported by substantial evidence): (1) the ALJ failed to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1)-(5) in that he erred by finding that the opinion of an examining neuropsychologist, Dr. Melissa Ogden, was overstated. And while Plaintiff's brief considers the medical opinions of record through the prism of factors listed in § 416.927(c), it is clear that what Plaintiff is arguing is that the ALJ did not properly consider/weigh the medical opinions of record, as noted by the Commissioner in her brief (see Doc. 14, at 6), and that the ALJ's two proffered reasons for rejecting a portion of Dr. Ogden's limitation findings (Doc. 14, at 8 (Commissioner notes in her brief that the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Ogden's marked limitations on the basis that they were not supported by the objective record, including the consultative evaluations of Drs. Robert A. DeFrancisco and Pamela Starkey, and that these limitations were inconsistent with Dr. Ogden's diagnosis that Plaintiff has the least severe form of autism); compare id. with Tr. 20)) are not supported by substantial evidence (see generally Doc. 11). The undersigned agrees with Plaintiff in this unusual case that the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion evidence in this case, particularly the two reasons offered for giving little weight to Dr. Ogden's marked limitations, is not supported by substantial evidence.
There can be little question but that "[w]eighing the opinions and findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians is an integral part of the process for determining disability." Kahle v. Commissioner of Social Security, 845 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2012). In general, "the opinions of examining physicians are given more weight than those of non-examining physicians, treating physicians are given more weight than those of physicians who examine but do not treat, and the opinions of specialists are given more weight on issues within the area of expertise than those of non-specialists." McNamee v. Social Security Administration, 164 Fed.Appx. 919, 923 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006). In assessing the medical evidence, "[t]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor[,]" Romeo v. Commissioner of Social Security, 686 Fed.Appx. 731, 732 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2017) (citing Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Security, 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011)), and the ALJ's stated reasons must be legitimate and supported by the record, see Tavarez v. Commissioner of Social Security, 638 Fed.Appx. 841, 847 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016) (finding that the "ALJ did not express a legitimate reason supported by the record for giving [the consulting physician's] assessment little weight."); compare id. with Nyberg v. Commissioner of Social Security, 179 Fed.Appx. 589, 590-591 (11th Cir. May 2, 2006) (unpublished) (recognizing that an ALJ "`must specify what weight is given to a treating physician's opinion and any reason for giving it no weight, and failure to do so is reversible error.'").
"When weighing each medical opinion,
Id. at 832-33 (internal citations omitted; footnote added). A panel of the Eleventh Circuit has determined that an "ALJ is not required to explicitly address each" of the factors set forth in § 416.927(c), see Lawton v. Commissioner of Social Security, 431 Fed.Appx. 830, 833 (11th Cir. June 22, 2011), and that the core inquiry is whether "good cause" exists for rejecting particular medical opinions, see id.
With these principles in mind, the undersigned considers whether the ALJ in this case improperly considered the opinion evidence in this case. To the extent Plaintiff requests that this Court consider his assignment of error by specifically evaluating the evidence in the context of each of the specific factors set forth in § 416.927(c), the Court declines to do so because, as set forth in Lawton, supra, an ALJ is not required to explicitly address each of those factors, 431 Fed.Appx. at 833. And since an ALJ is not required to explicitly address each of those factors, it would turn Lawton on its head if this Court was to find that it could independently assess each of those factors. And, indeed, to the extent Hunter is asking this Court to reweigh those factors, this Court does not have the authority to do so. See Winschel, supra, 631 F.3d at 1178 ("`We may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'").
While this Court cannot reweigh the evidence in this case within the context of the foregoing relevant factors, as Lawton and other relevant caselaw establishes, it is the Court's responsibility to determine whether the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinions in this case and, specifically, whether the ALJ properly rejected (or gave little weight) to Dr. Melissa Ogden's opinions that Plaintiff has "marked" limitations/restrictions in interacting appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers and in responding appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting (compare Tr. 233 (Dr. Ogden's specific findings) with Tr. 20 (ALJ's summary of Dr. Ogden's findings: "a marked level of severity in social interaction and adjustment to changes[.]").
With respect to the first reason, while the ALJ specifically states that the evidence in the
As to the ALJ's second reason, he simply states it in a conclusory and bare manner without any explanation for why Dr. Ogden's diagnosis of the least severe form of autism spectrum disorder (level 1) would be "intrinsically inconsistent" with the marked limitations found by the examining neuropsychologist. (See Tr. 20.) In other words, this "reason" is asserted in a vacuum without any citation to record evidence that directly supports it. Certainly, the ALJ points to nothing in Dr. Ogden's comprehensive evaluation which supports a finding of "intrinsic inconsistency" and, importantly, the ALJ does not address Dr. Ogden's explanation (and opinions) for why Autism Spectrum Disorder level 1 would significantly hamper Hunter's ability to perform numerous work activities (compare id. with Tr. 230-31). Dr. Ogden, a clinical neuropsychologist
(Tr. 230-31 (emphasis supplied)). Instead of addressing Dr. Ogden's explanation and opinions "head on," the ALJ in this case did exactly what Dr. Ogden warned against and this was to mistake the diagnosis of the least form of Autism Spectrum Disorder with a finding that this impairment would not significantly impact Plaintiff's ability to perform numerous work activities. As alluded to earlier, this was error, in the Court's opinion, because this "reason" is wholly conclusory and not directly tied to any evidence of record. In other words, the ALJ's second reason is not supported by substantial evidence of record. Moreover, the ALJ's wholesale failure to directly address Dr. Ogden's explanation and opinions regarding the impact of Autism Spectrum Disorder (level 1) on Hunter's ability to perform work activities accounts not only for the lack of substantial evidence to support the ALJ's second reason but, as well, is error on its own accord, see Baez v. Commissioner of Social Security, 657 Fed.Appx. 864, 870 (11th Cir. July 27, 2016) (finding reversible error where the ALJ's decision suggested "that the ALJ failed to consider
In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that a remand is necessary so that the ALJ can reconsider his assessment of Hunter's RFC in light of Dr. Ogden's opinions on the above-identified (and other related
It is
