NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES, See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

KELLY, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Timothy Owens petitions for review of the trial court's summary dismissal of his untimely, successive notice of and petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We grant review, but we deny relief.

¶2 After a jury trial that concluded in December 2006, Owens was convicted of twenty-two felony counts stemming from his involvement in an extensive drug-trafficking enterprise. The trial court sentenced him to six concurrent life terms without the possibility of release for at least twenty-five years and to various terms of imprisonment on the remaining counts, all to be served concurrently with the life terms. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Owens, No. 2 CA-CR 2007-0046 (memorandum decision filed Feb. 14, 2008).

¶3 In July 2008, Owens filed a notice of post-conviction relief, followed by a petition in which appointed counsel alleged claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At Rule 32 counsel's request, Owens also was permitted to file a supplemental petition raising additional claims. The trial court denied relief on the petition and supplemental petition, and this court denied relief on review. State v. Owens, 2 CA-CR 2010-0293-PR (memorandum decision filed Jan. 7, 2011).

¶4 In May 2012, Owens filed a successive, untimely notice of post-conviction relief, in which he alleged his "failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief . . . was without fault on [his] part." The trial court appointed counsel, who subsequently notified the court, "pursuant to the procedure set forth in Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 889 P.2d 614 (1995)," that she would not be filing a post-conviction relief petition, and the court granted Owens an extension of time in which to file a pro se petition. Before that extension of time had expired, another attorney filed a notice of appearance and a petition on Owens's behalf, in which he alleged (1) Owens's trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in advising Owens during plea negotiations and (2) Owens's first Rule 32 counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise the claim in his first Rule 32 proceeding.

¶5 The trial court summarily dismissed the proceeding, concluding Owens's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was precluded and his claim of ineffective assistance of Rule 32 counsel was not cognizable in Rule 32 proceedings. This petition for review followed.

¶6 On review, Owens merely repeats the claims and argument he raised below. We review a trial court's summary denial of post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 17, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006). Owens has not sustained his burden of showing an abuse of discretion here.

¶7 In addition to the reasons correctly identified by the trial court for dismissing Owens's successive Rule 32 proceeding, we note that his claims also are precluded as untimely under Rule 32.4(a), which provides, "Any notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h)," regardless of whether claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(a), (b), or (c) have been waived in previous proceedings. Although Owens sought and received permission to proceed on the ground that his successive notice had been untimely through no fault of his own, Rule 32.1(f) only provides such relief from "the prescribed time" for filing a notice of appeal or "notice of post-conviction relief of-right," not for a successive proceeding filed by a non-pleading defendant. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 ("Rule 32 of-right proceeding" refers to proceeding filed by "person who pled guilty or no contest, admitted a probation violation, or whose probation was automatically violated based upon a plea of guilty or no contest"); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) ("[A]ny court on review of the record may determine and hold that an issue is precluded.").

¶8 With this addition, we adopt the trial court's ruling, which clearly identified Owens's claims and resolved them correctly based on thorough, well-reasoned analysis. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993) (when trial court has correctly ruled on issues "in a fashion that will allow any court in the future to understand the resolution[, n]o useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing" that analysis).

¶9 For the foregoing reasons, review is granted, but relief is denied.