NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ESPINOSA, Judge.

¶1 Gregory T. appeals from the juvenile court's April 2014 order terminating his parental rights to N.T., born in April 2004, on the ground of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Gregory contends there was insufficient evidence to support the order. We affirm for the reasons stated below.

¶2 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only upon clear and convincing evidence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination, Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 12, 153 P.3d 1074, 1078 (App. 2007), and a preponderance of the evidence that severance of the parent's rights is in the child's best interest, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005). This court will affirm such an order unless we conclude, as a matter of law, that no reasonable person could find the evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the statute. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, ¶¶ 6, 9-10, 210 P.3d 1263, 1265-66 (App. 2009). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the order, Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, ¶ 13, 107 P.3d 923, 927-28 (App. 2005), and will not disturb the order unless it is clearly erroneous, that is, unsupported by reasonable evidence, Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002).

¶3 Abandonment is defined in A.R.S. § 8-531(1) as "the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision," and "includes a judicial finding that [the] parent has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child." The statute further provides that a parent's "[f]ailure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment." § 8-531(1).

¶4 Whether a parent has abandoned a child "is measured not by a parent's subjective intent, but by the parent's conduct." Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 18, 995 P.2d 682, 685-86 (2000). Conduct that constitutes abandonment includes withholding parental presence, love, care and financial support. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 25 Ariz.App. 10, 12, 540 P.2d 741, 743 (1975). Courts must examine whether a parent has "made more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental relationship." Michael J., 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 18, 995 P.2d at 685-86. As our supreme court commented in Michael J., "when `circumstances prevent the . . . [parent] from exercising traditional methods of bonding with [the] child, [the parent] must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his [or her] legal rights to the extent necessary.'" Id. ¶ 22, quoting In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97, 876 P.2d 1121, 1132 (1994). Thus, whether a parent has abandoned his or her child depends on the particular circumstances of each case. See Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, ¶¶ 18-19, 243 P.3d 636, 640 (App. 2010); see also Pima Cnty. No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. at 96, 876 P.2d at 1131 ("What constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision varies from case to case.").

¶5 The record shows that in 2000, Gregory was sentenced to prison following his conviction for transportation of a controlled substance for sale in California; he was released on parole in 2003. N.T. was born in 2004 and Gregory and N.T.'s mother, Jennifer H., were married about a year later. The couple moved with N.T. to Tucson in 2005. Gregory was arrested for violating parole and incarcerated for less than a year in California. For about six months after Gregory was released from prison, N.T. lived with him; Gregory returned N.T. to Jennifer in January 2007.

¶6 Gregory was again incarcerated for violating parole and did not see N.T. for about two years. The last time he saw N.T. was November 2008. Gregory testified at the termination hearing that Jennifer had intended to allow Gregory to take N.T. with him for a couple of weeks but chose not to after Gregory refused to have sexual relations with her. Gregory was arrested for burglary in 2009 in California, subsequently convicted of that offense, and incarcerated. Gregory and Jennifer were divorced while he was in prison.

¶7 In November 2012, the Department of Child Safety (DCS)2 took custody of N.T. and filed a dependency petition after Jennifer left N.T. with an acquaintance and did not return for him two months later as she had agreed. DCS alleged in the petition that Gregory had not established paternity of N.T.; Gregory's whereabouts were unknown, and Gregory had not had contact with N.T. for years and had failed to establish a relationship with the child. DCS filed a motion to terminate both parents' rights in June 2013, alleging, inter alia, abandonment and neglect as grounds for terminating Gregory's rights.3

¶8 In April 2014, the juvenile court terminated Gregory's parental rights after a hearing in a nine-page under-advisement ruling in which it summarized the history of the case, cited the relevant statutory and case law related to the ground of abandonment, entered factual findings relevant to that ground, and made legal conclusions based on its findings. We need not restate the ruling in its entirety here. The gravamen of the ruling as it relates to the issue raised on appeal, however, is that although Gregory "never intended to abandon [N.T.]," based on his actions and inactions since January 2007, he nevertheless abandoned the child. The court found, inter alia, Gregory "provided no support for [N.T.], failed to maintain regular contact, made no more than minimal efforts to support and communicate with him, and did not maintain a normal parental relationship." The court further found he did so without "just cause," § 8-531(1), specifying the facts and the circumstances upon which it based that finding.

¶9 Gregory concedes he failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with N.T. for six months but insists there was just cause for that failure, arguing the juvenile court's finding to the contrary is erroneous. He asserts he was incarcerated from May 2009 to March 2014, but "used the means available to him to attempt to maintain a relationship with his son," particularly through his fiancée, to find Jennifer and N.T.; Jennifer "intentionally hampered his ability to parent"; and, DCS did not make serious efforts to find him and never offered him reunification services as a result.

¶10 In its ruling, the juvenile court makes clear it considered all of the factors related to just cause for Gregory's failure to maintain a parent/child relationship with N.T. The court expressly noted Gregory's incarceration and acknowledged that, under Michael J., imprisonment does not provide a parent with a defense to abandonment, nor does it alone justify severing a parent's rights. The court also acknowledged Jennifer had made it difficult for Gregory to find her and N.T. but found the evidence did not show Jennifer's primary purpose in engaging in this conduct was to hide N.T. from Gregory. The court acknowledged DCS's "efforts to locate Father left much to be desired," but concluded that, in any event, Gregory had not been sufficiently active or aggressive in seeking to establish and pursue his rights as a parent.

¶11 To a certain extent, Gregory is asking this court to reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion about Gregory's failure to establish and maintain a relationship with N.T. But we do not reweigh evidence, rather we defer to the juvenile court, which, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence based on all of the circumstances and its assessment of the witnesses' credibility. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d at 207 (resolution of "conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the juvenile court as the trier of fact"). The record reflects, as we stated above, the court considered the motion to terminate Gregory's parental rights based on the correct authority, according to proper standards, and with the relevant principles of law to guide it. We have no basis for disturbing its ruling; rather, because the record supports the court's factual findings and the legal conclusions based on those findings, we see no error and uphold the ruling. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 16, 53 P.3d at 207-08; State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993).

¶12 The juvenile court's order terminating Gregory's parental rights to N.T. is affirmed.