STEPHEN M. DOYLE, Magistrate Judge.
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on an Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff, an indigent state inmate, in which he complains that he injured his left index finger on September 17, 2017, while confined at the Houston County Jail. (Doc. 5) at 2-3. Specifically, he alleges that his finger "was smashed in the cell door due to a faulty hydraulic door stopper." (Doc. 5) at 3.
Defendants filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials addressing Plaintiff's claim for relief. In these filings, Defendants deny they acted in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights and further argue that this case is due to be dismissed because prior to filing this cause of action, Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust the administrative remedy available to him at the Houston County Jail with respect to the claim presented in the complaint. (Doc. 18) at 5-7. Defendants base their exhaustion defense on Plaintiff's failure to file a grievance regarding the claim presented in this case. (Doc. 18-4) at 2; (Doc. 18-5) at 2. Defendants further argue that because Plaintiff did not file a grievance within the time required by the grievance procedure, he "failed to exhaust his remedies and can never exhaust them." (Doc. 18) at 7.
Upon review of Defendants' special report, the Court issued an order providing Plaintiff an opportunity to file a response to the report in which he was specifically directed to address "the defendants' argument[] that . . . [h]is claims are due to be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)" prior to filing this federal civil action. (Doc. 22) at 1. The Order also advised Plaintiff that his response should be supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and/or other appropriate evidentiary materials. (Doc. 22) at 3. In addition, the order cautioned Plaintiff that unless "
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to treat the special report filed by Defendants (Doc. 18) as a motion to dismiss with respect to the exhaustion defense. Thus, this case is now pending on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted) ("[A]n exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment [motion]; instead, it should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary judgment."); Trias v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 587 F. App'x 531, 534 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court properly construed Defendant's "motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies[.]").
In addressing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e as to exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit has
Leal v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the law is well-settled that "the question of exhaustion under the PLRA [is] a threshold matter that [federal courts must] address before considering the merits of the case. Because exhaustion is mandated by the statute, [a federal court has] no discretion to waive this requirement." Myles v. Miami-Dade Cty. Corr. and Rehab. Dep't, 476 F. App'x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1998)). The Court will therefore "resolve this issue first." Myles, 476 F. App'x at 366.
"When deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies, the court should first consider the plaintiff's and the defendants' versions of the facts, and if they conflict, take the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. If in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed. If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at this step, then the court should make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion." Myles, 476 F. App'x at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008)). Consequently, a district court "may resolve disputed factual issues where necessary to the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust [without a hearing]. The judge properly may consider facts outside of the pleadings to resolve a factual dispute as to exhaustion where doing so does not decide the merits, and the parties have a sufficient opportunity to develop the record." Trias, 587 F. App'x at 535 (internal citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, the Eleventh Circuit specifically rejected the argument that "disputed facts as to exhaustion should be decided by a jury [or other factfinder]." Id.
Upon review of the Amended Complaint, Defendants' special report and the undisputed evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the Court concludes that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted.
Plaintiff complains of an injury suffered during his prior incarceration at the Houston County Jail. In response to the complaint, Defendants assert that this case is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust the administrative remedy provided at the jail prior to filing the instant complaint as required by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The PLRA compels exhaustion of all available administrative remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." "Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative remedies." Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). "The PLRA strengthened [the exhaustion] provision [applicable to inmate complaints] in several ways. Exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court but is mandatory. Prisoners must now exhaust all `available' remedies, not just those that meet federal standards. Indeed, as [the Supreme Court] held in Booth, a prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies even where the relief sought—monetary damages—cannot be granted by the administrative remedies." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (internal citation omitted).
Exhaustion of all available administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation, and a federal court cannot waive the exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). "[M]andatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion." Ross v. Blake, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1857 (2016). However, "[a] prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not `available.'" Id. at 1855. Generally, a remedy is "available" when it has "sufficient power or force to achieve an end, [or is] capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose[.]" Booth, 532 U.S. at 737 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion." Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in federal court] because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the courts of its proceedings. . . . Construing § 1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion . . . fits with the general scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary] interpretation [allowing an inmate to bring suit in federal court once administrative remedies are no longer available] would turn that provision into a largely useless appendage." Id. at 90-91, 93.
The Supreme Court reasoned that because proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary an inmate cannot "satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement . . . by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal[,]" or by effectively bypassing the administrative process simply by waiting until the grievance procedure is no longer available to him. Id. at 83-84; Bryant, 530 F3d at 1378 (To exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must "properly take each step within the administrative process."); Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that inmate who files an untimely grievance or simply spurns the administrative process until it is no longer available fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA); Higginbottom, 223 F.3d at 1261 (holding that inmate's belief that administrative procedures are futile or needless does not excuse the exhaustion requirement). "The only facts pertinent to determining whether a prisoner has satisfied the PLRA's exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he filed his original complaint." Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App'x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012).
It is undisputed that the Houston County Jail provides an administrative remedy for inmate complaints in the form of an inmate grievance procedure. (Doc. 18-2) at 8. In addition, the undisputed evidentiary materials filed by Defendants demonstrate that Plaintiff had access to the grievance procedure at all times while confined in the Houston County Jail, i.e., the grievance procedure was available to him throughout his confinement in the jail. The grievance procedure applicable to the claim presented by Plaintiff allowed him the opportunity to submit grievances to jail personnel with respect to matters/conditions occurring at the Houston County Jail. The grievance procedure provides as follows:
The record before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff had an administrative remedy available to him during his confinement in the Houston County Jail. The undisputed evidentiary materials filed by the defendants further establish that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust this remedy prior to filing this federal civil action. Specifically, despite the availability of a grievance procedure and his access thereto, Plaintiff did not file a grievance addressing the alleged injury to his finger caused by the malfunctioning door in accordance with the jail's grievance procedure. It is likewise undisputed that the facility's administrative remedy is no longer available to Plaintiff because the time limit applicable to filing a grievance, i.e., three days from the date of incident, has long since expired.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to exhaust the administrative remedy provided to him by Defendants while such remedy was available to him. Under these circumstances, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1375 n.1; Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157; Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Without the prospect of a dismissal with prejudice, a prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement by filing no administrative grievance or by intentionally filing an untimely one, thereby foreclosing administrative remedies and gaining access to a federal forum without exhausting administrative remedies."); Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2nd Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted) (holding that inmate's "federal lawsuits . . . properly dismissed with prejudice" where previously available administrative remedies had become unavailable).
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 18) be GRANTED to the extent Defendants seek dismissal of this case due to Plaintiff's failure to properly exhaust the administrative remedy previously available to him at the Houston County Jail prior to initiating this cause of action.
2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice in accordance with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) for Plaintiff's failure to properly exhaust an administrative remedy before seeking relief from this court.
3. Other than the filing fee assessed in this case, no further costs be taxed herein.
The parties may file objections to this Recommendation
