ORDER

G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.

Plaintiff Curtis Lee Block brought this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Phoenix Police Department Officers Adam Applegate, James Ray, and Seth Jahnke. (Doc. 7.)1 Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which Plaintiff opposes. (Docs. 34, 57.)

The Court will grant the Motion and terminate the action.

I. Background

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on June 21, 2014, Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered the curtilage of his residence to arrest him without a warrant. (Doc. 7.)

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Plaintiff had numerous misdemeanor warrants for his arrest and (2) Plaintiff's claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). (Doc. 34.)

The Court issued an Order with the Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998), which informed Plaintiff of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 37.) After some procedural delays, the Motion for Summary Judgment is fully briefed and ready for ruling. (Docs. 57, 63.)2

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, it must "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

At summary judgment, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court does not make credibility determinations; it must believe the nonmovant's evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id. at 255; Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

III. Relevant Facts

On June 14, 2014, Sergeant Jahnke met with members of his squad and informed them that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on an attempted robbery charge stemming from a 2012 incident. (Doc. 35, Defs.' Statement of Facts ¶ 1.) Applegate conducted a records check of Plaintiff and found that he had numerous misdemeanor warrants for his arrest, primarily for failure to appear, and Applegate shared this information with Jahnke and Ray. (Id ¶ 2.) Defendants decided to conduct a knock-and-talk at Plaintiff's last known address; however, they were advised Plaintiff had not been at that residence recently. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Defendants attempted to locate Plaintiff at possible job sites and another residential address, to no avail. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)

A woman at the last residential address directed Defendants to a house on the corner of 10th Avenue and Buckeye, where Defendants observed a bicycle that matched the description of the bicycle Plaintiff was known to ride. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 16.) This house had a chain link fence surrounding the front yard and a gate. (Id. ¶ 17.) Applegate approached the gate and could see someone seated inside a porch enclosure; Applegate called out Plaintiff's name, and Plaintiff came to the gate. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19; Doc. 58 at 2.) Upon request, Plaintiff handed his Arizona driver's license to Applegate, which confirmed Plaintiff's identity. (Doc. 35 ¶ 20; Doc. 58 at 2.) Applegate asked Plaintiff to come out of the yard to discuss a case with him, but Plaintiff refused and advised Applegate to get a warrant. (Doc. 35 ¶ 22; Doc. 58 at 2.) According to Plaintiff, he and Applegate had a discussion about the officers' need for a warrant to enter the premises absent any exigent circumstances. (Doc. 7 at 3.) Plaintiff also told Applegate that he was aware there was a misdemeanor warrant for his arrest; however, Applegate told Plaintiff the officers were not there on the misdemeanor warrant. (Doc. 58 at 2.)

Defendants then went into a huddle, and Applegate explained the situation to Jahnke; they agreed that Applegate would attempt to detain Plaintiff the next time he made contact. (Doc. 58 at 2; Doc. 35 ¶ 23.) Applegate returned to the front gate and handed Plaintiff his driver's license back; when Plaintiff reached for his license, Applegate grabbed his wrist and pulled extremely hard in an attempt to pull Plaintiff over the fence. (Doc. 35 ¶ 24; Doc. 58 at 3.)

The parties dispute what transpired next. Plaintiff states that he pulled back and broke the hold, landing on his posterior. (Doc. 58 at 3.) Then, after he fell back, Defendants lifted the latch, rushed into the yard, and tackled and cuffed Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendants state that when Plaintiff pulled back, he pulled Applegate through the gate, which had not been locked, and Applegate grabbed Plaintiff around the waist, and they went to the ground. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 25-26.) Applegate then cuffed Plaintiff, and Ray helped Plaintiff up and escorted him to the patrol car. (Id. ¶ 27.)

Plaintiff was booked for his outstanding misdemeanor warrants. (Id.)

At some point thereafter, Plaintiff was charged with Attempt to Commit Robbery and Burglary in the 2nd Degree, and, in March 2015, he pled guilty to Burglary in the 2nd Degree. (Id. ¶ 28; Doc. 35, Ex. 11 (Doc. 35-1 at 57).)

IV. Fourth Amendment Violation

A. Governing Standard

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is a basic principle that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.'" Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quotation omitted). "Because the curtilage is part of the home, searches and seizures in the curtilage without a warrant are also presumptively unreasonable." United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).

Despite this "presumption of invalidity attaching to warrantless entry . . . `for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.'" United States v. Gooch, 506 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980)). This is because an arrest warrant by itself, "authorizes the police to deprive a person of liberty," and thus "necessarily . . . authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214 n.7 (1981). Thus, a valid arrest warrant, whether it is for a felony, a misdemeanor, or even a bench warrant for failure to appear, affords police officers limited authority to enter a residence to effectuate the arrest. Gooch, 506 F.3d at 1159.

B. Discussion

As stated, at the summary judgment stage, the Court takes as true Plaintiff's facts, which are that Defendants tried to grab Plaintiff's wrist and, after Plaintiff broke the hold and fell back, Defendants simply opened the gate, entered Plaintiff's yard, and arrested him. Plaintiff's enclosed yard in front of his house clearly constitutes curtilage subject to Fourth Amendment protection. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12; United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747 (9th Cir. 2010). And there is no dispute that Defendants did not have a search warrant to enter Plaintiff's property.

There is also no dispute that at the relevant time, Plaintiff had outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrants. (See Doc. 35, Exs. 4-9.) As long as Defendants had reason to believe Plaintiff was within the curtilage of the home, they had authority to enter it to arrest Plaintiff pursuant to those outstanding arrest warrants. See Gooch, 506 F.3d at 1158-59. Plaintiff verified his identity to Defendants with his driver's license; thus, their entry into the yard was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

That Defendants may not have been fully aware at the time that they had the authority to enter the yard to arrest Plaintiff pursuant to the misdemeanor arrest warrants does not alter this determination. Their subjective intent is irrelevant; only objective factors are considered in determining whether an officer's conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d at 1187 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff fails to present any specific facts or evidence to establish a material factual dispute whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation. He contends that Defendants did not go to his house on June 21, 2014, to arrest him pursuant to the misdemeanor warrants; rather, they arrested him for suspicion of the robbery and only later discovered the outstanding warrants, which they now claim as grounds to support their entry into his yard. But Plaintiff's own facts and evidence belie this contention. In his Response, Plaintiff states that he and Applegate discussed his outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrants, thereby confirming that Defendants were aware of them at the relevant time. (Doc. 58 at 2; see Doc. 35, Ex. 2, Applegate Decl. ¶ 4 (Doc. 35-1 at 8).) Also, the police report that Plaintiff submitted with his Response documents that Plaintiff was taken into custody and booked on his outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrants. (Doc. 57, Ex. 1 (Doc. 57 at 7.)

Plaintiff next argues that Defendants did not properly announce their presence and purpose before entering. (Doc. 57 at 2-3.) He relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3109, the "knock and announce" statute, which requires officers to give notice of their authority and purpose before breaking into a home to execute a search warrant. (Id.) See United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 1995). Section 3109 governs the conduct of federal officers, not city police officers. United States v. Combs, 394 F.3d 739, 742 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Even so, "§ 3109 is the federal codification of the common-law knock and announce principle," and it is relevant to whether Defendants acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The goals underlying the knock-and-announce rule are to "protect[] the sanctity of the home, prevent[] the unnecessary destruction of private property through forced entry, and avoid[] violent confrontations that may occur if occupants of the home mistake law enforcement for intruders." Id. at 744.

Here, when Defendants first arrived at Plaintiff's house, they stayed outside of the gated yard, respecting that the yard constituted curtilage associated with the sanctity of Plaintiff's home. There was no mistaking that Defendants were police officers, and they explained that they were there to talk to Plaintiff, who then verified his identity and approached the gate to speak to Defendants. These actions substantially comply with the knock-and-announce rule, even if Defendants did not specifically state that they were there to arrest Plaintiff on misdemeanor arrest warrants.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest him for attempted robbery. (Doc. 57 at 4.) But because there were outstanding misdemeanor warrants for Plaintiff's arrest that gave Defendants limited authority to enter the curtilage of Plaintiff's home to effect an arrest, whether or not there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for attempted robbery is of no moment.

In sum, the Court finds that Defendants' actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and their Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. The Court need not address Defendants' argument under Heck.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34)

(2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34) is granted.

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.