MURDOCK, Justice.

The Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association ("the AIGA") appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court against the AIGA and in favor of the Association of General Contractors Self-Insurer's Fund ("the AGCSF").1 The issue on appeal is whether the AGCSF may recover from the AIGA based upon a claim arising out of an insurance policy ("the Reliance policy") issued by Reliance National Indemnity Company ("Reliance"). We hold that it may, and we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

A. General

The AGCSF is a group of employers who, through their participation in AGCSF, have qualified as "self-insurers" under Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-9(a), a part of the Workers' Compensation Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq. Section 25-5-9(a) states:

The AIGA is "a nonprofit unincorporated legal entity," Ala.Code 1975, § 27-42-6, created pursuant to the Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 27-42-1 et seq. ("the Guaranty Act"). The legislature enacted the Guaranty Act and created the AIGA

Ala.Code 1975, § 27-42-2.

As it existed at the time the claim arose in the present case, the Guaranty Act defined a "covered claim" as

Ala.Code 1975, § 27-42-5(4) (emphasis added). Section 27-42-3, Ala.Code 1975, states that the Guaranty Act "shall apply to all kinds of direct insurance, except life, annuities, disability, accident and health, title, surety, credit, mortgage guaranty and ocean marine insurance." The parties' dispute primarily concerns (1) whether the AGCSF's claim under the Reliance policy and against the AIGA concerns an amount due an "insurer" or an "insurance pool," as those terms are used in § 27-42-5(4), and (2) whether the Reliance policy is one for direct insurance, i.e., an "insurance policy to which [the Guaranty Act] applies."

Based upon an affidavit from Joseph S. Ammons, chief counsel for the Workers' Compensation Division of the Alabama Department of Industrial Relations, "[s]ince January 1, 1982, [the AGCSF] has been recognized by the State of Alabama as a group of employers that have pooled their resources together to meet their liabilities to injured employees for the purpose of qualifying as self-insurers pursuant to the [Workers' Compensation Act]."3

Also, according to an affidavit from Don Jones, the administrator of the AGCSF,

(References to exhibit's omitted and emphasis added.) See Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Industrial Relations), r. 480-5-3-.06 et seq. (regulatory requirements for self-insured-employer groups). It does not appear that the participation agreement between the AGCSF and the member at issue in the present case, M & D Power Construction Co. ("M & D Power"), was included in the parties' submissions to the trial court.

The explanation of how the AGCSF operates provided by Jones's affidavit is consistent with the amended and restated bylaws of the AGCSF ("the bylaws"). The bylaws require the AGCSF to establish a "claims-fund account" to hold members' contributions and from which to pay workers' compensation claims. The bylaws further state:

According to an affidavit from David Parsons, the deputy commissioner for the Alabama Department of Insurance, so far as the Department of Insurance is concerned, "[s]elf-insured workers' compensation groups are not `insurers' under the laws pertaining to insurance in the State of Alabama and these groups are not regulated by the Alabama Department of Insurance." See Ala.Code 1975, § 27-1-2(2) (defining an "insurer" as "[e]very person engaged as indemnitor, surety or contractor in the business of entering into contracts of insurance" (emphasis added)) and § 27-1-2(1) (defining "insurance" as "[a] contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or provide a specified amount or benefit upon determinable contingencies"). Consistent with Parsons's affidavit, the bylaws state that the AGCSF "is not an insurance company and does not sell insurance." Of course, such a statement is not determinative of whether the law deems the AGCSF to be an insurer or to issue insurance contracts. See Schoepflin v. Tender Loving Care Corp., 631 So.2d 909, 912 (Ala.1993) ("`[A] company may be found to be engaged in an insurance business even though it expressly disclaims any intention to sell insurance.'" (quoting 43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 4 (1982))).4

In 1987, several § 25-5-9(a) self-insured-employer groups, including the AGCSF, established the Alabama Reinsurance Trust Fund ("the Reinsurance Trust Fund") pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-9(b). Section 25-5-9(b) provides that "[t]wo or more employer groups as described in [§ 25-5-9](a) ... may enter into agreements to pool their liabilities under this chapter for the purpose of providing excess coverage above the self-insured retention levels maintained by the individual employer groups." (Emphasis added.) See generally Black's Law Dictionary 1391 (8th ed.2004) (defining "self-insured retention" as "[t]he amount of an otherwise-covered loss that is not covered by an insurance policy and that usu[ally] must be paid before the insurer will pay benefits").

The trust indenture for the Reinsurance Trust Fund provides for the trustees of that fund to issue an instrument referred to as a "Policy" to each participating self-insured-employer group. The trust indenture defines "Policy" as "[a] schedule which is issued by the Trustees to a [self-insured-employer group] and which sets forth the rights with respect to excess coverage and the responsibilities (including, without limitation, premium commitments) of such [self-insured-employer group]." The record does not contain a copy of the "policy" the Reinsurance Trust Fund issued to the AGCSF, and the specific terms of the policy are not discussed in any of the pleadings, motions, or briefs included in the record on appeal.

Section 4.01 of the trust indenture for the Reinsurance Trust Fund states that

Also, § 2.01 of the trust indenture states:

(Emphasis added.) Further, the trust indenture authorizes the trustees to "obtain appropriate insurance, or reinsurance, from such insurance carrier or carriers as the Trustees may from time to time deem appropriate." (Emphasis added.)

According to an affidavit from Boyd Kelly, the administrator of the Reinsurance Trust Fund,

(Emphasis added.)

A document titled "Certificate Of Reinsurance" issued in relation to the Reliance policy states, at the outset: "IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAYMENT OF THE REINSURANCE PREMIUM AND SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED HEREIN, WHICH ARE MADE PART OF THIS CERTIFICATE, RELIANCE NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (HEREAFTER CALLED THE REINSURER) DOES HEREBY REINSURE" the Reinsurance Trust Fund. (Capitalization in original.) The certificate continues:

Further, the certificate states that the Reinsurance Trust Fund would "retain for its own account or for that of its treaty reinsurer, if applicable," "0% OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION" and "0% OF EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY." (Capitalization in original.)

The certificate reflects a separate liability limit for each of the self-insured-employer groups that participated in the Reinsurance Trust Fund. As to the liability limit for claims in relation to the AGCSF, Reliance "agree[d] to indemnify the [Reinsurance Trust Fund]" for:

(Capitalization in original.) The "General Conditions" included in the certificate state:

It appears from the materials in the record before us that, at all times pertinent to the present case, Reliance, which was apparently a Pennsylvania company, was authorized to do business in the State of Alabama. In May 2001, Reliance was placed into rehabilitation in Pennsylvania because it was allegedly insolvent. In October 2001, a Pennsylvania court declared Reliance insolvent and ordered it liquidated.

B. The Claim at Issue

In May 1999, Paul David Wheeler allegedly suffered an on-the-job injury in Alabama while employed by M & D Power, which is a member of the AGCSF. Wheeler, a resident of Florida when he was injured, filed a workers' compensation claim against M & D Power. Eventually, the AGCSF's payments for Wheeler's workers' compensation claim exceeded $400,000. The AGCSF notified the Reinsurance Trust Fund that it had been required to make payments in excess of its self-insured retention.9 In May 2002, Kelly, as administrator of the Reinsurance Trust Fund and on behalf of AGCSF, filed a claim with Reliance, and, in light of Reliance's insolvency, with the AIGA.

In June 2004, after realizing that Wheeler was a resident of Florida when he was injured and that he still resided in Florida, the AIGA sent the claim file to the Florida Workers' Compensation Insurance Guaranty Association ("the FWCIGA"),10 along with a letter that stated, in part:

Although the letter elsewhere refers to M & D Power as the insured in regard to Wheeler's claim, the foregoing language clearly is referring to the AGCSF as the "insured which had exceeded its $400,000 self-insured retention."

In a letter dated June 21, 2004, to the AGCSF, the FWCIGA rejected its claim, stating:

Neither the AIGA, which had forwarded the claim to the FWCIGA, nor the Reinsurance Trust Fund nor the AGCSF filed a judicial proceeding to contest the FWCIGA's denial of the claim.12 Instead, the AGCSF requested that the AIGA pay the claim. In a letter dated July 2, 2004, counsel for the AGCSF informed counsel for the AIGA as follows:

The letter continued by discussing the AGCSF's position that the Reliance policy was "direct insurance," not reinsurance, and that it was covered under the provisions of the Guaranty Act. The AGCSF contended that neither it nor the Reinsurance Trust Fund could be considered "insurers" under the exclusion language found in § 27-43-5(4).

After it did not receive an acceptable response from the AIGA, the AGCSF sued the AIGA in the Montgomery Circuit Court. The AGCSF alleged that the AIGA had refused to pay a "covered claim" under the Guaranty Act. It requested that the trial court enter a judgment declaring the "rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties" under the Reliance policy and that it award the AGCSF "a judgment for the amounts owed to [the AGCSF] in this matter with interests and costs." The AIGA filed an answer denying that the AGCSF's claim was a "covered claim" under the Guaranty Act.

The AGCSF filed a motion for a summary judgment, evidentiary materials is support of its motion, and a brief in support thereof, including the affidavits quoted above. The AGCSF asserted that

The AGCSF then went on to discuss the rationale and holding in Iowa Contractors Workers' Compensation Group v. Iowa Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 437 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1989), see discussion infra, and cases from other jurisdictions that allegedly supported its argument that the AIGA was obligated to pay the AGCSF's claim.

The AIGA opposed the AGCSF's summary-judgment motion, and it filed a "cross-motion" for a summary judgment. The AIGA argued that "[i]t was not designed as a safety net for self-insurers like [the AGCSF]." Specifically, the AIGA asserted:

In part, the materials the AIGA filed in support of its cross-motion included an affidavit from Joseph C. Manus, assistant vice president for Reliance, which stated, in part, that "Reliance intended for [the Reliance policy] to be a reinsurance policy and does not consider it to be a policy that provides excess workers' compensation coverage." The AIGA also filed a motion to strike a portion of Kelly's affidavit. The AIGA argued that Kelly's statement that "[t]he Reliance policy agreed to reimburse each [Reinsurance Trust Fund] member[ ] when its losses had exceeded an amount called the retention level up to a specific amount which varied according to the member self-insured fund" was

But see discussion, infra, concerning the parties' subsequent stipulation that Reliance had issued the Reliance policy "to the three members of the [Reinsurance Trust] Fund," one of whom is the AGCSF, and that the policy "provide[d] for reimbursement to the individual members of the [Reinsurance Trust] Fund."13 The AIGA asserted that the insurance policy at issue was the best evidence of its content.

The AGCSF filed a motion to strike Manus's affidavit because, it said, the affidavit did not reflect the factual basis behind his assertions, particularly whether he was employed by Reliance when it issued the Reliance policy or what involvement he had had in the negotiations concerning the Reliance policy. The AGCSF also filed a response in opposition to the AIGA's cross-motion for a summary judgment.

In November 2006 the trial court entered an order granting the AGCSF's motion for a summary judgment and denying the AIGA's motion. The order states, in part:

(Emphasis added.) The trial court then discussed the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Iowa Contractors, concluding that the Reliance policy was not a reinsurance policy. The trial court concluded that neither the Reinsurance Trust Fund nor the AGCSF were insurers and, accordingly, that the AGCSF's claim was a covered claim under the Guaranty Act. It directed the AIGA to "pay all claims submitted by AGC[SF] pursuant to the Reliance policy at issue in this case." The trial court did not specify the amount of damages due the AGCSF from the AIGA, however.

The AIGA appealed, and this Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination as to damages and for the entry of a final judgment. On remand, the parties stipulated that the AGCSF had made workers' compensation benefit payments to or on behalf of Wheeler in the amount of $907,734.96, that the AGCSF was responsible for paying $400,000 of that amount as self-insured retention, and that the terms of the Reliance policy required Reliance to reimburse the AGCSF for the remaining $507,734.96.14 They further stipulated that Reliance had issued the Reliance policy "to the three members of the [Reinsurance Trust] Fund," one of whom is the AGCSF, and that the policy "provide[d] for reimbursement to the individual members of the [Reinsurance Trust] Fund for `loss paid or payable as a result of: ... Compensation and other benefit payments required of the Reassured [Insured] by the Workers Compensation Law of any state ...'." Nonetheless, the AIGA maintained its position that AGCSF's claim was not a "covered claim" under the Guaranty Act.

After conducting a hearing on remand and considering the parties' stipulations, the trial court entered a judgment against the AIGA and in favor of the AGCSF in the amount of $507,734.96. The court directed the AIGA to pay all future claims submitted by the AGCSF concerning Wheeler, "up to the $1,000,000 limit of the Reliance policy of insurance."

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a summary judgment is well settled:

Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So.2d 933, 935 (Ala.2006).

The AIGA does not contend that the summary judgment was improper because there was a material issue of fact. Based on the arguments made by the AIGA, we are presented only with the question whether the trial court erred as to the law or as to the application of the law to the undisputed material facts.

III. Analysis

The AIGA argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the AGCSF had no further obligation to pursue its claim with the FWCIGA. The AIGA also argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the claim at issue was a "covered claim" under the Guaranty Act because, according to the AIGA, the AGCSF and the Reinsurance Trust Fund are "insurers" or "insurance pools," and the Reliance policy was reinsurance, not direct insurance.15

A. Exhaustion of Remedies

The AIGA contends that the trial court failed to properly apply Ala.Code 1975, § 27-42-12(b), when it concluded that the AGCSF had no further obligation to pursue its claim with the FWCIGA. Section 27-42-12(b) provides:

(Emphasis added.)16

The AIGA contends that if the AGCSF's position on the merits is correct (i.e., that its claim is a "covered claim" under the Guaranty Act), then the FWCIGA would be required to pay the claim because the Guaranty Act and the act governing the FWCIGA are "in material respects similar."17 The AIGA further contends that the last sentence of § 27-42-12(b) means that the AGCSF can seek recovery from the AIGA "[o]nly if there are insufficient benefits available from [the FWCIGA]."

We need not address whether the Guaranty Act and the pertinent statutory provisions governing the FWCIGA are "in material respects similar," though that does not appear to have been the case when the present claim arose. See note 11, supra. Whether the statutes are or are not "in material respects similar," the plain language of § 27-42-12(b) does not support the AIGA's position.

As this Court stated in DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275-76 (Ala.1998):

(Emphasis added.)

Assuming § 27-42-12(b) is applicable in the present case, it required the AGCSF to first "seek recovery ... from the association of the residence of the claimant," i.e., the FWCIGA. There is no dispute that the AGCSF sought recovery from the FWCIGA and that the FWCIGA denied the AGCSF's claim based on the application of Florida law. The AIGA did not contend to the trial court, and it does not argue to this Court, that the FWCIGA wrongly understood or wrongly applied Florida law when it concluded that the Reliance policy was a reinsurance policy. Thus, it does not appear that the claim is one "which may be recovered under more than one insurance guaranty association," and § 27-42-12(b) is thus inapplicable.18

Also nothing in § 27-42-12(b) suggests that the legislature intended to require, as a precondition to pursuing a claim against the AIGA, that a party seek further relief (by filing a case in court, for example) if the "other guaranty association" denied the claim.19 Indeed, the imposition of such a requirement would be inconsistent with one of the purposes of the Guaranty Act, namely "to avoid excessive delay in payments." Ala.Code 1975, § 27-42-2. In short, based on the arguments presented and the facts before us, it appears that the AGCSF satisfied any obligation it had under § 27-42-12(b).

B. Is the AGCSF or the Reinsurance Trust Fund an Insurer or an Insurance Pool?

Section 27-42-5(4) of the Guaranty Act defines "covered claim" so as to exclude "any amount due any ... insurer [or] insurance pool ... as subrogation recoveries or otherwise." The AIGA argues that both the AGCSF and the Reinsurance Trust Fund are "insurers" or "insurance pools," whose claims are excluded from coverage under the Guaranty Act. We note, however, that the AIGA does not attempt to define the term "insurance pool"; it cites no legal authority in support of a specific argument relating to an "insurance pool";20 and its arguments in regard to that term consist only of conclusory statements. "We have unequivocally stated that it is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala.1994). Thus, we will not consider whether the AGCSF or the Reinsurance Trust Fund might be an "insurance pool." Instead, we will confine our analysis to whether the entities at issue are "insurers" as that term is used in the Guaranty Act. We conclude that they are not.

The Guaranty Act does not define the term "insurer." The Guaranty Act is included within Title 27, however, and § 27-1-2, Ala.Code 1975, states:

(Emphasis added.) See also Ala.Code 1975, § 27-1-2(3) (defining "person" as "[a]n individual, insurer, company, association, organization, ... partnership, syndicate, business trust, corporation, and every legal entity"). Section 27-1-2(1), Ala.Code 1975, defines "insurance" as "[a] contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or provide a specified amount or benefit upon determinable contingencies."

The broadly worded definition of "insurance" and the use of the above-emphasized restrictive language in the definition of "insurer" compel us to conclude that not all persons who enter into an "insurance" contract, i.e., who "undertake to indemnify another or provide a specified amount or benefit upon determinable contingencies," are considered "insurers" for purposes of Title 27. In other words, not all persons who contract to insure another person's obligation are "in the business of entering into contracts of insurance" for purposes of § 27-1-2(2). See Coates v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 747 So.2d 341 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (recognizing that a contract might be considered insurance for purposes of the tort of bad faith without the defendant's being subject to the provisions of Title 27). In fact, it appears that the legislature has recognized as much in regard to the type of entities involved in the present case. Section 27-4A-2(6), Ala.Code 1975, which defines "insurer" for purposes of the chapter on the Insurance Premium Tax, states that "self-insurance programs utilizing a trust fund or similar entity providing workers' compensation, health, and other insurance-like coverage shall not be included within this definition of insurer." (Emphasis added.) Compare Fla. Stat. § 624.4621(7) (providing that "[p]remiums, contributions, and assessments received by a group self-insurer's fund" under Florida's worker's compensation statutes are subject to the premium tax applicable to insurance companies, but the "tax rate shall be 1.6 percent of the gross amount of such premiums, contributions, and assessments").

Also, enforcement of Title 27, of which the Guaranty Act is a part, falls to the Department of Insurance. See Ala.Code 1975, § 27-2-7. As noted in David Parsons's affidavit, the Department of Insurance does not consider "[s]elf-insured workers' compensation groups [to be] `insurers' under the laws pertaining to insurance in the State of Alabama and these groups are not regulated by the Alabama Department of Insurance."

Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 683 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.1996); see also, e.g., Hulcher v. Taunton, 388 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Ala. 1980).

Under the circumstances presented, the Department of Insurance's interpretation that a self-insured-employer group is not an "insurer" within the meaning provided in Title 27 is a reasonable one. It certainly is not unreasonable to conclude that a group formed for the purpose of allowing its members to qualify as self-insurers under the workers' compensation law (in lieu of their having to obtain insurance from an insurance company regulated by the Department of Insurance) and that is subject to regulation by the Department of Industrial Relations, is not "in the business of entering into contracts of insurance." As this Court has recognized, self-insurance really is not insurance at all; it is "the antithesis of insurance as that term is commonly used." Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Marriott Homes, Inc., 286 Ala. 231, 232, 238 So.2d 730, 732 (1970).21

Furthermore, the conclusion that groups like the AGCSF and the Reinsurance Trust Fund are not "insurers" is consistent with the position of the framers of the model act upon which the Guaranty Act is based. As this Court has noted, the Guaranty Act "was modeled after the Post-Assessment Property and Liability Guaranty Model Act," Air Tuskegee, Ltd., 883 So.2d at 195, which was promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("the NAIC"). As the Connecticut Supreme Court observed in Doucette v. Pomes, 247 Conn. 442, 461-62, 724 A.2d 481, 491-92 (1999), a case involving the issue whether a self-insured employer was an "insurer" for purposes of Connecticut's insurance-guaranty-association act,

(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Accord Iowa Contractors, 437 N.W.2d at 916 (relying, in part, on the NAIC study committee, which "unequivocally noted the availability of insurance guaranty association fund protection if a [self-insured] group's excess carrier were to become insolvent," and concluding that such "groups are simply not `insurers' for purposes of Iowa" law). See also, e.g., MGM Mirage v. Nevada Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 209 P.3d 766, 772 (Nev.2009) (interpreting the Nevada insurance-guaranty-association act: "[B]ecause the plain meaning of `insurer' necessarily denotes a person or entity that is in the insurance business, self-insured employers are not insurers.... This conclusion is supported by a majority of jurisdictions' interpretations of their guaranty acts and is in harmony with Nevada's workers' compensation laws."); Stamp v. Department of Labor & Indus., 122 Wn.2d 536, 543-44, 859 P.2d 597, 601 (1993) ("In keeping with a majority of jurisdictions which have considered the status of self-insurers under an insurance guaranty act, we hold that employers which self-insure their workers' compensation obligations in Washington are not reinsurers, insurers, insurance pools or underwriting associations for purposes of either the Oregon guaranty act, or its nearly identical Washington counterpart.").22

Even if the Department of Insurance had taken no position on this matter, however, we note that in Schoepflin v. Tender Loving Care Corp., supra, this Court stated:

631 So.2d at 911 (quoting 43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 4 (1982) (emphasis added)). After considering the purpose of the AGCSF and the Reinsurance Trust Fund, and "the particular objects which [they have] in view," we are compelled to conclude that neither is an insurer for purposes of Title 27, including the Guaranty Act.

First, the sole purpose of the AGCSF is to facilitate self-insurance by a select group of employers who meet the requirements set forth in the bylaws.23 As noted above, self-insurance is the antithesis of insurance. See Marriott Homes, Inc., 286 Ala. at 232, 238 So.2d at 732.

Second, this Court has no basis upon which to decide that a self-insured-employer group might be considered an insurer for purposes of a part of Title 27, namely the Guaranty Act, but not for purposes of the remainder of Title 27. Such a group either is in the "business of entering into contracts of insurance," § 27-1-2(2), within the meaning of Title 27 and is thus required to meet the requirements of Title 27 governing casualty insurers, or it is not. See Ala.Code 1975, § 27-3-1(a) ("No person shall act as an insurer and no insurer shall transact insurance in this state unless so authorized by a subsisting certificate of authority issued to it by the commissioner, except as to such transactions as are expressly otherwise provided for in this title [i.e., Title 27]".); Ala.Code 1975, § 27-5-6(a)(3) (explaining that workers' compensation insurance is a type of "casualty insurance").

Further, in deciding whether a self-insured-employer group might be an insurer governed by Title 27, we cannot ignore the specific statutory scheme in the Workers' Compensation Act concerning such groups. Crawford v. Springle, 631 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala.1993) ("Where statutes in pari materia are general and specific, the more specific statute controls the more general statute."). As explained hereinafter, it is clear that to accept the AIGA's argument would turn the workers' compensation insurance scheme on its head so far as self-insured employers are concerned.

Section 25-5-8(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides that an employer who is subject to the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act may

Section 25-5-8(b), Ala.Code 1975, provides that an employer may

With respect to an employer who chooses to self-insure, § 25-5-9(a) provides that

(Emphasis added). The AGCSF is such an approved group. Section 25-5-9(b) provides that

The Reinsurance Trust Fund constitutes such a group.

The foregoing provisions clearly contemplate that, if an employer chooses to purchase insurance to cover its liability under the Workers Compensation Act, rather than self-insuring that liability, the "insurance" it will purchase for that purpose will be insurance provided by an insurer regulated by the Department of Insurance. See Ala.Code 1975, § 27-3-1(a). As to self-insured employers, however, it is equally clear that such employers and the groups contemplated by § 25-5-9(a) and (b) in order to enable employers to self-insure are regulated by the Department of Industrial Relations, see § 25-5-8(b), not the Department of Insurance.24

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the AGCSF and the Reinsurance Trust Fund25 are not "insurers" for purposes of the Guaranty Act.

C. Is the Reliance Policy a Reinsurance Policy?

The AIGA next argues that the AGCSF's claim is not a "covered claim" under the Guaranty Act because, according to the AIGA, the Reliance policy is not direct insurance, but is instead reinsurance. Specifically, the AIGA contends that the Reliance policy does not satisfy the definition of direct insurance as set forth in Alabama Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Pierce, 551 So.2d 310 (Ala.1989), and that by its terms it is instead reinsurance. We reject the AIGA's arguments.

We first observe that, for essentially the same reasons we conclude above that the AGCSF and the Reinsurance Trust Fund are not "insurers," we cannot conclude that the participation agreement issued by the AGCSF or the "policy" issued by the Reinsurance Trust Fund (to the extent the policy otherwise resembles insurance) properly could be classified as "insurance" under Title 27. See also Ala.Code 1975, § 27-4A-2 (describing such "self-insurance programs" as "insurance-like").

Second, as mentioned above, in Doucette the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that the framers of the model act on which the Guaranty Act was based indicated that a self-insured group

247 Conn. at 462, 724 A.2d at 492 (emphasis added); see also Iowa Contractors, supra.

Third, the determination whether an insurance policy is reinsurance does not depend solely on whether there is an underlying insurance policy that is being insured. Instead, the determination whether an insurance policy is reinsurance also depends on whether the insured is itself an insurer. Reinsurance is "insurance for insurance companies." 1A Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 9:1 (3d ed.2005); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1312 (8th ed.2004) (defining "reinsurance" as "[i]nsurance of all or part of one insurer's risk by a second insurer, who accepts the risk in exchange for a percentage of the original premium").

Couch on Insurance at § 9:2 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

Although the obligations of the AGCSF and the Reinsurance Trust Fund are "insurance like," and thus the relationship between them and Reliance might resemble reinsurance in some respects, the AGCSF and the Reinsurance Trust Fund are not insurers under Alabama law. Accordingly, by definition, the Reliance policy could not properly be classified as reinsurance for purposes of the Guaranty Act.26

Fourth, the AIGA wrongly reads Pierce as requiring the conclusion that insurance that is not paid to Wheeler or to M & D Power is not direct insurance. In Pierce, O.B. Pierce suffered an on-the-job injury while working for his son, Johnny Pierce, who was a vendor of the Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Company.

551 So.2d at 311.

This Court first held that the AIGA had no obligation to pay any claim against either Western Preferred Casualty Company or American Excess Underwriters, Inc., because neither of them had been licensed to transact insurance in Alabama. We reached the contrary conclusion as to Early American Insurance Company, however, and went on to consider whether its endorsement was direct insurance under the Guaranty Act:

551 So.2d at 312-13 (emphasis added).

Among other things,27 the AIGA argues that the Reliance policy does not constitute "direct insurance" because it provides indemnity coverage to the Reinsurance Trust Fund rather than coverage to the "direct insured or any third parties." Although the AIGA made the foregoing argument in its initial appellate brief, on remand it stipulated that Reliance had issued the Reliance policy "to the three members of the [Reinsurance Trust] Fund," one of whom is the AGCSF, and that the policy "provide[d] for reimbursement to the individual members of the [Reinsurance Trust] Fund for `loss paid or payable as a result of: (A) Compensation and other benefit payments required of the Reassured [Insured] by the Workers Compensation Law of any state ...'." Thus, we will consider those facts as settled between the parties.

That said, the AIGA misreads Pierce. It is true that in Pierce, the insurance was considered "direct insurance" because the proceeds of the policy were paid directly to the injured employee. It is also true that, in Pierce, if Western had been the party to directly pay the injured employee and Early American Insurance Company had merely indemnified Western, the policy under which that indemnification had been made would have constituted a policy of reinsurance. This would have been true in Pierce, however, because Western was an insurer. Here, in contrast, although Reliance did not make a payment directly to Wheeler, the entity to which it was obligated to make payment, AGCSF, was not an insurer. That obligation, therefore, is not an obligation under a reinsurance policy.

Furthermore, in Zinke-Smith, Inc. v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 304 So.2d 507 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974), the primary case upon which Pierce relied, a Florida appeals court noted that "`direct insurance' as used in the [Florida Insurance Guaranty] Act refers to an insurance contract between the insured and the insurer which has accepted the risk of a designated loss to such insured, which relationship is direct and uninterrupted by the presence of another insurer." 304 So.2d at 508 (emphasis added). As the Zinke-Smith court further recognized, even "a policy of reinsurance would, of course, be direct insurance as between the parties thereto, i.e., the insurer-reinsured on the one hand and the reinsurer on the other hand." 304 So.2d at 509 (emphasis added). The court then explained that, "as concerns the scope of the Act, the same was not intended to apply to reinsurance," because reinsurance was insurance for insurers, who were precluded from recovery under the pertinent provisions of Florida law. Id. As noted, however, the AGCSF is not an insurer. Accordingly, the Reliance policy was one of direct insurance only, not reinsurance.

Given the parties' stipulations, we conclude that the Reliance policy directly insured the AGCSF as to its risk of loss for the payment of workers' compensation claims in excess of $400,000. The AGCSF is not an insurer, and the Reliance policy was not a policy of reinsurance.28

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

1060495—AFFIRMED.

1071194—AFFIRMED.

COBB, C.J., and STUART and BOLIN, JJ., concur.

LYONS, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.

LYONS, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).

As to the main opinion's affirmance of the trial court's judgment based on its finding that the AGCSF complied with the requirements of § 27-42-12(b), Ala.Code 1975 ("Any person having a claim which may be recovered under more than one insurance guaranty association or its equivalent shall[,] ... if it is a workmen's compensation claim, ... seek recovery first from the association of the residence of the claimant."), I concur in the result.

The trial court, as one of its bases for rejecting the AIGA's contention that the AGCSF had not sufficiently complied with § 27-42-12(b) by failing to pursue litigation against the FWCIGA after receiving an unfavorable administrative determination, concluded that such a course of action would have been futile. The AIGA argues in its principal brief, without citation to authority, that the trial court "had no authority to make a de facto ruling under Florida law...." (Brief of the AIGA, at 16 n. 5.) Rule 28(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., requires an appellant to present reasoning and citation to authority in support of its argument. Because of the failure of the AIGA to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), any challenge to the rationale for the trial court's interpretation of § 27-42-12(b) as not requiring the pursuit of fruitless litigation after an adverse administrative determination has been waived. "`[W]here no legal authority is cited or argued, the effect is the same as if no argument had been made.'" Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So.2d 488, 493 (Ala.2005) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 506 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Ala. Civ.App.1987)). Moreover, as the main opinion notes, the AIGA does not contend that such further litigation would have produced a result inconsistent with the administrative determination by the FWCIGA.

In all other respects I concur in the thorough analysis of the main opinion.