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WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. INY, 2:13-cv-01561-MMD-NJK. (2014)

Court: District Court, D. Nevada Number: infdco20140626c46 Visitors: 22
Filed: Jun. 25, 2014
Latest Update: Jun. 25, 2014
Summary: ORDER (Docket No. 83) NANCY J. KOPPE, Magistrate Judge. Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Scheduling Deadlines by Ninety (90) Days. Docket No. 83. The Court has considered Plaintiff's motion and Defendants' response. 1 Docket Nos. 83, 84. I. DISCUSSION The Court has broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080 , 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). A motion to extend deadlines in the Court's scheduling order must be suppo
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ORDER (Docket No. 83)

NANCY J. KOPPE, Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Scheduling Deadlines by Ninety (90) Days. Docket No. 83. The Court has considered Plaintiff's motion and Defendants' response.1 Docket Nos. 83, 84.

I. DISCUSSION

The Court has broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). A motion to extend deadlines in the Court's scheduling order must be supported by a showing of "good cause" for the extension. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and Local Rule 26-4.2 The good cause inquiry focuses primarily on the movant's diligence. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2000). "Good cause" to extend a deadline exists "if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

Plaintiff requests that the Court extend all of the current deadlines in this case by ninety days "so as to allow the parties additional time to complete discovery." Docket No. 83, at 1. In support of its request, Plaintiff states that it "has not received any document discovery from Defendants or relevant third-party witnesses because of a series of motions to quash and motions for a protective order filed by Defendants." Id., at 2. Plaintiff reasons that an additional ninety days is an appropriate amount of time for Plaintiff "to both review and analyze the initially requested materials and conduct any additional discovery." Id., at 4.

For their part, Defendants agree that the discovery deadlines should be extended in this case, but maintain that the scheduling deadlines should only be extended by sixty days. Docket No. 84, at 4. Defendants argue that "Plaintiff does not show why an extension of . . . [ninety days] is required for the discovery remaining in this action." Id., at 3-4. Defendants reason that interrogatories and requests for production of documents have already been served, and submit that a sixty-day "extension of discovery will be sufficient to conduct the remaining discovery in this action." Id., at 4.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of demonstrating that good cause exists to extend the scheduling deadlines in this matter. Moreover, Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff's contention that the (now-resolved) disputes regarding the scope of Plaintiff's third-party subpoenas and the parties' proposed protective orders have resulted in a substantial delay of document production. Accordingly, the Court finds that an extension of ninety days is appropriate, given the fact that the production of documents from third-parties is just getting underway following the entry of a protective order in this case. See Docket No. 88.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Scheduling Deadlines (Docket No. 83) is hereby GRANTED. In order to allow the parties enough time to conduct discovery, the Court extends the current discovery deadlines by ninety days, as follows:

a. Close of Discovery: September 23, 2014 b. Last Date to File Dispositive Motions: October 23, 2014 c. Pretrial Order: November 24, 2014

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FootNotes


1. Defendants' response is titled "Defendants' Limited Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Scheduling Deadlines by Ninety (90) Days." Docket No. 84. Plaintiff did not file a reply in support of its motion.
2. The "good cause" standard outlined in Local Rule 26-4 is the same as the standard governing modification of the scheduling order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
Source:  Leagle

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