VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
Plaintiff James Alfred Hughes brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. He seeks review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), who denied his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").
Mr. Hughes was 54 years old at the time of his hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Doc. 10 at 4. He has a tenth-grade education. Tr. 196. He has no past relevant work experience, as he has not reported any earnings since 1987. Tr. 66. He claims he became disabled on April 20, 2010,
On April 20, 2010, Mr. Hughes protectively filed an application for SSI. Tr. 23. On June 25, 2010, the Commissioner initially denied his claim. Id. Mr. Hughes timely filed a written request for a hearing on July 12, 2010. Id. The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on May 24, 2011. Id. On July 8, 2011, he issued his opinion concluding Mr. Hughes was not disabled and denying him benefits. Tr. 32. Mr. Hughes timely petitioned the Appeals Council to review the decision on July 27, 2011. Tr. 17. On November 14, 2012, the Appeals Council issued a denial of review on his claim. Tr. 1.
Mr. Hughes filed a Complaint with this court on January 15, 2013, seeking review of the Commissioner's determination. Doc. 1. The Commissioner answered on April 29, 2013. Doc. 7. Mr. Hughes filed a supporting brief (doc. 10) on June 13, 2013, and the Commissioner responded with her own (doc. 11) on July 15, 2013.
The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must "scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. It is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id.
This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ's legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ's decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Id.
After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:
Tr. 23-32.
The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "This does not relieve the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding." Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Mr. Hughes urges this court to reverse the Commissioner's decision to deny him SSI on the grounds that (1) substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's RFC findings, and (2) the ALJ failed to clarify the record by either re-contacting the consultative physician or obtaining a medical expert opinion. Doc. 10 at 6-9. Neither argument is persuasive.
The ALJ determined that Mr. Hughes had the RFC to perform light work with certain restrictions. Doc. 27. In his brief, Mr. Hughes complains that the ALJ did not adequately explain how this RFC determination could accommodate all of his severe and non-severe impairments. Doc. 10 at 7. Mr. Hughes further objects that the ALJ's RFC findings "would in any event better comport with an RFC for sedentary work at best." Id. at 8. According to Mr. Hughes, "[a]s an individual of closely approaching advanced age with a limited education and no past relevant work, Medical Vocational Rule (MVR) 201.09 would apply." Id.
In response, the Commissioner ably demonstrates why Mr. Hughes's criticisms are unfounded. On the one hand, the record evidence substantially supported the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Hughes's alleged knee and shoulder arthritis were not severe. Supporting medical evidence includes the following:
The ALJ also noted that Mr. Hughes had not sought "significant medical attention for his knee or shoulders." Tr. 25. This uncontested fact also supports his RFC determination. See 20 C.F.R. 416.929(c)(3)(v) (stating ALJ may consider claimant's treatment record when evaluating his or her symptoms); Hutchinson v. Astrue, 408 F. App'x 324, 327 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (finding claimant's lack of mental health treatment supported ALJ's finding that her anxiety and depression were not severe impairments).
Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ's decision to discredit Mr. Hughes's complaints of totally-disabling pain. At his hearing, Mr. Hughes testified that his COPD, chronic back and leg pain, and vertigo rendered him functionally disabled. See Tr. 27-28, 44-53. A claimant who seeks "to establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other symptoms" must show the following:
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). An ALJ must articulate "explicit and adequate reasons" in order to discredit subjective testimony. Id. (citation omitted). Failure to do so "requires, as a matter of law, that the testimony be accepted as true." Id. (citation omitted). However, the ALJ does not need to "specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision," so long as the decision shows that the ALJ considered the claimant's medical condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
The ALJ here acknowledged that Mr. Hughes's various impairments "could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms." Tr. 28. However, the ALJ discredited Mr. Hughes's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ provided explicit and adequate reasons. He specifically highlighted the following facts in Mr. Hughes's medical record:
Tr. 28. The ALJ also emphasized that Mr. Hughes's rendition of his own daily activities undermined his case. Specifically, Mr. Hughes confirmed in disability questionnaires that he lived by himself and was able to vacuum occasionally, dust a little, wash a few dishes, fold laundry, clean parts of his apartment, drive three to five times a week, watch television, prepare simple meals for himself, and shop for groceries. Tr. 29, 148-154. The ALJ reasonably found this description to undercut Mr. Hughes's claim that his impairments totally disabled him. The court agrees. Altogether, the Commissioner has sufficiently shown that the ALJ holistically considered Mr. Hughes's condition before discrediting his pain complaints.
Social Security proceedings "are inquisitorial rather than adversarial." Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000) (plurality opinion). The ALJ thus has the duty "to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits." Id. at 111 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971)). The ALJ's "basic obligation to develop a full and fair record," Coward v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981), exists whether or not the applicant is represented. Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). When the claimant is unrepresented, however, the ALJ's duty is heightened. See Smith v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 1982). As the Commissioner notes, Mr. Hughes was legally represented in his hearing below. Doc. 9 at 14 (citing Tr. 48). Thus, the ALJ had no special duty to "scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts." Id. (quotation omitted).
The ALJ must specifically "develop the claimant's complete medical history for at least the 12 months preceding the month in which the application was filed, and to make every reasonable effort to help a claimant get medical reports from the claimant's own medical sources when permission is given." Robinson v. Astrue, 235 F. App'x 725, 727 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d)). The ALJ should re-contact medical sources when the evidence received from that source is inadequate to determine whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e). "Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
As noted above, Mr. Hughes argues that the ALJ wrongly failed to "clarify the record" by either re-contacting Dr. Vakharia or by obtaining a medical expert opinion. Doc. 10 at 8. Neither omission was reversible error. An ALJ should solicit a medical expert opinion or a consultative examination "when such an evaluation is necessary for him to make an informed decision." Reeves v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 519, 522 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). That is, such an assessment is essential when the record is otherwise underdeveloped. The court has already reviewed the analysis performed by the ALJ in this case. The ALJ did not encounter a claimant with an unexamined (or inadequately examined) collection of impairments. Rather, the ALJ confronted a "record contain[ing] sufficient evidence . . . to make an informed decision." Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Mr. Hughes — through his counsel — notably did not petition the ALJ to re-contact Dr. Vakharia at the time. Nor did he ask the ALJ to seek a medical expert opinion beyond what was already contained in the record. The ALJ therefore did not err in failing to obtain one unrequested by this represented claimant.
Based upon the court's evaluation of the evidence in the record and the parties' submissions, the court finds that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and that she applied proper legal standards in arriving at it. Accordingly, the court will affirm the decision by separate order.