CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Arlean Moses ("Moses") applied for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., alleging that she was unable to work because of a disability. Her application was denied at the initial administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the claim. The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ's decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the person is unable to
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11
The standard of review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one. This court must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11
Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11
The ALJ found that Moses had the residual functional capacity to perform light work "involving on (sic) occasionally climbing of ramps and stairs but never climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and avoiding unprotected heights and hazardous machinery or involving more than simple instructions and simple 1 and 2 step tasks. She is capable of sustaining concentration for 2 hours with normal breaks involving only infrequent contact with the general public." (R. 16). The ALJ concluded that Moses could not return to her past relevant work, (R. 20), but relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, determined that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform. (R. 21). Consequently, the ALJ concluded that she was not disabled. (Id.).
(Pl's Br., Doc. # 11 at 1).
The plaintiff raises several issues and arguments related to this court's ultimate inquiry of whether the Commissioner's disability decision is supported by the proper legal standards and substantial evidence. See Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622 (11
After setting forth his residual functional capacity conclusion, the ALJ launches into a description of the medical evidence of record. (R. at 13-20). As a prelude to this descriptive exercise, the ALJ recites that he
(R. at 16)
In the midst of the recitation of the medical evidence, the ALJ says this:
The problem for the court is that, beyond the recitation of some of the medical evidence, without explaining what specific evidence the ALJ relies on, what weight the ALJ gives the evidence and why he relies on some evidence but not other evidence, the court is unable to determine upon which evidence the ALJ actually relies to reach his conclusion that Moses is not disabled. For example, although the record is replete with references to Moses' Graves' disease and concomitant hyperthyroidism and hypothyroidism, the ALJ does not consider the effect of this impairment on Moses' ability to work.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to suggest that Moses suffers from lumbar radiculopathy and cervical radiculopathy which the ALJ does not mention. (R. 593-94, 557-58) While the ALJ mentions Moses' plantar fasciitis, he finds that "there is no indication that this impairment causes significant loss of function." (R. 19). It is undisputed that Moses suffers from recurrent and chronic plantar fasciitis. (R. 424-429, 714, 776-78). Even if the ALJ concludes that these conditions that are not severe impairments, he must still consider every impairment alleged by the plaintiff and determine whether the alleged impairments are sufficiently severe — either singularly or in combination — to create a disability. See Gibson v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 619, 623 (11
An ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical evidence and the reasons therefor. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11
The Commissioner argues that because the ALJ found that Moses could perform light work, "implicit in this finding was that Plaintiff had no limitations on the use of her arms and hands and could stand or walk for six hours and sit for two hours each in an eight-hour workday." (Mem. in Supp. of Comm'r's Dec., doc. # 17, at 13). The Commissioner's argument is purely speculative. Neither the Commissioner nor the court can ascertain from the ALJ's decision what consideration, if any, the ALJ gave to the effect of Moses' Graves' disease or carpal tunnel syndrome on her ability to work.
The Commissioner says any error was harmless because the vocational expert testified that light work can be performed either standing or sitting. The problem with the Commissioner's position is that because the ALJ did not delineate what evidence he considered, it is impossible for the court to determine whether the vocational expert considered all of the plaintiff's impairments when testifying about her abilities. The ALJ determined that Moses has the residual functional capacity to perform light work which involves occasionally climbing ramps, and stairs, while avoiding unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. (R. 16). Unfortunately, the ALJ makes no more specific findings regarding Moses's residual functional capacity taking into consideration the effect of her plantar fasciitis and radiculopathy on her ability to stand and walk, or the effect of her carpal tunnel syndrome on her ability to lift, reach, handle or carry. Consequently, because the court is unable to determine what evidence the ALJ relied upon to reach his decision, the court is unable to determine whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence.
"Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits." Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-111 (2000).
Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11
For these reasons, the court concludes that the Commissioner erred as a matter of law, and that the case should be remanded for further proceedings. In this case, it is clear that the ALJ failed to fulfill his responsibilities with respect to evaluating all the evidence of the plaintiff's impairments in combination. Thus, the court is unable to determine whether the ALJ's residual functional capacity determination is supported by substantial evidence, and doubt is necessarily cast upon the ALJ's conclusion that the plaintiff is not disabled. And, since this case must be remanded, the plaintiff will have an opportunity to present updated evidence to the ALJ, including the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council.
Accordingly, this case will be reversed and remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is further
ORDERED that, in accordance with Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1278 fn. 2 (11